The internet is not dying from a single catastrophic failure, but from a slow, deliberate fragmentation driven by national sovereignty and corporate gatekeeping. The Hated One presents a chilling thesis: the unified global network we take for granted is already being replaced by a "multiverse of parallel internets," where access is permissioned, content is curated by algorithms, and the very protocols of connection are being rewritten to exclude the outside world.
The Architecture of Isolation
The piece begins by dismantling the assumption that the internet is a natural, inevitable force. Instead, The Hated One explains it as a fragile consensus built on unique identifiers known as IP addresses. "Every phone, laptop, website or server has to have one and no two devices or servers can have the same ip address," they write, highlighting the delicate coordination managed by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). This is a crucial distinction: the global internet exists only because nations agree to play by the same rules.
The argument gains urgency when examining how this consensus is fraying. The Hated One points to Ukraine's request for ICANN to remove Russian IP addresses as a turning point. While ICANN rejected the move on technical and structural grounds, the real story lies in the reaction. "The only actor that can effectively shut down russia's internet is kremlin itself," the author notes, before detailing Moscow's preparation for a "sovereign splinternet" dubbed the "Runet." By testing a national domain name system that can function independently of global consensus, Russia is effectively building a firewall around its digital economy. This isn't just about censorship; it's about resilience against external pressure, a move that could trigger an "internet arms race" where nations feel encouraged to launch cyber attacks without fear of collateral damage.
If more countries or blocks follow suit it could start an information cold war.
Critics might argue that national firewalls are a necessary defense against foreign interference and disinformation, but The Hated One effectively counters that this logic inevitably leads to a world where "the concept of reaching anyone across the world would be completely alien."
The Corporate Gatekeepers
The coverage shifts compellingly from state actors to the private sector, arguing that the "splinternet" is already being built by tech giants who act as quasi-infrastructure providers. The Hated One identifies a dangerous concentration of power: "Amazon web services runs cloud operations for many major services with a monopoly nearing market share," while Google and Apple control the vast majority of search and device access. When these companies make business decisions, they effectively carve up the internet for their users.
The author illustrates this with the example of Apple removing news apps from the Chinese App Store. "Apple's decision curated a splinternet for iphone users in china," they write, noting that unlike Android users, iPhone owners had no workaround. This highlights a critical vulnerability: the internet is only as open as the most restrictive gatekeeper allows. The piece further argues that the European Union's pressure on tech companies to ban Russian media, while well-intentioned, risks "fulfilling the demands for content censorship on social media and search engines" and further splintering the global network.
The most insidious aspect of this corporate fragmentation, according to The Hated One, is the algorithmic filter bubble. "Google has admitted their algorithm has a filter bubble problem," the author states, explaining how personalization creates a reality where users never see content they haven't explicitly engaged with. This creates a soft splinternet where users are isolated not by firewalls, but by their own data profiles.
The Chinese Blueprint
Perhaps the most alarming section of the piece details China's move to not just restrict the current internet, but to replace its underlying protocol. The Hated One describes a "top-down design for a global network" where access is permissioned and anonymity is erased. "In china you would have to apply for a license to do [host a website]," the author explains, contrasting this with the current "leaky" global internet where anyone can host content.
The proposed new IP framework would hard-code access controls, allowing administrators to operate a "whitelist mode" for devices and apps. "All data on the new ip would be shared with the government and used to serve ai big data and machine learning applications," The Hated One warns. This is not merely a national project; the author suggests China could offer this framework as a service to developing nations, exporting a model of controlled connectivity that prioritizes state surveillance over open communication.
The new ip would hard code access controls into the protocol to allow the chinese sensors to restrict devices and networks on an automated basis.
While the Chinese model offers a stark vision of a permissioned internet, a counterargument worth considering is whether the technical complexity of replacing the global IP protocol is feasible on a global scale, or if it remains a theoretical threat for now.
The Path to a Peer-to-Peer Future
Despite the grim outlook, The Hated One concludes with a technological solution: bypassing the infrastructure entirely. The author argues that the trust in telecommunications providers is the core issue, and that the solution lies in "creating our own mesh network of peer-to-peer connections." By utilizing Bluetooth and Wi-Fi to route traffic between devices, users could create a network that doesn't rely on the ground wires or satellites controlled by governments or corporations.
The piece highlights projects like Briar and Cushe as early steps toward this vision. "Neither of these are mesh networks as they do not route traffic but the first peer-to-peer network that begins offering mesh routing would be our best chance to create a truly permissionless neutral and consent based internet," the author writes. This is a bold claim: that the only way to save the internet is to build a new one from the bottom up, one that cannot be taken down by any single authority.
Bottom Line
The Hated One's most powerful contribution is reframing the "splinternet" not as a distant dystopia, but as an active, accelerating process driven by both state sovereignty and corporate consolidation. The argument's greatest strength is its technical specificity regarding IP addresses and protocol design, which grounds the fear of fragmentation in hard reality. However, the proposed solution of peer-to-peer mesh networks remains a significant vulnerability; while theoretically sound, it currently lacks the scale and reliability to replace the global infrastructure for billions of users. The reader should watch closely for the next iteration of China's new IP framework, as that will be the true test of whether the global internet can be rewritten from the top down.