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What strategy for labor?

Eric Blanc cuts through the noise of modern labor strategy with a provocative claim: the path to reversing decades of union decline isn't just about winning better campaigns, but fundamentally changing who holds the steering wheel. While many observers focus on the latest high-profile strike, Blanc argues that the current model is structurally incapable of scaling to the tens of millions of workers needed to counter the rise of oligarchy. This is not a plea for more resources; it is a demand for a new architecture of power that leverages digital tools to make worker-led organizing the default, not the exception.

The Scalability Imperative

Blanc's central thesis rests on a stark reality check regarding the limits of traditional union structures. He engages with critics like Peter Olney, Jane Slaughter, and Ben Fong, acknowledging their valid points while dismantling what he sees as their fatal flaw: a failure to grasp the math of scale. "While improving the tactical quality of union campaigns is crucial, it isn't enough on its own to organize a sufficiently large number workers for systemic change," Blanc writes. This distinction is vital. It separates the goal of winning a single battle from the necessity of winning the war.

What strategy for labor?

The author argues that the "staff-intensive" model, where paid organizers do the heavy lifting, hits a hard ceiling. Even with deep pockets, established unions cannot afford to send staff into every workplace to replicate the success of recent victories at companies like Starbucks or Amazon. Blanc posits that the only way to break this ceiling is to shift the division of labor. He defines his proposed model as one where "workers have a decisive say on strategy, and workers begin organizing before receiving guidance from a parent union, and/or workers train and guide other workers in organizing methods." This isn't just romantic idealism; it is a logistical necessity. As he notes, "we need to replace a blurry image of worker-to-worker organizing with a high-definition picture." Without this clarity, the movement remains stuck in a cycle of isolated wins that fail to transform the broader economy.

Critics might argue that relying on unpaid worker leaders risks burnout or inconsistency, especially in the face of aggressive corporate legal teams. Blanc anticipates this, pointing to the NewsGuild's national Member Organizer Program as proof that rigorous training can be institutionalized. He suggests that without such systems, the movement cannot hope to absorb the thousands of workers who have recently expressed interest in unionizing but have nowhere to turn.

Without such clarity, it'll be hard to diffuse a new grassroots model or to counter the claims of its skeptics.

The Digital Advantage and Strategic Targets

A key differentiator in Blanc's argument is his insistence that the historical precedents of the 1930s are not a perfect blueprint because the terrain has changed. He challenges the notion that worker-led organizing is entirely new, admitting, "I'm definitely not the first person to make the case that putting workers into the driver's seat is the key to building a powerful mass labor movement." However, he contends that the specific practices are distinct today due to technology. "It's now possible through digital technologies for workers to train, co-strategize, and initiate organizing campaigns with other workers anywhere in the country," he explains. This capability allows for a "mass seeding" of drives that was physically impossible a century ago.

Blanc also tackles the debate over where to organize. While some strategists insist on focusing solely on manufacturing and logistics—sectors with traditional economic chokepoints—Blanc argues this ignores the reality of the modern economy. Services now make up over 75 percent of America's GDP, and the workforce is dispersed. He warns against a "hyper-concentrated strategy" that fails to inspire the broader working class. Instead, he advocates for targeting sectors with high "social power," such as teachers and federal workers, who can galvanize public support even if they lack immediate economic leverage. "Federal workers, at the heart of today's fight against authoritarianism and austerity, will have to do the same," he writes, linking labor strategy directly to the defense of democratic institutions.

This reframing is particularly relevant given the decentralized nature of modern corporations. Blanc notes that "the largest corporations in the US are now generally dispersed into relatively small workplaces scattered across the country." In this environment, the ability to coordinate across thousands of small nodes via digital tools becomes the primary source of leverage, rather than a single massive strike at a factory gate. He points out that even economically powerful workers can lose without sufficient social power, citing the historical failures of manufacturing strikes before the New Deal provided a political shield.

Winning the War vs. Winning Battles

The most contentious part of Blanc's analysis is his critique of how the labor movement handles moments of victory. He uses the example of the Amazon Labor Union's election win at JFK8, where the union lacked the capacity to onboard the nearly thousand workers who immediately sought help. "The ALU had neither the capacity nor organizing vision to onboard these workers; failing to initiate any mass training to absorb them, ALU missed an unprecedented opportunity for scaling up," Blanc observes. This failure, he argues, is symptomatic of a movement that is good at winning specific elections but bad at building a lasting infrastructure for growth.

He pushes back against the idea that better tactics alone will solve the problem. "If good tactics continue to be paired with a staff-intensive model, labor can't scale up," he asserts. The solution, according to Blanc, is to use the financial assets of the labor movement to fund mass training and digital outreach, effectively "seeding" new drives in strategic industries. He asks a rhetorical question that cuts to the heart of the issue: "Why not use labor's access to a huge amount of voter data to call or knock the doors of every voter who works at Amazon, Walmart, and FedEx to generate leads for ambitious national unionization campaigns at these companies?"

Critics might note that this approach places a heavy burden on rank-and-file workers who may lack the time or resources to organize effectively without significant institutional support. Blanc acknowledges the need for experienced staff but insists their role must shift from doing the work to training workers to do it themselves. The argument is that the "staffing-resource dilemma is primary," and until the movement solves the equation of how to multiply worker leaders, it will remain a niche player in the American economy.

Bottom Line

Eric Blanc's strongest contribution is his refusal to treat the current wave of unionization as a self-sustaining miracle; instead, he frames it as a fragile opportunity that requires a radical shift in operational strategy to survive. The argument's biggest vulnerability lies in the practical difficulty of scaling worker-led training programs without the very staff-heavy infrastructure he seeks to minimize. The labor movement must now decide whether to cling to the comfort of traditional organizing or risk the complexity of a truly decentralized, digital-first model to secure its future.

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What strategy for labor?

by Eric Blanc · Labor Politics · Read full article

What can we do to turn around decades of union decline? This is the key challenge of our era, because the power of a revitalized labor movement is needed to pull America off its descent into oligarchy and authoritarianism. There are no easy answers, which is why I welcome the responses of union organizer Peter Olney, Labor Notes co-founder Jane Slaughter, and labor scholar Ben Fong to my new book We Are the Union: How Worker-to-Worker Organizing is Revitalizing Labor and Winning Big.

Whereas Slaughter and Olney’s critical-but-comradely reviews accurately address my book’s major arguments, Fong’s dismissive polemic is marred by strawman claims and tendentious logic. Nevertheless, all of their pieces raise important questions about just how new worker-to-worker unionism is; the role and industrial scope of strategic targeting in our contemporary political economy; and the generalizability of the campaigns profiled in the book. I’ll do my best here to address their major criticisms.

Is the Model New?

The starting point of Fong’s critique is his case that worker-to-worker unionism “is not a fundamentally ‘new model’ of organizing.” There’s a lot of truth to this. Indeed, I explicitly highlight the roots and commonalities of recent worker-led unionization campaigns with their historic predecessors in the 1930s and earlier. As I write in the book, “I’m definitely not the first person to make the case that putting workers into the driver’s seat is the key to building a powerful mass labor movement. … We Are the Union makes a new case for an old strategy.”

But contrary to Fong’s claims that I am self-servingly “overhyping a branded ‘model,’” the actual reason I conceptualize worker-to-worker unionism as “new” is that a) the specific organizing practices and structures of today’s worker-led efforts are significantly different than they were a century ago, and b) if labor is going to scale up, it’s necessary to be very specific about what worker-to-worker unionism refers to, since critics wrongly assume it requires romanticizing “spontaneity” and since so many unions continue to frame their unscalable, staff-intensive efforts as “grassroots” or “bottom-up.”

Here’s how I put it: “we need to replace a blurry image of worker-to-worker organizing with a high-definition picture. Without such clarity, it’ll be hard to diffuse a new grassroots model or to counter the claims of its skeptics.”

I define the worker-to-worker model as one in which organizing is relatively lightly staffed, and therefore scalable, because “1) ...