← Back to Library

The peace that guarantees war

Claire Berlinski delivers a chilling diagnosis of a potential geopolitical catastrophe, arguing that a leaked twenty-eight-point "peace plan" is not a path to stability but a blueprint for Russia's rearmament and a future, more devastating war. She contends that the document, which the administration is now backing, effectively rewards aggression while forcing the victim to disarm, creating a vacuum that history suggests will be filled by renewed violence. For the busy reader, the urgency lies in her claim that this is not a negotiation but a surrender instrument that ignores the brutal reality of Russian strategic culture.

The Architecture of Surrender

Berlinski frames the proposed agreement not as a compromise but as a fundamental betrayal of allied security. She writes, "It is not a peace plan. It is not even an armistice plan. It is a Russian rearmament plan, and its adoption would mark the most craven betrayal of an allied nation since the 1930s." This comparison to the 1930s is not hyperbole in her view; it is a direct echo of the Munich Agreement, where territorial concessions to an aggressor were mistaken for a guarantee of peace, only to embolden further expansion. The core of her argument rests on the specific terms: Russia retains Crimea and the industrial heartlands of Donetsk and Luhansk, while Ukraine is barred from NATO and forced to gut its own military.

The peace that guarantees war

The author emphasizes that the plan grants Moscow the one resource it desperately lacked during its stalled 2022 offensive: time. "Russia will not be required to shed any of its allies nor reduce any aspect of its military force," Berlinski notes, pointing out that while Ukraine must demobilize, the aggressor remains fully armed. This asymmetry is the crux of the danger. She argues that the plan demands Ukraine "accept, without resistance, its own mutilation, the abnegation of its security, and the certainty—yes, certainty—of renewed Russian attack once Moscow has rebuilt its forces." Critics might argue that a frozen conflict is preferable to continued bloodshed, but Berlinski counters that freezing the front lines without security guarantees merely pauses the clock for the next invasion.

Treaties and guarantees are not imbued with some metaphysical force. They function only insofar as the signatories believe that breaking them carries a cost greater than the benefit of the violation.

The Illusion of Enforcement

A significant portion of Berlinski's critique targets the enforcement mechanisms, or lack thereof, within the draft. She highlights the absurdity of a clause stating, "It is expected... that Russia will not invade neighboring countries," noting the absence of any definition of who holds this expectation or what happens if they are wrong. The plan suggests a "joint American-Russian working group" to ensure compliance, a structure that excludes Ukraine entirely. Berlinski finds this particularly galling, writing, "Who will ensure compliance with the agreement? 'A joint American-Russian working group.' Ukraine is not invited."

She draws a sharp parallel to the Minsk agreements, which were similarly used by Moscow to buy time and rearm separatist forces before launching a full-scale invasion. "Since 1994, Russia has violated every agreement involving Ukraine it has signed," she asserts, listing the Budapest Memorandum, the INF Treaty, and various ceasefires as evidence of a pattern where Moscow treats accords as tactical tools rather than binding commitments. The author argues that the plan offers no real cost for violation, stating, "Nothing in this plan imposes costs on Moscow for breaking its word—for invading its peaceful neighbor; slaughtering its civilians..." This lack of consequence, she warns, makes the guarantee of non-aggression worthless.

The Human and Strategic Cost

Berlinski does not shy away from the human toll, insisting that the plan demands a country that has buried tens of thousands of citizens to accept its own dismemberment. She details the provisions for war criminals to receive unconditional amnesty and the requirement for Ukraine to outlaw undefined "Nazi ideology," a term she notes Putin uses to delegitimize the entire Ukrainian government. "The most depraved war crimes Europe has seen since Hitler? Forgive and forget. Good question," she writes, questioning the moral logic of such a concession.

Furthermore, she exposes the economic dimensions of the plan, which would unfreeze roughly $300 billion in Russian assets and require Europe to contribute significantly more to Ukraine's reconstruction than Russia itself. "The EU will contribute another US$100 billion to this fund—meaning that Europe will pay more in reparations for Russia's invasion of Ukraine than Russia," Berlinski points out. She also highlights the potential for a new alliance against China, suggesting the plan may include a "Christian alliance" demagoguery to lure the administration into a broader geopolitical pivot. The author suggests the document was translated from Russian, citing errors like spelling Kherson "Kherzon," as proof of its origins. "I am absolutely certain that this is a Russian, not a jointly-developed, proposal," she concludes.

Bottom Line

Berlinski's most powerful argument is that this "peace" is a strategic trap designed to guarantee a future war, leveraging the administration's desire for a quick resolution to dismantle Ukraine's defenses. While the urgency of ending the conflict is undeniable, the piece's greatest vulnerability lies in its absolute dismissal of any diplomatic off-ramp, potentially closing doors to negotiations that could save lives in the immediate term. However, the historical evidence she marshals regarding Russia's track record of treaty violations provides a sobering warning: without enforceable costs for aggression, any agreement is merely a pause in the violence.

Deep Dives

Explore these related deep dives:

  • Munich Agreement

    The article explicitly references 'the most craven betrayal of an allied nation since the 1930s' - the Munich Agreement is the defining example of appeasement policy that emboldened Hitler and led to WWII. Understanding this historical parallel illuminates the author's core argument about the dangers of territorial concessions to aggressive powers.

  • Minsk agreements

    The proposed peace plan mirrors the failed Minsk agreements (2014-2015) which attempted to freeze the Donbas conflict. Understanding how those earlier agreements were structured, violated, and ultimately collapsed provides essential context for evaluating why critics see this new plan as similarly doomed.

Sources

The peace that guarantees war

There are moments when a nation must decide whether it wishes to see or to will its own blindness. This is one of them. The 28-point “peace plan” for Ukraine—leaked in outline, circulating Washington now with a surreal air of normalcy—would be the most consequential document produced by an American politician in decades, except that it was clearly written by a Russian. It is not a peace plan. It is not even an armistice plan. It is a Russian rearmament plan, and its adoption would mark the most craven betrayal of an allied nation since the 1930s.

To anyone with even a cursory knowledge of Russian strategic culture, twentieth-century European history, or the mechanics of deterrence, it’s obvious that this instrument contains the seeds of a much greater conflagration—one that will not spare the United States. Yet there’s been almost no public outcry in America, further evidence that we have lost the capacity to grasp the scale of the danger gathering on the horizon.

Let me attempt to restore that sense of scale. The essential features of the plan are now clear. Russia keeps Crimea, with its water, land, and rail logistics secured. Ukraine cedes all of Donetsk and Luhansk—with their industry, manpower, and mining—and gives Moscow a fortified land bridge to Crimea. The remaining front lines would be frozen in place. Kyiv would hand over a vast swathe of territory it now controls, territory that Russia has been unable to conquer despite four years of war, four years in which wave after wave of Russian men have been mown down, shredded up, and left to rot in no-man’s-land. It puts immediate demobilization pressure on Ukraine. Above all, Russia gets the single most important resource it now lacks: time.

This plan is exactly what Russia was hoping for in 2022, when its offensive stalled. Ukraine will be permanently barred from joining NATO; NATO will be barred from further expansion. Ukraine will be required to gut its armed forces. It will not be allowed to possess weapons that could reach Russia. Russia will not be required to shed any of its allies nor reduce any aspect of its military force. No Western troops or long-term deployments will be allowed—ever—on Ukrainian soil, even though only last month, encouraged by Trump, Europeans agreed that in the event of a truce, they would send troops to secure it, and Trump grandly offered to provide ...