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The Iran stalemate

Niall Ferguson arrives with a chilling correction to our collective memory: wars do not end when the news cycle says they do. In this piece, he dismantles the comforting illusion that a ceasefire in the Strait of Hormuz equates to peace, arguing instead that we are witnessing a dangerous, slow-burning stalemate where economic pain is merely being redistributed rather than resolved. For the busy reader tracking global stability, the critical insight here is not the latest headline, but the terrifying timeline Ferguson constructs for a supply chain collapse that could trigger stagflation within months.

The Illusion of the Ceasefire

Ferguson begins by invoking the historian's paradox of time, noting that while financial crises move slowly before exploding, wars start fast and linger forever. He applies this lens to the current conflict, which he terms "Operation Epic Fury," launched in late February. Despite a ceasefire announced in early April, Ferguson argues the reality on the ground tells a different story. He writes, "A ceasefire is not a peace agreement," immediately grounding the reader in the precarious nature of the current truce. The evidence he marshals is stark: within days of the truce, Iranian drones struck the United Arab Emirates and swarmed U.S. ships, prompting the U.S. to sink six Iranian fast-attack boats. "The ceasefire was literally over," Ferguson states, stripping away the diplomatic fog.

The Iran stalemate

The author contrasts the diplomatic style of the past with the present, noting that while President Dwight Eisenhower practiced "brinkmanship," the current administration prefers "blinkmanship." This distinction is crucial to understanding the volatility. Ferguson describes how the executive branch paused "Project Freedom," a quasi-escort mission for commercial shipping, citing a request from Pakistan and claiming "Great Progress has been made toward a Complete and Final Agreement." Yet, he highlights the threat lurking behind the diplomacy: "If they don't agree, the bombing starts, and it will be, sadly, at a much higher level and intensity than it was before." This oscillation between negotiation and threat creates a state of perpetual uncertainty that is far more damaging to global markets than open warfare.

Wars take much less time to start than you think they will, and last much longer than you thought they could.

Ferguson's skepticism is well-placed. He draws a historical parallel to Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points in 1918, which were supposed to end World War I but were followed by another ten months of fighting. He warns that the current "one-page, 14-point memorandum of understanding" is merely a starting gun for further negotiations, not a finish line. The terms, according to leaks, involve an Iranian moratorium on nuclear enrichment, but the duration remains undefined—five years? Twenty? "If the Iranians make these concessions, I shall be flabbergasted," Ferguson admits, offering a dinner to the negotiators if he is proven wrong. This bet underscores the sheer improbability of the current diplomatic breakthrough.

The Economics of Attrition

The piece shifts to the brutal arithmetic of economic warfare, a theme Ferguson has explored in his companion deep dives on historical operations like Project Azorian. He argues that economic pressure is even slower to act than kinetic force. "The problem with economic warfare is that it is even more slow-acting than actual war," he writes. He cites the sanctions on Russia, which were expected to cripple the war machine but instead proved to be "maybe a 3" on the Richter scale of sanctions. The lesson is clear: no state can inflict pain on an adversary's economy without spilling that pain onto its own.

Ferguson dives into the data, projecting that Iran has roughly $26.2 billion in reserves, which could be exhausted in six to 14 months given the blockade. However, he identifies four critical "pressure valves" that prevent immediate collapse. Iran can bypass the sea blockade via land and air routes, barter oil for food, and utilize a burgeoning cryptocurrency sector developed over the last five years. Furthermore, the author notes that China is almost certainly providing both economic and military support. "There is a chance of Iranian economic and regime collapse, but it doesn't feel like the base case," Ferguson concludes. This is a sobering assessment that challenges the optimistic narrative of imminent regime change.

Critics might note that Ferguson underestimates the internal social unrest that hyperinflation—currently at 62.2 percent headline and 99 percent for food—could ignite. While the regime has pressure valves, the civilian population does not. However, Ferguson's focus remains on the strategic endurance of the state apparatus rather than the humanitarian cost, a choice that reflects his macro-historical lens but risks minimizing the human toll of the blockade.

The Global Supply Shock

The most alarming section of the commentary concerns the global ripple effects of the Strait of Hormuz closure. Ferguson moves beyond oil to discuss the critical shortages of fertilizer, sulfur, and helium. He presents three scenarios generated by an economic model, ranging from a quick reopening to a six-month closure. In the worst-case scenario, a six-month blockade would result in "global stagflation and a systemic collapse of the international fertilizer trade." He warns that the loss of sulfur would "cripple the global phosphate chain," destroying winter wheat preparations and pushing U.S. inflation to nearly 6 percent.

In Scenario 3, a six-month closure, represents a 'worst-case scenario' resulting in global stagflation and a systemic collapse of the international fertilizer trade.

Ferguson points out that the market's current optimism, driven by the AI boom, is dangerously disconnected from the physical reality of supply chains. "The markets may be up, but that doesn't sound too great to me," he writes, citing polling data that shows deep public disapproval of the administration's handling of inflation and gas prices. He notes that the Senate is now "surely in play," suggesting that the economic fallout could reshape the political landscape before the midterms. The author also touches on the rising political violence, noting that one in four young, liberal voters now believe violence can sometimes be justified, a sign of the deepening societal fracture.

Bottom Line

Niall Ferguson's most compelling argument is that the world is sleepwalking into a prolonged economic crisis disguised as a short military conflict. His strength lies in connecting the dots between a stalled diplomatic process, a resilient Iranian economy, and a fragile global supply chain that could snap within months. The piece's vulnerability is its heavy reliance on the assumption that the Iranian regime will prioritize survival over the suffering of its citizens, potentially underestimating the speed of internal collapse. The reader must watch the fertilizer and helium markets closely; if those prices spike, the "blinkmanship" of the administration will face a reality check that no amount of diplomatic theater can fix.

Deep Dives

Explore these related deep dives:

  • Operation Praying Mantis

    This 1988 naval engagement in the Persian Gulf provides the historical precedent for the article's description of U.S. forces sinking Iranian fast-attack boats and escalating tensions over freedom of navigation.

  • Project Azorian

    The article's reference to 'blinkmanship' and the sudden pausing of military operations mirrors the high-stakes, covert nature of this Cold War-era salvage mission, illustrating how U.S. strategy often oscillates between aggressive action and abrupt withdrawal.

Sources

The Iran stalemate

“In economics, things take longer to happen than you think they will,” the economist Rüdiger Dornbusch famously observed, “and then they happen faster than you thought they could.”

He had financial crises in mind. In history, and especially the history of war, it’s different. Wars take much less time to start than you think they will, and last much longer than you thought they could.

Looking back on the first few months of my writing about the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, I consistently underestimated how long the war would last. At first, like most Western intelligence agencies, I assumed Ukraine would be overrun. Then, when I realized the Ukrainians had won the Battle of Kyiv and halted the Russian advance, I expected there would be a ceasefire. It took me until the end of the year to use the word stalemate. Four years, two months, and two weeks since it began, the war rages on. I know of no one who at the outset foresaw a war that will soon have lasted as long as World War I.

I begin to wonder if I have made the same mistake with the U.S. war against Iran. When Operation Epic Fury was launched on February 28, I was confident of one thing: that it would be a short war. Well, here we are, nearly 10 weeks later.

Of course, you may be one of those cheerful optimists who thinks the war is already over—indeed, that it ended with the ceasefire announced on April 8. But a ceasefire is not a peace agreement. Consider the events of the past week.

On April 29, leaked American diplomatic cables revealed that the administration was exploring the possibility of a new international coalition to restore freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. On May 4, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced Project Freedom, a quasi escort mission designed to open the strait to outbound shipping. Later that day, Iran launched a drone and missile attack on the United Arab Emirates, the first since the ceasefire began. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) also launched drones and missiles at U.S. ships. The U.S. said it sank six Iranian fast-attack boats as they swarmed commercial vessels.

The ceasefire was literally over. Wasn’t it?

In the early phase of Cold War I, “brinkmanship” was the way diplomacy was conducted by President Dwight Eisenhower. President Donald ...