The Liberal Dilemma Over National Identity
A philosophical essay that refuses the easy comfort of dismissing nationalism as mere pathology. Cyril Hédoin forces public reason liberalism to confront what nineteenth-century thinkers hoped would vanish: nationalist sentiment as a permanent feature of modern politics, not a relic.
The Cosmopolitan Mistake
Early liberals believed nationalism would fade with economic and cultural progress. They treated it as tribal residue, destined to disappear alongside archaic myths and religion. History proved them wrong. Nationalism fueled two world wars and now drives populist success across Western democracies.
Cyril Hédoin writes, "if political morality (the morality that underlies political actions and institutions, that is in relation to the use of coercion in the organization of society) is social, then this stance is mistaken and wrong." The moralistic cosmopolitan position fails not just on normative grounds but on descriptive ones—it cannot explain what actually motivates political behavior.
The Rawlsian framework treats national identity as a "comprehensive doctrine" that cannot justify coercive laws. As the companion deep dive on John Rawls clarifies, Rawlsian public reason demands principles compatible with multiple moral and religious beliefs. Nationalist reasons, on this view, must not reject liberal justice principles recognizing equal rights and fair opportunities for everyone.
Cyril Hédoin notes, "the Rawlsian version of public reason liberalism is largely inimical to nationalism." Discriminatory laws against foreign workers get labeled "unreasonable" and excluded from the overlapping consensus. Critics might note this creates a sectarian liberalism that disqualifies non-rational considerations from the start—a prejudice inherited from Enlightenment rationalism.
"The problem with nationalism is not that it supports illegitimate or unreasonable views, but that it nowadays tends to become, in some part of the population, a 'narrow identity' that trumps all other considerations."
Intelligible Reasons Over Preconceived Principles
Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier defend a more open conception. Cyril Hédoin writes, "Rather than disqualifying from the start reasons that don't fit with some preconceived liberal principles, they only require that public justification proceed based on mutually intelligible reasons."
This makes public reason far more friendly to religious and nationalist views. You can disagree with someone claiming foreign workers "steal" jobs from nationals, but the reasoning is intelligible and open to deliberation. A nationalist could argue their reasoning treats everyone equally by granting priority to everyone in their country.
The risk: more diverse reasons in public deliberation mean less agreement on common laws. The chances someone has a "defeater"—an intelligible reason that decisively rejects a law—increase dramatically.
Manent's Distinction: Identity Versus Political Community
Pierre Manent argues democracy must take place within the national body. The nation emerged as a substitute for religion, offering the indivisible whole where political sovereignty can be grounded. His target is what he sees as the fiction of a European democratic political union.
Cyril Hédoin draws on Manent's distinction between two expressions of nationalism: as identity and as political community. The former addresses what reasons can legitimately justify coercive laws. The latter asks who counts as "members of the public"—who has a say in deliberation.
Viewed as identity, national identity is only one among many. Cyril Hédoin writes, "There is nothing that justifies giving it special treatment over others." Public reason liberals are right that beliefs tied to nationality should not be excluded from public justification. But no moral or anthropological argument establishes national identity as more important than religious or supranational identity.
The companion deep dive on Pierre Manent explores his illiberal conception of democratic legitimacy. Yet Manent's distinction remains useful even when his conclusions are rejected.
Viewed as political community, strict nationalism entails non-nationals' reasons are totally irrelevant for justifying coercive laws—even if they live on national territory and are directly affected by force. This national sectarianism is hardly acceptable. Nationalists' most consistent stance is then to forbid entry to non-nationals.
Critics might note this creates a paradox: closing borders undermines diversity and dynamism that nationals themselves could invoke as reasons to partially open borders. But welcoming non-nationals means they must figure as members of the public.
The Delimitation Problem
Two extreme views exist on who deserves justification. The restrictive view: justification is only due to individuals directly or potentially coerced by political authorities. This circles back to closing frontiers. The extensive view: justification is due to everyone indirectly affected by coercive decisions. This vindicates cosmopolitanism—all living and future human beings are members of a "global public."
Cyril Hédoin writes, "none of them is clearly superior to the other, this suggests that the identification of the members of the public is open to a myriad of considerations and contingencies and that neither 'nationality' nor 'humanity' is automatically the right delimiting criterion."
Manent's quasi-anthropological claim that the nation is the only appropriate democratic body is doubtful. Nations are not pure and immutable essences. Central Europe's history from the Holy Roman Empire onward shows nationalities and national identities are historically variable entities responding to many contingencies, including political decisions.
European Integration and the Future
This bears directly on the European Union. Nationalists and European skeptics endorse Manent's argument. Proponents of federal Europe have committed the same error as nineteenth-century liberals: dismissing nationalist concerns.
Cyril Hédoin writes, "Nationalist considerations are legitimate, and, from a liberal and federalist perspective, one could even argue that national 'loyalties' are needed to prevent excessive centralization." But national identities are not the only relevant identity-based considerations. A European identity can also provide such considerations, especially in the current geopolitical context.
There is no decisive argument against the possibility of a European political community where public membership transcends national borders. This community is not given and must be patiently constructed. Cyril Hédoin concludes, "public reason doesn't stop at national borders."
Critics might note this patient construction has been ongoing for decades with mixed results—national loyalties remain far more potent than European ones in actual political behavior. The philosophical possibility does not guarantee the political reality.
Bottom Line
Hédoin refuses both cosmopolitan dismissal and nationalist triumphalism. Nationalist reasons are intelligible and should not be excluded from public deliberation—but neither should they be privileged. The delimitation of "the public" remains open, contingent, and historically variable. Public reason liberalism must accommodate nationalist considerations without surrendering to them.