Matt Stoller delivers a counterintuitive verdict on the state of American competition policy: the populist antitrust movement hasn't collapsed, but it has mutated into something far more volatile and politically charged than the legal establishment anticipated. While Wall Street celebrates a return to the "good old days" of easy mergers, Stoller argues that the rules of the game have fundamentally shifted, leaving even the most powerful corporations unsure of their standing. This is not a story about a simple rollback; it is a diagnosis of a fractured legal landscape where the law remains robust, but the political will to enforce it has become unpredictable.
The Illusion of a Return to Normalcy
Stoller begins by dismantling the comforting narrative that the executive branch has simply reverted to the pre-2020 consensus. He notes that from Reagan to Obama, competition policy was a "genteel space, politely controlled by lawyers, economists and bankers in a 'bipartisan consensus' whereby consolidation was seen as virtuous and size was nothing to be afraid of." The author highlights how this era treated massive corporate size as benign, citing a Clinton-era memo that absurdly claimed, "Large size is not the same as monopoly power. For example, an ice cream vendor at the beach on a hot day probably has more market power than many multi-billion-dollar companies in competitive industries."
This framing is crucial because it exposes the sheer artificiality of the previous status quo. Stoller points out that under that old regime, the Federal Trade Commission wasted resources on powerless actors like "Uber drivers, church organists, bull semen traders, and ice skating teachers," while allowing the creation of modern giants through acquisitions like Google buying Waze and Facebook buying Instagram. The author argues that the Biden administration, and now the current administration, broke this consensus, but not by abandoning the law. Instead, the current dynamic is defined by a shift from "polite" corruption to one where "payoffs and political connections with Trump matters."
"Payoffs and political connections with Trump matters, not the more polite kind of corruption that flourished in the days of Bush and Obama. And politics is now important."
This observation is the piece's most striking insight. It suggests that the uncertainty facing corporations today isn't a sign of weak antitrust enforcement, but rather a sign that the enforcement mechanism has become personalized and political. Critics might argue that this makes the legal environment less stable and more prone to arbitrary decisions, but Stoller's evidence suggests that for the average consumer or small business, this unpredictability is a feature, not a bug.
The Law Remains Stronger Than the Headlines
Despite the political noise, Stoller meticulously details how the actual legal doctrines have been strengthened, not weakened. He traces a revival of monopolization law, noting that from 1998 to 2020, the Department of Justice filed zero cases using this body of law due to the restrictive Trinko precedent. Under the aggressive enforcers appointed by the previous administration, that barrier was shattered. Stoller writes, "The Antitrust Division under Jonathan Kanter attacked this obstacle head-on, winning two Sherman Act cases against Google." The result is that the "Trinko era is over," and private litigation has skyrocketed.
The author also highlights the restoration of the Robinson-Patman Act, a Depression-era law prohibiting price discrimination that had been dormant for decades. Stoller notes that the Federal Trade Commission sued alcohol distributor Southern Glazers for violations, and a judge upheld the claim. This is a significant historical pivot, connecting modern enforcement to the legal frameworks of the 1930s rather than the neoliberal consensus of the 1980s. Furthermore, the focus on labor markets has intensified, with the government securing the first criminal wage-fixing conviction and blocking mergers like Penguin/Simon & Schuster on labor grounds.
"With a bevy of private Section 2 cases, it's clear the Trinko era is over. Oh, and the Antitrust Division even restored criminal monopolization law."
This section effectively counters the narrative that the populist antitrust movement is dead. The legal tools are sharper, the precedents are being rewritten, and private attorneys are finally empowered to sue monopolists. However, Stoller is careful to distinguish between the law and the policy. While the statutes are stronger, the executive branch's priorities have become erratic.
Policy Volatility and the Meta Exception
The piece takes a darker turn when analyzing specific policy outcomes, particularly regarding Big Tech. Stoller identifies the handling of Facebook (Meta) as the most significant failure. Despite the company's documented harms, including fostering ethnic conflict and sex trafficking, the administration has moved to empower the corporation rather than constrain it. Stoller writes, "Mark Zuckerberg's company is now a newly empowered macro-economic force, at the center of Trump's data center-focused strategy."
The author points to a disturbing alliance where the administration has invited Meta's chief technology officer to become a lieutenant colonel in a new Army technology unit. This represents a stark departure from the aggressive stance taken by the previous administration, which had filed its own antitrust case against the company. Stoller notes that while the law remains intact, the political will to enforce it against specific allies has evaporated. He observes that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which once regulated Meta's financial activities, is now largely defunct in that capacity.
"The scandals haven't stopped; just over the past two weeks, it was sued over involvement in sex trafficking, and a story came out showing that up to 10% of its revenue allegedly comes from scam ads. I wish I could say any of it mattered, but it has not."
This admission of powerlessness in the face of political alignment is the article's most sobering moment. It suggests that while the legal framework for antitrust is stronger than it has been in forty years, its application is now subject to the whims of the executive branch's political calculus. The rollback of the Competition Executive Order and the withdrawal of support for the non-compete ban further illustrate this policy inconsistency.
"The legacy of antitrust populism is not that it failed, but that it became a weapon of political power rather than a shield for the public."
Bottom Line
Stoller's analysis is a necessary corrective to the simplistic view that the populist antitrust movement has been erased; the legal architecture is actually more robust than it was a decade ago, with revived statutes and a surge in private litigation. However, the article's greatest vulnerability lies in its acceptance that political loyalty can override legal precedent, creating a two-tiered system where some monopolies are dismantled while others are fortified. The reader must watch not just the court rulings, but the shifting alliances in the White House, as the fate of competition policy now hinges less on the law and more on who holds the gavel in the executive branch.