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Can Russia win in Ukraine on its current trajectory: Assessing Russia’s 2025 war effort

Mick Ryan cuts through the static of daily frontline updates to ask a question most analysts are too afraid to answer: Can Russia actually win this war, or is it merely grinding down Ukraine to force a political surrender? By shifting the metric from "square kilometers gained" to "strategic return on investment," Ryan exposes a brutal paradox where the Kremlin's military momentum masks a deepening strategic failure.

The Illusion of Momentum

Ryan begins by dismantling the common narrative that territorial gains equate to victory. He argues that the current Russian advance is less about land and more about a political gamble to force a ceasefire on favorable terms. "Russian advances on the ground in Ukraine this year, while limited compared to the resources expended to secure them, provide an insight into the mindset of the Russian military leadership," Ryan writes. This framing is crucial because it forces the reader to look past the map lines and see the human and material cost behind every meter of progress. The author suggests that the administration's focus on "political gain" rather than total conquest is a sign of adaptation, not necessarily a sign of weakness, but one that comes at a staggering price.

"Russia retains the strategic initiative in this war. And, over the past three years, it has learned to learn better, to adapt systemically and harness its relationships with Iran, China and North Korea to support its war effort."

Ryan's observation that the Russian military has achieved a "critical mass" in its ability to learn is supported by his analysis of their operational tempo. He notes that Moscow is no longer just reacting; it is systematically integrating foreign support and refining its tactics. This echoes the lessons of the Battle of Debaltseve, where Russian forces demonstrated a terrifying capacity to encircle and destroy Ukrainian units through superior coordination. However, Ryan is careful to distinguish between tactical adaptation and strategic success. He points out that while the executive branch has managed to sustain a multi-axis offensive, the cost is unsustainable. "It has come at the cost of around 350,000 casualties in 2025," he notes, citing British intelligence. This figure is not just a statistic; it represents a hemorrhage of human life that threatens to destabilize the very society the Kremlin claims to be defending. Critics might argue that Russia's vast population reserves make these losses manageable in the short term, but Ryan's data suggests that the quality of manpower is degrading faster than quantity can replace it.

Can Russia win in Ukraine on its current trajectory: Assessing Russia’s 2025 war effort

The Aerial Siege and the Human Toll

The commentary shifts to the skies, where the nature of the conflict has become increasingly brutal. Ryan highlights a disturbing trend: the shift from mixed missile strikes to an overwhelming reliance on cheap, mass-produced drones. "By the start of November 2025, this had more than doubled to 170 per day," he writes regarding the deployment of HESA Shahed 136 variants. This escalation is not merely a tactical choice; it is a strategy of attrition designed to exhaust Ukraine's air defenses and terrorize its civilian population. The sheer volume of these strikes, combined with an average of 175 glide bombs per day, creates a constant state of siege that makes normal life impossible for millions.

"The magnitude of strikes has increased since the start of 2025. While most strikes still feature a mix of drones, ballistic and cruise missiles, Shahed drone variants are now the overwhelming majority of weapons used in these strikes."

Ryan's analysis here is particularly sobering. He does not glorify the technology; instead, he frames it as a tool of desperation and volume over precision. The increase in glide bomb usage, in particular, signals a shift toward leveling cities rather than targeting specific military assets. This aligns with the broader narrative of the war being about "subjugating Ukraine" and breaking its will to resist. The human cost of this aerial campaign is immense, with civilian infrastructure and defense industries under continuous assault. Ryan's refusal to sugarcoat the reality of these attacks serves as a stark reminder that for the people on the ground, the war is not a chess game but a fight for survival.

The Strategic Failure of Containment

Perhaps the most damning part of Ryan's assessment is his evaluation of Russia's ability to neutralize Ukraine's deep strike capabilities. He argues that despite Moscow's efforts to fortify its airspace, Ukraine has successfully turned the tables, striking deep into Russian territory to degrade its war-making capacity. "Ukraine's long-range strike operations reinforce that Russia cannot win this war," Ryan asserts. He points to the destruction of up to 40% of Russian oil refining capability as evidence of this failure. This is a critical point: if a major power like the United States or Saudi Arabia suffered such losses, it would trigger a national panic. Yet, in Russia, the response has been muted, suggesting a disconnect between the Kremlin's narrative of strength and the reality on the ground.

"The only assessment that can be made against this measure of success for Russia is that they are failing – and failing worse as each day goes on."

Ryan's argument is bolstered by the introduction of new Ukrainian weapons systems, such as the Flamingo missile, and improved integration of intelligence and targeting. This demonstrates that Ukraine is not just surviving but evolving into a more potent threat. The author notes that Ukraine's strikes are "precise, focused, and disciplined," avoiding the targeting of civilians while systematically dismantling Russia's economic and military infrastructure. This contrasts sharply with Russia's own tactics, highlighting a moral and strategic divergence between the two sides. Critics might suggest that Russia's internal security apparatus is simply better at hiding the extent of the damage, but the economic indicators and the visible destruction of refineries tell a different story.

"Nothing demonstrates this more than the increasingly dangerous (for Russia) long-range strike campaign being executed with precision, focus and discipline by Ukraine."

Bottom Line

Ryan's most compelling contribution is his insistence on measuring success by strategic outcomes rather than territorial inches, revealing that Russia's "victories" are pyrrhic and its failures are systemic. While the Kremlin may claim momentum, the evidence of 350,000 casualties and the collapse of its air defense against deep strikes suggests a trajectory toward strategic exhaustion rather than victory. The reader should watch closely for how the administration's diplomatic pressure interacts with these military realities, as the window for a favorable Russian outcome is rapidly closing.

Deep Dives

Explore these related deep dives:

  • Deep operation

    The article discusses Russian military doctrine including double envelopment and multiple axes of advance. Deep operation is the Soviet/Russian military theory of conducting simultaneous offensive operations across multiple fronts to overwhelm enemy defenses - directly relevant to understanding Russian strategic thinking in Ukraine.

  • HESA Shahed 136

    The article extensively discusses Shahed drone usage, noting Russia deploys 170+ per day. Understanding the technical specifications, Iranian origins, and tactical employment of this specific loitering munition would provide valuable context for readers trying to understand the aerial warfare dimension.

  • Battle of Debaltseve

    The article references Russian double envelopment tactics around Pokrovsk and the Donbas fortress cities. The 2015 Battle of Debaltseve was a pivotal example of Russian encirclement tactics in the same region, providing historical precedent for current operations and illustrating how Russia has refined these approaches.

Sources

Can Russia win in Ukraine on its current trajectory: Assessing Russia’s 2025 war effort

by Mick Ryan · Mick Ryan · Read full article

May 2025 be our year. The year of Ukraine. We know that peace will not be given to us as a gift. But we will do everything to stop Russia and end the war. This is what each of us wishes for. President Zelenskyy, 2025 New Year Message.

Russian advances on the ground in Ukraine this year, while limited compared to the resources expended to secure them, provide an insight into the mindset of the Russian military leadership and importantly, President Putin. This war is much less about territorial gain than it is about political gain. That should not be a surprise. But too much of the reporting on the war is reduced to square kilometres gained or lost, and numbers of drones used in Russia’s nightly, continuous aerial assaults against Ukrainian infrastructure, defence industry and civilian targets.

Throughout the course of this war, I have proposed measures of success and failure to provide more illumination about how Russia, and Ukraine, are going in this war, and to inform debate on its trajectory. These measures are also important because, if used consistently, they can also yield political and military lessons about Russia and Ukraine for western military and civilian analysts of the war.

Over the past year, Russia has built strategic momentum with its ground and aerial assaults on Ukraine. While this has been insufficient to deliver a decisive military victory for Russia, it has underpinned its diplomacy to gain limited support from the Trump administration for forcing a ceasefire on Ukraine that is advantageous to Russia. While Putin’s efforts in this regard have stalled of late, they have not been entirely wasted.

Russia retains has the strategic initiative in this war. And, over the past three years, it has learned to learn better, to adapt systemically and harness its relationships with Iran, China and North Korea to support its war effort. And, as I wrote in a just-published white paper for the Center for Strategic and International Studies: “It is very likely that Russian efforts to “learn how to learn better” in the past three years have achieved critical mass and are now paying dividends at the tactical and strategic levels.”

But what does that really mean for Russia’s prospects in the war? And what is the possibility of President Putin achieving his political and strategic objectives of subjugating Ukraine, keeping Ukraine militarily neutral and ensuring Ukraine is not ...