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XI’s military meltdown

In a stunning reversal of expectations, the Chinese leadership has not just removed a senior military figure but has dismantled the very cohort of generals Xi Jinping once trusted to secure his legacy. This piece by Jordan Schneider, featuring former CIA analyst Jon Czin, moves beyond the standard corruption narrative to suggest a terrifyingly personal purge where the leader is now turning on his oldest allies. The coverage is notable not for confirming rumors, but for framing the Central Military Commission as a decapitated institution where loyalty is the only currency left, and even that is no longer enough.

The Shift from Enemies to Friends

Schneider and Czin anchor their analysis in the dramatic fall of Zhang Youxia, a man who had been kept in power well past retirement age—a clear signal of deep trust that has now been violently revoked. The authors argue that this is not routine anti-corruption housekeeping but a qualitative leap in authoritarian control. "Xi started his term by going after his enemies. In his third term, he started going after associates — kind of like a mafia boss, seeing these guys as disposable," Czin observes. This comparison to a mafia boss is jarring but effective; it strips away the veneer of bureaucratic procedure to reveal a system driven by personal paranoia and the absolute need for submission.

XI’s military meltdown

The commentary highlights the sheer speed of this betrayal. Zhang was not just removed; he was disgraced with accusations of treason, including the alleged leaking of nuclear secrets to the United States. "It's one thing to be cruel to your enemies. It's qualitatively different to be pitiless with your friends," Schneider notes, underscoring the psychological toll on the remaining leadership. The implication is that the administration is no longer seeking stability through experienced generals but is prioritizing a total, unchallengeable grip on the military, even if it means gutting its own command structure.

Critics might argue that labeling this a "mafia" dynamic oversimplifies the complex institutional checks and balances that still exist within the Chinese Communist Party, yet the evidence of a "generational turnover" where an entire cohort is "virtually decapitated" suggests a level of disruption that transcends normal political maneuvering.

It's one thing to be cruel to your enemies. It's qualitatively different to be pitiless with your friends.

The Mechanics of a Purge

The piece delves into the opaque machinery of the Discipline Inspection Commission, led by Zhang Shengmin, who now stands as the sole other member of the Central Military Commission alongside the leader. Schneider and Czin suggest that the purge is less about specific crimes and more about the systematic removal of any potential threat to the Chairman Responsibility System. "There's always a convenient pretext to take down anyone. That means there was a political issue we don't know about," Czin explains. This reframing is crucial: it shifts the reader's focus from the specific allegations of espionage to the broader strategy of institutional terror.

The authors posit that the administration maintains control by keeping dossiers on every official, creating a state of perpetual vulnerability. "My understanding is that's a feature, not a bug, of the communist system. This is how you maintain control over a party with a bigger population than Germany," Czin argues. The logic here is chillingly pragmatic. By ensuring that every general knows they can be destroyed at any moment, the leadership ensures absolute compliance. The Wall Street Journal's report on nuclear leaks is analyzed not necessarily as a verified fact, but as a strategic signal released to the public and the party to cement Zhang's status as a traitor, making his removal irreversible.

However, the reliance on rumors and the lack of concrete evidence regarding the nuclear leaks leaves a gap in the narrative. While the political signal is clear, the factual basis for such a severe accusation remains speculative, raising questions about how much of this is genuine intelligence versus political theater designed to intimidate the remaining military elite.

The Succession Vacuum

Perhaps the most alarming implication discussed is the impact on China's future leadership and military readiness. With the removal of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, the Central Military Commission is reduced to a "tandem bike" with only two riders. "Who wants this job? It can't be good for morale on their side," Schneider asks, highlighting the human cost of this internal strife. The authors note that the position of Vice Chairman, traditionally used to groom successors, has been vacant since 2012, leaving a void in the chain of command.

The commentary suggests that the administration may be willing to let the institution wither rather than risk empowering a new generation of generals who might challenge the leader's authority. "The PLA is a high-tech, culturally opaque organization — really an empire unto itself within the Chinese Communist Party," Czin states, explaining why the leader feels the need to constantly "mow the grass" to keep the military subservient. This relentless purging, while securing short-term control, risks creating a leadership vacuum that could destabilize China's strategic planning, particularly regarding tensions over Taiwan.

The PLA is a high-tech, culturally opaque organization — really an empire unto itself within the Chinese Communist Party.

Bottom Line

Schneider and Czin provide a compelling, if unsettling, analysis of a regime in the throes of a self-inflicted crisis, where the drive for absolute control is dismantling the very military apparatus needed to project power. The strongest part of their argument is the reframing of the purge not as a corruption crackdown but as a paranoid consolidation of power that has turned on the leader's closest allies. The biggest vulnerability, however, lies in the speculation regarding the specific motivations—whether it is a reaction to Taiwan plans or personal distrust—which remains opaque and difficult to verify. Readers should watch for how the administration fills this leadership void, as the silence from the remaining military elite may be the most telling indicator of the regime's next move.

It's one thing to be cruel to your enemies. It's qualitatively different to be pitiless with your friends.

Sources

XI’s military meltdown

by Jordan Schneider · ChinaTalk · Read full article

Zhang Youxia 张又侠 has fallen. We thought he would be the last man standing, but instead, he is a “tiger blocking the road” who “seriously fueled threats to the Party’s absolute leadership.” Xi had already purged more CMC members than Mao ever did, but this round of expulsions is distinct from mere anti-corruption housekeeping.

To discuss what makes this purge unique, ChinaTalk sat down with Jon Czin, a former China analyst at the CIA who served as China Director on Biden’s NSC and now works at the Brookings Institution. You can check out Jon’s previous ChinaTalk appearances here and here.

We discuss…

Zhang Youxia’s long personal relationship with Xi, and how it could have soured,

The WSJ’s bombshell report claiming that Zhang leaked information about China’s nuclear weapons to the USA,

Why corruption alone can’t explain Zhang’s fate and the uniquely harsh methods of discipline Xi chose to use,

Why Xi could be getting paranoid, and what this means for succession plans,

Whether Zhang was purged because he stood up against Xi’s Taiwan invasion plans

Listen now on your favorite podcast app.

What Just Happened.

Jordan Schneider: Zhang Youxia had a rough week. Jon, where do we begin?

Jon Czin: A lot of people in the China-watching community were frankly astonished that the rumors accumulating last week were real this time around — that Zhang Youxia was actually in trouble. And not just Zhang Youxia. His takedown has somewhat overshadowed the demise of Liu Zhenli 刘振立, who was running the Joint Staff Department. That’s another CMC member leaving the Central Military Commission, which now has just two members: Xi Jinping, of course, and Zhang Shengmin 張升民, who ironically runs the Discipline Inspection Commission — the chief internal investigator for all these anti-corruption campaigns.

Jordan Schneider: “Ironically” might not be the right word here, Jon.

Jon Czin: That’s fair. Maybe “tellingly” is better. This is a pretty remarkable moment in Chinese politics — it’s not an overstatement to call it Shakespearean. The few facts we do know are quite dramatic, even without the embroidery of speculation and rumors from the last few days.

We know their fathers served together in China’s civil war. We know there was some kind of nexus between Xi and Zhang Youxia — and that’s not just historic. Xi kept Zhang around at the last Party Congress even though he had exceeded the retirement age. That alone ...