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Monopoly without market, subsidies without subscribers: Guo quanzhong on state media

Zichen Wang delivers a brutal autopsy of China's state media, arguing that the sector is not merely struggling but has already collapsed under the weight of its own institutional contradictions. The piece's most startling claim is that the massive subsidies propping up these outlets are not a lifeline but a symptom of a business model that no longer exists, leaving the state to pay for a monopoly without a market. This is essential listening for anyone trying to understand how information flows in the world's second-largest economy, where the gap between official messaging and public attention has become an unbridgeable chasm.

The Illusion of Connection

Wang begins by dismantling the comforting myth that state media still commands a loyal audience. He writes, "The primary reason mainstream media have fallen into systemic difficulty is the failure of user connection. It is no exaggeration to say that mainstream media today lack a sizeable user base and have effectively been abandoned by their audiences." This is a stark admission from within the system, one that rejects the usual narrative of external interference in favor of internal obsolescence.

Monopoly without market, subsidies without subscribers: Guo quanzhong on state media

The author draws a sharp distinction between having followers on a platform and actually owning a user base. As Wang puts it, "Followers of mainstream media on internet platforms belong to the platforms, not to the mainstream media themselves." He argues that while state outlets may boast millions of followers on WeChat or Douyin, they possess none of the data or leverage that comes with true ownership. This reframing is critical: it suggests that the administration's push for "systemic transformation" is fighting a battle against a reality where the audience has already voted with their attention. Critics might argue that state media still holds unique authority in times of crisis, but Wang's data suggests that even that authority is eroding as the public retreats to private, algorithm-driven ecosystems.

The concept of the "user" is a personalised and data-driven notion... Internet platforms, leveraging strong technological capacity and sophisticated user operation mechanisms, have acquired hundreds of millions of users.

The Economic Cliff

The financial argument is where Wang's analysis becomes most devastating. He traces the collapse of the traditional "secondary sales" model—selling content to audiences and then selling that audience to advertisers—not as a slow decline, but as a structural implosion. "The once-effective 'secondary sales' business model has completely collapsed," Wang writes, noting that advertising follows distribution channels, not content quality. This is a fundamental shift that the state media establishment has struggled to accept.

The evidence is in the numbers. Wang points out that in 2023, fiscal subsidies for broadcasting and television nearly doubled their advertising revenue, reaching nearly 100 billion yuan against just 58 billion in ad sales. "Without such subsidies, most broadcasting and television outlets nationwide would struggle to survive," he notes. This creates a bizarre dynamic where the state is essentially paying to keep its own megaphones running, while the actual market for information has migrated entirely to private tech giants. The historical parallel is striking: just as print circulation in the early 2000s failed to predict the speed of digital displacement, today's state media is clinging to a "resource-based development" model that the internet has rendered obsolete.

Wang highlights the futility of the current approach: "Many mainstream media professionals still fail to grasp the fundamental relationship between advertising, content, and distribution channels. Some still harbour the illusion that producing high-quality journalism can help them win back advertising revenue." This illusion is dangerous because it masks the reality that the monopoly on distribution—the true source of their past wealth—is gone. The administration's recent calls for "systemic transformation" may be too little, too late, as the very resources these outlets relied upon (licenses, frequencies, ISBNs) have lost their scarcity value.

The Institutional Trap

Perhaps the most profound insight Wang offers is that the problem is not just technological, but deeply political and structural. State media in China operates under a "triple identity" as state agencies, public institutions, and enterprises, a hybrid that Wang argues is incompatible with the speed and risk-taking required for digital survival. "Purely market-oriented internet media require a privately led institutional and operational mechanism," he asserts, listing the need for rapid decision-making, flexible capital, and high-risk incentives.

The state-owned model, by contrast, is bogged down by wage caps, lengthy approval processes, and a culture of risk aversion. Wang writes, "Leadership teams often lack sufficient incentives; their innovation awareness is weak, while risk aversion is strong." This creates a paradox: the executive branch demands that these outlets transform into modern, competitive digital platforms, yet the very rules that govern them prevent them from acting like modern, competitive businesses. The result is a sector that is overstaffed, underfunded in terms of technology, and disconnected from the users it is supposed to serve.

The root cause of mainstream media's deep crisis lies in the failure of user connection, and the fundamental solution lies in rebuilding that connection.

Critics might suggest that the state's goal is not profitability but ideological control, rendering market metrics irrelevant. However, Wang's analysis suggests that without a viable economic model, even ideological control becomes unsustainable. If the audience is not listening, the message is lost, regardless of the budget behind it.

Bottom Line

Wang's most compelling argument is that China's state media is trapped in a "monopoly without market," sustained only by the very government that is trying to reform it. The strongest part of his case is the unflinching data showing that subsidies have become the primary revenue source, effectively nationalizing the cost of a failed business model. The biggest vulnerability in the administration's current strategy is the belief that "systemic transformation" can be mandated from the top down without fundamentally altering the institutional constraints that make such transformation impossible. The reader should watch for whether the state will eventually accept that its media arm is no longer a market player, but a purely subsidized public utility, or if it will continue to chase a digital ghost that has already moved on.

Deep Dives

Explore these related deep dives:

  • Print circulation

    Explains the traditional 'secondary sales' business model referenced in the article, where newspapers sold audiences to advertisers, and why this model collapsed globally with the rise of digital platforms

  • Platform economy

    Illuminates the fundamental shift Guo describes where platforms like WeChat, Weibo, and Douyin captured user loyalty and data, explaining why followers on platforms don't translate to owned audiences for traditional media

Sources

Monopoly without market, subsidies without subscribers: Guo quanzhong on state media

by Zichen Wang · Pekingnology · Read full article

The buzzword in China’s state media industry now is 系统性变革 systemic transformation, a full year after the word was included in the Resolution of the 3rd Plenum of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on further deepening reform comprehensively to advance Chinese modernization

We will improve the spokesperson system, develop content production and communication mechanisms as well as assessment systems for all forms of media, and promote a systemic transformation in mainstream media.

Why is a systemic transformation necessary? Because the situation is dire.

Listen to Guo Quanzhong, Professor at the School of Journalism & Communication, Minzu University of China and formerly Board Secretary and Director of the Investment Advisory Department at China Press and Publishing Media Group, and Deputy Director of the Strategic Operations Department at Nanfang Media Group in Guangdong Province.

Guo has launched a brisk WeChat series skewering the transformation of China’s mainstream outlets—state-owned newspapers and broadcasters under various tiers of government—which, for all their privileges in licences and fiscal subsidies, command scant loyalty. Meanwhile, platforms such as WeChat, Weibo, and Douyin have become the country’s most popular and lucrative purveyors of information.

The culprit, he argues, is both institutional constraint and the internet’s steady gravitational pull. Audiences have migrated to platforms; the platforms, not news outlets, own the users’ loyalty. Advertising, in turn, follows distribution rather than reportage.

He also punctures a cherished newsroom conceit: content is a necessity, but news is not. News is a narrow, perishable slice of content, whereas entertainment, knowledge, and services are what he believes win wallets. Add overstaffed newsrooms, thin reporting, and low technical capacity, and the mainstream media’s business model collapses.

Below are selections from Guo’s series of short posts on his personal WeChat account, 全中看传媒.

—Yuxuan Jia

主流媒体系统性变革系列谈.

Series on the Systemic Transformation of Mainstream Media.

主流媒体系统性变革系列谈之7:用户连接失效.

No. 7 The Failure of User Connection.

The primary reason mainstream media have fallen into systemic difficulty is the failure of user connection. It is no exaggeration to say that mainstream media today lack a sizeable user base and have effectively been abandoned by their audiences.

1. Mainstream media have neither users nor audiences.

The traditional audience base that mainstream media relied upon for survival has completely migrated to the internet, resulting in a near-total loss of traditional readership and viewership. In other words, the once-loyal groups of readers, viewers, and listeners have now fully transitioned to ...