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The private governments who will resist zohran mamdani and populism

Matt Stoller argues that the real barrier to effective governance isn't political gridlock, but the invisible hand of commercial monopolies that have quietly taken over the machinery of the state. While voters are rightly furious at their leaders, Stoller suggests they are misidentifying the enemy: it is not just the politicians, but the "private governments"—from fire truck manufacturers to health insurance middlemen—that dictate the terms of public life. This is a crucial reframing for anyone tired of the usual blame games, offering a structural diagnosis for why cities feel ungovernable and costs keep rising.

The Shadow Governance

Stoller opens by observing a recurring pattern in American politics: voters repeatedly throw out incumbents, only to find the underlying system unchanged. "In 2006, 2008, 2010, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2022, and 2024, voters threw the bums out... And I think the reason is because most of our leaders are only looking at the public governments, not the private governments - aka commercial monopolies - that undergird them." This is a bold claim, yet the evidence he marshals is hard to dismiss. He points to the pandemic, noting that "during Covid, it was Apple and Google, not governments, who set public health policy around contact tracing through their control of mobile privacy settings."

The private governments who will resist zohran mamdani and populism

The author's framing here is sharp. He isn't just listing corporate power; he is describing a shift in sovereignty where essential public functions are outsourced to entities that answer to shareholders, not citizens. Stoller notes that despite the anti-establishment rhetoric of recent administrations, "neither broke with the status quo on its alignment with Wall Street." This observation cuts through the partisan noise, suggesting that the problem is systemic rather than merely a failure of a specific political party.

"The shadow private governance model, controlled by financiers, is what Americans dislike."

This insight lands because it explains the deep-seated frustration that fuels populism. It's not just that things are expensive; it's that the rules of the game are written by private actors who have no incentive to serve the public good. Stoller highlights the appointment of Lina Khan, a leading antitrust scholar, by New York City's new leadership as a potential turning point. "Is there now a nascent unification of political populism with governing expertise?" he asks, suggesting that the new crop of officials might finally be willing to tackle the economic termites eating away at city budgets.

The Cost of Safety and Infrastructure

The article moves from abstract theory to concrete, costly examples, starting with public safety equipment. Stoller details how a handful of corporations have turned fire trucks and police gear into monopolized markets. He cites a recent investigation into companies like REV Group and Oshkosh, which have made it "extremely hard to repair fire trucks," driving up prices and delaying deliveries. The situation is even more dire with law enforcement technology. Stoller writes, "Baltimore, Maryland; Augusta, Maine; and Howell, New Jersey have sued Axon, alleging that the company has committed antitrust violations, abused its market power, and forced cities to pay exorbitant fees for a basic, but crucial piece of law enforcement tech."

The financial impact is staggering. Stoller notes that after Axon acquired a competitor, "body cam prices had risen 50 percent. By 2022, those prices had nearly tripled, reaching $490 per camera." But the real shock comes from the shift in business model: "You no longer purchase and own, you 'subscribe' with a fee and it is $500,000 a year." This subscription model locks cities into long-term contracts, making it nearly impossible to switch vendors even when the service is poor or the price is unjustified.

Critics might argue that government procurement is inherently complex and that switching vendors for critical safety equipment carries risks. However, Stoller counters this by pointing out that the "prestige factor" often drives these decisions, with officials too scared to try new suppliers. He suggests that New York City could break this cycle by "bringing antitrust suits here in coordination with other cities, or investing directly in startups or potential rivals who could make similar cheaper products."

The pattern repeats in emergency communications. Stoller highlights a New York Times report on flash floods in Texas, where a monopoly by Motorola Solutions left responders with inadequate equipment. "The grueling job was made more difficult because the radio system they needed to coordinate the response was not up to the task," he writes. With Motorola controlling 70-80% of the market, prices have soared, with a single radio site costing $500,000 today compared to $300,000 seven years ago. This isn't just inefficiency; it's a direct threat to public safety.

The Software Stranglehold

Perhaps the most insidious monopoly Stoller identifies is in the software that runs our cities. He points to Tyler Technologies, a company that manages everything from jail booking to school bus tracking. "Where court-record software is concerned," Stoller quotes an analyst, "Tyler has a near-monopoly and that it's hard to even find a website for one of its rivals." This creates a "lock-in" effect where cities are trapped in outdated, expensive systems because the cost of switching is prohibitive.

Stoller describes these systems as "identity of record" software, which are "usually bad quality and very difficult to move off of." The solution, he argues, lies in using legal tools to force interoperability. "The way to address this problem is to use legal tools and bargaining power to open up this software to third party developers, and foster the interoperability of data." This is a pragmatic approach that leverages the city's purchasing power to break the stranglehold of entrenched vendors.

Health Care and the Middlemen

The argument extends to health care, where Stoller identifies pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) and insurance companies as the primary drivers of cost. He notes that states like Ohio, Kentucky, and New York have begun to replace these corporate middlemen with public systems, saving money and improving patient care. "Oregon recently banned corporate ownership of medical practices, and Arkansas passed a law to break up insurers," he writes, highlighting a growing trend of state-level resistance to corporate consolidation.

In New York City, the mayor has significant leverage over the largest municipal health system in the country. Stoller suggests that this system could be used to negotiate better drug prices and bypass expensive wholesalers. "New York City could also seek to contract with California for cheap insulin," he proposes, pointing to the potential for cross-state collaboration to lower costs. However, he also acknowledges the entrenched interests at play, noting that the board of the city's hospital system includes a Goldman Sachs managing director and a UnitedHealth Care advisor.

"The cost of commercial rent in New York City, for instance, is inflated by the widespread use of non-disclosure agreements by landlords, as well as by bank loans whose covenants make it very hard to drop list rent prices, and privilege chain stores."

Stoller's analysis of the broader economy reveals how these monopolies extend beyond specific sectors. He points to credit card networks like Visa and Mastercard, which "cost every business in the economy money by taking a cut of every transaction." He also notes the recent legal victory against Google's advertising technology, suggesting that cities could demand damages for their role as ad buyers. This broadens the scope of the argument, showing that the problem is not isolated to a few bad actors but is a systemic feature of the modern economy.

Bottom Line

Stoller's most compelling contribution is his identification of the "private governments" that have quietly assumed control over public functions, turning essential services into profit centers. His argument is strongest when he connects specific, costly examples—from fire trucks to software—to a broader theory of governance failure. However, the biggest vulnerability lies in the political feasibility of his solutions; breaking up entrenched monopolies requires a level of political courage and coordination that has been rare in recent decades. The coming years will test whether the new wave of populist leaders can translate this analysis into action, or if they too will be swallowed by the very systems they seek to reform.

Deep Dives

Explore these related deep dives:

  • Lina Khan

    Khan is mentioned as one of Mamdani's transition co-chairs and is described as an 'anti-monopoly leader.' Understanding her background, her landmark paper on Amazon's antitrust implications, and her tenure as FTC Chair provides essential context for the article's central thesis about fighting private monopoly power.

  • Axon Enterprise

    The article extensively discusses Axon's monopolistic practices in body cameras and police equipment, including specific lawsuits from Baltimore, Augusta, and Howell. Understanding the company's history, acquisition strategy, and market dominance illuminates the 'private government' concept central to the article.

  • Natural monopoly

    The article describes multiple markets (fire trucks, emergency radios, transit buses, court software) where consolidation has led to monopoly pricing power over government purchasers. Understanding the economic theory of natural monopolies and how they differ from artificial monopolies helps readers evaluate when government intervention is warranted.

Sources

The private governments who will resist zohran mamdani and populism

by Matt Stoller · · Read full article

A few days ago, Zohran Mamdani got elected to be the mayor of New York City. Along with new governors-elect Mikie Sherrill in New Jersey and Abigail Spanberger in Virginia, as well as elected officials across smatterings of other states, and new Georgia public services commissioners Peter Hubbard and Alicia Johnson, this crop is the latest group with a mandate to do something about the anger Americans feel towards their society. And whether moderate, left-wing, or in-between, most, led by Mamdani, are saying they will do something about it.

The challenges facing these leaders are profound, and they are not unique to this moment. In 2006, 2008, 2010, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2022, and 2024, voters threw the bums out, as the famous statement goes. They are likely to do so again in 2026, this time repudiating Donald Trump. And I think the reason is because most of our leaders are only looking at the public governments, not the private governments - aka commercial monopolies - that undergird them. To take a simple but powerful example, during Covid, it was Apple and Google, not governments, who set public health policy around contact tracing through their control of mobile privacy settings.

This shadow private governance model, controlled by financiers, is what Americans dislike. Obama and Trump saw this dynamic, and yet despite their anti-establishment political messaging, neither broke with the status quo on its alignment with Wall Street. Similarly, Nancy Pelosi in 2006 ran on Drain the Swamp, a message Trump re-used so effectively few remember Pelosi was there first. In fact, no one in the last 20 years has channeled the rage of voters with sufficient policy courage.

That’s why one of the more interesting dynamics at work in New York City is that Mamdani brought on anti-monopoly leader Lina Khan as one of his transition co-chairs. There are other signs. Mamdani is apparently going to maintain his political organizing machine, and has even launched a high-profile resume-gathering operation. (If you’re in NYC and are looking to do something interesting, you should consider applying…)

These dynamics lead to a question. Is there now a nascent unification of political populism with governing expertise? I don’t want to overstate the argument, since New York City governance is not something I know particularly well, and Mamdani has a whole lot of people giving him advice. We’ll know more when he starts hiring and ...