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The beginning of the end of the ukraine-russia war

Niall Ferguson cuts through the noise of diplomatic theater to argue that the Ukraine-Russia war is finally approaching its terminus, not through a decisive battlefield victory, but through the grinding exhaustion of both sides and the sharp pivot of American leverage. While Western media fixates on the optics of a potential "sellout," Ferguson marshals historical data and battlefield realities to suggest that the current 28-point proposal, however flawed, represents the only viable path to stopping the bleeding. This is a sobering assessment for a public weary of endless conflict, one that demands we look past the headlines of leaks and deadlines to the stark arithmetic of survival.

The Long Shadow of History

Ferguson immediately dismantles the expectation of a quick resolution by anchoring the current crisis in the slow, painful rhythms of past conflicts. He writes, "Wars are quick to start, and—unless one side achieves decisive victory on the battlefield—slow to end." This framing is essential; it corrects the public's impatience by reminding us that the time between President Woodrow Wilson's December 1916 peace note and the end of World War I was nearly two years, while the Korean armistice negotiations dragged on for over two years. Ferguson uses this historical weight to explain why the administration's "Thanksgiving deadline" was always a rhetorical device rather than a binding constraint. As he notes, "I've had a lot of deadlines, but if things are working well, you tend to extend the deadlines. You also tend to extend them when things are not working well."

The beginning of the end of the ukraine-russia war

The author's skepticism regarding "instant pacification" is grounded in a consistent record of warning that Ukraine could not win a protracted war without collapsing economically. He argues that the Biden administration made a strategic error by "protract[ing] the war by urging a counteroffensive while slow-walking aid," missing a window to end the conflict when Ukraine was strongest. Now, the executive branch is pushing a "peace through strength" doctrine that prioritizes a negotiated settlement over total military victory. Critics might argue that this historical analogy ignores the unique nuclear stakes of the 21st century, which could accelerate a collapse rather than prolong a stalemate, but Ferguson's point about the inertia of war remains compelling.

Wars are quick to start, and—unless one side achieves decisive victory on the battlefield—slow to end.

The Anatomy of a Flawed Peace

The core of Ferguson's analysis lies in his dissection of the leaked 28-point plan. He admits, "I do not much like the 28-point draft ceasefire agreement. It is not difficult to pick holes in it." Yet, he insists that as a starting point, it offers critical protections that were absent in early 2022 negotiations. The document ostensibly confirms Ukraine's sovereignty and envisions a "total and complete non-aggression agreement" between Russia, Ukraine, and Europe. Perhaps most significantly, it promises "robust security guarantees," threatening that if Russia invades again, "all global sanctions [would] be restored, [and] recognition for the new territory and all other benefits from this agreement [would] be withdrawn."

However, the cost of this stability is steep. Ferguson details the painful concessions: Ukraine would have to cap its military at 600,000, accept no NATO troops on its soil, and recognize Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk as "de facto Russian." The plan even suggests a "joint U.S.-Russia Security task force" and the reintegration of Russia into the global economy. Ferguson points out a stark shift in Russian thinking, noting that in April 2022, Moscow demanded an 85,000 cap on Ukrainian troops and the end of all Western military cooperation. "It is astonishing that, this time around, media coverage did not lead with Russian acceptance of a security guarantee for Ukraine," he writes, highlighting that Russia's core war aim was the elimination of Ukraine as an independent state.

The human toll of these negotiations cannot be overstated. While diplomats haggle over borders, the air war against civilians continues unabated. Ferguson notes that "last Wednesday, a missile strike killed at least 39 people in Ternopil," and nightly barrages are eroding morale. He argues that Ukraine's counter-strikes on Russian energy infrastructure may be the very reason Moscow is now serious about a ceasefire. "If you are looking for another reason why the Russians might be serious about a compromise peace—or at least a ceasefire—look no further," he suggests, pointing to the economic strangulation caused by new sanctions on Russian oil firms and Chinese buyers.

The Agony of Choice

The piece culminates in a heartbreaking assessment of President Volodymyr Zelensky's position. Ferguson captures the essence of the dilemma: "either the loss of our dignity or the risk of losing a key partner." He interprets Zelensky's public admission that "any metal, even the strongest, can give way" as a tacit acknowledgment that the war cannot be sustained much longer. The revised 19-point plan, reportedly stripped of some hardline territorial clauses, still leaves the fate of disputed lands to a future meeting, creating a precarious limbo.

Ferguson warns that the current strategy of trying to "improve the terms of the deal" runs the risk of "scuttling it altogether with the Russians." He revisits his seven questions from the war's first month, noting that while Russia did not take Kyiv, they are advancing incrementally through grinding tactics that exploit Ukrainian drone vulnerabilities. The domestic political landscape in Ukraine is also fracturing, with the "Operation Midas" corruption probe shaking the government and threatening to destabilize the front just as negotiations heat up. Ferguson's analysis suggests that the window for a deal is closing, not because of a lack of will, but because the material reality of the war has shifted against Kyiv.

Critics might argue that Ferguson underestimates the moral hazard of rewarding aggression with territorial recognition, potentially setting a dangerous precedent for future conflicts. Yet, his argument rests on the pragmatic reality that a "decisive victory" is no longer on the table for either side, and the alternative to a flawed peace is continued slaughter.

Yes, we are made of steel. But any metal, even the strongest, can give way.

Bottom Line

Ferguson's strongest contribution is his refusal to romanticize the path to peace, forcing readers to confront the brutal trade-offs between territorial integrity and the cessation of mass death. The argument's greatest vulnerability lies in its reliance on the assumption that the Russian leadership will honor security guarantees once sanctions are lifted—a historical gamble with high stakes. The reader must now watch whether the revised terms can satisfy Kyiv's need for dignity without triggering a total collapse of the negotiation framework.

Deep Dives

Explore these related deep dives:

  • Paris Peace Conference (1919–1920)

    Ferguson explicitly cites the duration between Wilson's 1916 peace note and WWI's end as historical precedent for how long peace negotiations take. The Paris Peace Conference shaped the post-WWI order and offers lessons about the complexities of multilateral peacemaking that directly inform the Ukraine situation.

  • Korean Armistice Agreement

    Ferguson specifically mentions the Korean armistice negotiations lasting over two years as a parallel to current Ukraine talks. This agreement created a ceasefire without a peace treaty—a model that may be relevant to Ukraine—and the Korean DMZ offers a concrete example of 'frozen conflict' buffer zones.

Sources

The beginning of the end of the ukraine-russia war

Servicemen of the 808th Dniester Separate Support Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces work beside an explosive hazard-clearance machine during demining operations on a liberated territory in Kherson region, Ukraine, on November 22, 2025. (Dmytro Smolienko/Ukrinform/NurPhoto via Getty Images).

And so the familiar rituals of peacemaking resume. The president of the United States seeks to broker a ceasefire between two warring countries. A document, intended to be used as a starting point, is partially leaked by one side, then wholly leaked by the other side. There is controversy in the press about its provenance and significance.

The negotiators gather in a neutral location. Although there are only two combatant countries, there turn out to be many others with skin in the game. While the diplomacy continues, so does the war, each side seeking to gain leverage from military pressure.

And on it goes. And on. President Donald Trump originally set a Thanksgiving deadline (tomorrow) for Ukraine to accept a new 28-point plan for peace with Russia. A high-level U.S. delegation met with Ukrainian representatives in Geneva over the weekend to delete some of the 28 points and revise some of the others, before meeting with Russian spokesmen early this week in Abu Dhabi. However, as Trump admitted last week, the Thanksgiving deadline was never a hard one: “I’ve had a lot of deadlines, but if things are working well, you tend to extend the deadlines.” You also tend to extend them when things are not working well.

Wars are quick to start, and—unless one side achieves decisive victory on the battlefield—slow to end. The time between President Woodrow Wilson’s December 1916 peace note to the combatant powers and the end of World War I was one year, 10 months, and 25 days. The duration of the Korean armistice negotiations was two years and 17 days. Henry Kissinger’s negotiations to end the Vietnam War took three years, five months, and 24 days—and failed to secure a lasting peace between North and South Vietnam. A ceasefire was reached in the Yom Kippur War on October 25, 1973. But the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty took until March 26, 1979—five years, five months, and one day later.

This history explains why I have always treated President Trump’s promises of instant pacification in Eastern Europe with skepticism.

My position on this war has been consistent. In January 2022, I warned that war was coming. When it ...