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China forces scott bessent to embrace anti-monopoly tactics

Matt Stoller delivers a startling historical twist: the very anti-monopoly tools the U.S. once dismantled are now being resurrected not by progressives, but by the current administration to counter Chinese state power. The piece's most provocative claim is that the West's decades-long embrace of deregulation and financialization has left it defenseless against a rival that mastered the art of predatory pricing and strategic monopoly control. For busy listeners, this reframes the current trade war not as a political squabble, but as a structural collapse of American industrial strategy that is finally hitting a wall.

The Premature Anti-Monopolist

Stoller opens by drawing a sharp parallel between the "premature anti-fascist" label of the 1930s and today's anti-monopoly advocates. He argues that just as those who opposed Hitler early were persecuted, those who warned against the dangers of concentrated corporate power are only now being vindicated by geopolitical necessity. "Today, we are in a similar moment with anti-monopoly arguments," Stoller writes, noting that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is now embracing tactics that were once considered radical.

China forces scott bessent to embrace anti-monopoly tactics

The core of Stoller's argument is that China has weaponized the rules the West wrote for itself. He details how Beijing uses state subsidies to drive prices below cost, a strategy known as predatory pricing, to capture global markets in critical sectors like electric vehicles and rare earth processing. "China has a smart industrial policy, the government subsidizes its industries so that they can charge below-cost rates, driving everyone else out of business," he explains. This isn't just economic competition; it's a geopolitical lever. Stoller points out that China now controls the "tap" for essential materials, with the ability to cut off access to foreign militaries and industries at will.

"They're installing what you might call a tap system, where they can turn that tap on and off."

Critics might argue that Stoller downplays the West's own history of using economic coercion, such as vaccine patent restrictions or financial sanctions. He acknowledges this, noting that "all countries engage in these kinds of games," but insists the current dynamic is unique because the U.S. voluntarily disarmed its own defenses. The author's framing is effective because it shifts the blame from foreign aggression to domestic policy failure.

The Betrayal of Domestic Industry

Stoller traces the roots of this vulnerability to a specific era of American policy: the 1980s and 1990s, when antitrust enforcement was gutted and intellectual property laws were rewritten to favor financial engineers over manufacturers. He highlights the case of Archibald Cox, whose company sold rare earth technology to the Chinese government, illustrating the "failure of modern liberalism and Wall Street." "Archie Cox and his company are committing a criminal act," Stoller quotes UAW organizer Mike O'Brien, calling him a "traitor to his country."

The piece argues that the Supreme Court's 1986 decision legalizing predatory pricing created a vacuum that foreign actors happily filled. Stoller writes, "There is a consensus among commentators that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful," a quote the court used to justify deregulation, which Stoller argues proved disastrously wrong in the global arena. By allowing domestic firms to be rolled up and sold off, the U.S. lost its ability to produce critical inputs independently.

"The son of a famous Watergate prosecutor lauded for his political courage, Cox sold out his country for money, and got a bonus for his troubles."

This historical analysis is the piece's strongest asset, connecting abstract economic theory to tangible national security risks. However, it glosses over the complexity of global supply chains; completely decoupling from Chinese processing is not merely a matter of changing laws but of rebuilding entire industrial ecosystems, a process that takes decades.

The Forced Reckoning

The most surprising element of Stoller's commentary is his observation that the current administration is being forced to adopt the very industrial policies it once mocked. He notes that the Pentagon has already implemented a minimum price guarantee for neodymium-praseodymium oxide to counter Chinese dumping. "Now, the two tactics used by the Chinese state to seize market power are also well-understood," Stoller notes, listing underpricing and strict intellectual property controls as the tools the U.S. must now counter.

Stoller suggests this creates a "dual economy" in America: one for non-essential goods that remains bloated and consolidated, and another for critical materials where the government actively intervenes. He draws a parallel between the administration's actions and the pilot programs proposed by Zohran Mamdani for government-run grocery stores, arguing that the logic is the same even if the sectors differ. "It would be better if we just reimplemented anti-monopoly rules across society, rather than picking some sectors where the government will structure healthier markets," Stoller argues.

"Scott Bessent and Trump are acting in ways that suggest they are being forced to reckon with foreign monopolies threatening America."

A counterargument worth considering is whether this "dual economy" approach is sustainable. If the government intervenes only in sectors deemed critical, it may inadvertently reinforce monopolies in non-critical sectors, leaving consumers vulnerable to price gouging in everyday goods. Stoller admits this is a flaw in the current approach but suggests the geopolitical threat is too immediate to wait for a comprehensive overhaul.

Bottom Line

Stoller's most compelling insight is that the U.S. is not fighting a new war, but fighting the consequences of its own deregulation, with China as the beneficiary. The piece's greatest vulnerability is its optimism that the administration can successfully pivot to an anti-monopoly stance without the ideological consistency to apply it universally. Readers should watch to see if these emergency measures become permanent structural reforms or temporary stopgaps that vanish once the immediate crisis passes.

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China forces scott bessent to embrace anti-monopoly tactics

by Matt Stoller · · Read full article

The term “premature anti-fascist” was a wry and cynical take from the first group of Americans to oppose Adolf Hitler. From 1936-1939, the Italian and German government sponsored a fascist in Spain, Francisco Franco, in a civil war between his forces and those of the motley disorganized left, some of whom were Soviet-aligned Communists and some of whom were not. Leftists from all over the world, like George Orwell, volunteered to fight Franco, and just a few years later, World War II was the same ideological conflict, but worldwide.

You’d think the people who were right early on would be feted as wise, but in fact, the opposite occurred. In the 1950s, the FBI and Senator Joe McCarthy went after liberals and leftists across a host of industries, in what was known as the “Red Scare.” Among the most targeted groups were those who volunteered to fight against fascism in the Spanish Civil War. It was important to be against Hitler, but not too early. Hence the term “premature anti-fascist.”

Today, we are in a similar moment with anti-monopoly arguments. Two days ago, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent laid out that the U.S. government is going to be setting minimum price floors across a host of industries, to thwart unfair pricing by the Chinese state. China has a smart industrial policy, the government subsidizes its industries so that they can charge below-cost rates, driving everyone else out of business and ensuring that the Chinese industry then has the scale and knowledge to become more efficient. In many areas, such as electric vehicles, the government fosters markets that are brutally competitive. The result is a set of world-class firms that have dominant market shares and can project Chinese geopolitical power, in everything from rare earth magnets to battery-grade cobalt and lithium processing to batteries to high quality graphite.

Over the past eight months, the Chinese government has started to use this power explicitly. It created an elaborate set of rules for who can get access to rare earth magnets and materials, which are critical components that go into everything from electronics to medical devices to cars to weapons, with hard-to-pronounce names like dysprosium, gadolinium, lutetium, samarium, scandium, terbium and yttrium. It won’t allow rare earths to be used in foreign militaries. To prevent smuggling, it is requiring firms seeking to purchase magnets to submit drawings and blueprints for how they will use ...