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Another unusual footnote in an en banc fifth circuit opinion

This piece from Reason pulls back the curtain on a procedural anomaly in the Fifth Circuit that suggests something deeper is fracturing the court's internal logic. It's not just about a missing vote or a confusing footnote; it's about a judge seemingly rewriting the rules of engagement to shield his own reasoning from the full court's scrutiny. For anyone tracking how federal courts function—or fail to function—this is a rare glimpse into the machinery breaking down in real time.

The Mechanics of a Procedural Black Hole

The article zeroes in on Ethridge v. Samsung SDI, a case involving exploding batteries where the court's behavior defied standard protocol. Reason reports that after a three-judge panel initially ruled in favor of jurisdiction, they abruptly reversed course following a Seventh Circuit precedent. But the real story lies in the aftermath: "The petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED because, at the request of one of its members, the court was polled, and a majority did not vote in favor of rehearing."

Another unusual footnote in an en banc fifth circuit opinion

What makes this unusual is the footnote attached to the order. The piece argues that Judge Oldham's exclusion from the vote count is legally dubious. The article notes, "Judge Oldham's participation is not reflected because the panel granted rehearing," yet the author contends this interpretation is flawed. The core of the argument is that a panel cannot hold a case hostage to prevent the full court from exercising its authority. As the piece puts it, "The original panel cannot hold a case hostage to keep it away from the full court."

This is a critical distinction. In the world of appellate procedure, en banc review is meant to correct panel errors or resolve circuit splits. By claiming the panel retained total control, the court created a procedural gray zone where the full court's power was effectively neutered by a single judge's interpretation of the rules. Critics might note that internal operating procedures are often flexible, and perhaps the panel simply acted within its discretion. However, the fact that sixteen other judges voted while one abstained suggests a breakdown in consensus rather than a standard procedural maneuver.

"The en banc court does not need the panel's permission to call a poll."

When Evenly Divided Courts Play Games with Optics

The analysis then shifts to Holberg v. Guerrero, where the court reached an equally divided 9-9 vote. Under normal circumstances, this results in an affirmation of the lower court's judgment without setting precedent. But Reason highlights a bizarre deviation: the court listed ten names in a footnote without specifying their stance, while a separate opinion by Judge Oldham claimed to be the controlling voice.

The piece observes, "The footnote tells us absolutely nothing about what happened. These names are just listed as connected with the per curiam opinion." This lack of clarity is alarming. The article points out that while five judges in that footnote wanted to affirm and five wanted to reverse, they were lumped together. "The listing of their names tell us what exactly?" the author asks.

Even more striking is the language used in Judge Oldham's opinion. Despite the tie vote, the opinion reads like a majority decision. "Today we affirm the district court and hold that AEDPA bars Holberg's claims," the opinion states. But as the piece notes, "No new precedent is set. And the last line of the 46-page opinion states 'AFFIRMED' in all caps. But Oldham's opinion can do no such thing."

This creates a "Schrodinger's Cat" scenario for legal precedent: is the opinion a binding majority or a non-binding dissent? The article suggests this is a deliberate move to shape the narrative. "Judges sometimes try to play fast-and-loose with the styling of opinions. Optics matter." While this might be a tactical choice to signal ideological alignment, it undermines the transparency that the judicial system relies on. A counterargument worth considering is that the confusion stems from the unique seniority dynamics of the Fifth Circuit, but the piece convincingly argues that seniority rules don't explain why a dissenting judge's opinion would be placed before a senior judge's concurrence.

The Erosion of Institutional Clarity

The broader implication here is a move away from predictable, rule-based adjudication toward a system where procedural quirks serve ideological ends. The article draws a parallel to Supreme Court dynamics, noting how justices sometimes leave "artifacts" in opinions after losing a majority. But in the Fifth Circuit, this seems to be happening with a frequency and opacity that is unprecedented.

The piece concludes that these anomalies aren't just footnotes; they are evidence of a court struggling to maintain its own coherence. "When opinions don't make sense and do something new, there is evidence that stranger things happened." This is a powerful indictment of a system where the rules of the game are being rewritten to suit the players.

"These strange dynamics led to the bizarre * footnote. Courts are generally predictable bodies. Things make sense and follow patterns."

Bottom Line

Reason's analysis exposes a troubling trend where procedural technicalities are weaponized to obscure judicial reasoning and manipulate the appearance of consensus. The strongest part of the argument is its meticulous dissection of how a single judge's interpretation of internal rules can derail the en banc process. The biggest vulnerability is the lack of direct testimony from the court itself, leaving the interpretation of these anomalies open to speculation. Readers should watch for how these procedural precedents are cited in future cases, as they could fundamentally alter how the Fifth Circuit handles jurisdictional challenges and evenly divided votes.

Deep Dives

Explore these related deep dives:

  • Personal jurisdiction

    The article hinges on a complex reversal regarding whether a Texas court can hear a case against a foreign battery manufacturer, a legal threshold that varies drastically depending on the specific nexus between the defendant's contacts and the plaintiff's injury.

  • En banc

    Understanding the Fifth Circuit's unique internal polling mechanism and the specific rule that allows a three-judge panel to override the full court's desire to rehear a case is essential to grasping why the en banc petition was denied despite a near-even split among active judges.

  • Judicial notice

    The panel's sudden reversal was triggered by a specific procedural concept where a court accepts facts or legal conclusions from another circuit without requiring new evidence, illustrating how inter-circuit dialogue can instantly dismantle a prior ruling.

Sources

Another unusual footnote in an en banc fifth circuit opinion

by Various · Reason · Read full article

Over the years, I have written about many unusual and fractured voting splits on the en banc Fifth Circuit. An en banc case decided last week made me think of another en banc case from last year.

Ethridge v. Samsung SDI.

Let's start with Ethridge v. Samsung SDI, a personal injury case about exploding batteries. In May 2025, a divided three-judge panel (Jones, Oldham, King) ruled that the district court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Judge Oldham wrote the panel opinion, joined by Judge King. Judge Jones dissented, finding the district court lacked personal jurisdiction. The Defendant filed petitions for panel rehearing and en banc rehearing. In December 2025, the Fifth Circuit issued a very unusual order with two components.

The first component indicates that the three-judge panel granted the petition for panel rehearing, withdrew the panel opinion, and issued a four-page substitute opinion.

Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge:

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for panel rehearing is GRANTED. The court's prior panel opinion is WITHDRAWN, see Ethridge v. Samsung SDI Co., 137 F.4th 309 (5th Cir. 2025), and the following opinion is SUBSTITUTED therefor.

Now, the panel reversed itself and found that there was not personal jurisdiction. What caused the change? The Seventh Circuit addressed the same question "with the benefit of jurisdictional discovery." The panel stated "After reconsideration in light of [the Seventh Circuit precedent], we affirm the district court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction."

So far, nothing out of the ordinary. It is common enough for a panel to grant a petition for rehearing, especially if there is some relevant precedent from another circuit.

The second component of the order is strange. The body of the order is two paragraphs, followed by a * footnote.

Per Curiam:

The petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED because, at the request of one of its members, the court was polled, and a majority did not vote in favor of rehearing (Fed. R. App. P. 40 and 5th Cir. R. 40).

In the en banc poll, 5 judges voted in favor of rehearing (Jones, Smith, Richman, Ho, and Engelhardt), and 11 judges voted against rehearing (Elrod, Stewart, Southwick, Haynes, Graves, Higginson, Willett, Duncan, Wilson, Douglas, and Ramirez).*

* Judge Oldham's participation is not reflected because the panel granted rehearing. See Fed. R. App. 40(a) ("Panel rehearing is the ordinary means of reconsidering a panel decision; rehearing en banc ...