The Time Machine Behind Falling Birth Rates
Richard Hanania opens with a stark observation that cuts through conventional economic thinking. The relationship between wealth and fertility is nearly universal, he notes, but something darker is happening beneath the surface. Even when countries reach the same income levels as previous generations, they produce far fewer children.
Wealth Isn't the Whole Story
Richard Hanania writes, "As countries get wealthier, fertility drops. This relationship is nearly universal, and its implications are very dark." The data shows Ukraine today at just $6,000 GDP per capita with a fertility rate of 0.98 — below replacement level. Nepal reached similar lows at comparable income. This pattern didn't exist in the 18s or 199s.
East Asia illustrates the drift most dramatically. China crossed the $20,000 threshold in 2021 with a fertility rate of 1.12. When Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan hit that same mark between the late 197s and early 199s, they maintained rates between 1.7 and 1.8. Richard Hanania points out that "the later an East Asian country achieved $20,000, the lower its fertility at that moment."
"It seems that pro-natalists are battling against time itself."
Critics might note that China's one-child policy distorts this comparison — state coercion, not cultural drift, explains much of that gap. But the pattern holds across non-coercive societies too.
The Opportunity Cost of Modern Life
Richard Hanania writes, "When you're richer, the alternatives to having children get much better. If your labor is worth $50,000 a year, focusing on raising kids is less likely to be seen as worthwhile than if it is worth $10,000 a year." Yet $50,000 in 2025 buys a smartphone that didn't exist in 1980, regardless of income. About two-thirds of people in middle-income countries like China, Brazil, and Indonesia now have smartphones.
The US in 1955 had GDP per capita equivalent to Paraguay or Kosovo today. But modern nations at that wealth level access the internet, streaming, and endless digital alternatives to leaving home. Richard Hanania puts it plainly: "Perhaps they are just the latest in a series of new technologies that isolate people from one another and give them reasons to stay inside." Before smartphones came radio, TV, cable, video games — each iteration pulling people inward.
Culture as the Invisible Hand
Richard Hanania writes, "There's a global culture that has become more anti-family and anti-child over time." The Brazil case study is striking. Between 1970 and 1991, television access jumped from 8% to 81% of Brazilians. Fertility dropped from 5.8 to 2.9 births per woman. Rede Globo's soap operas featured small families and emancipatory values. Researchers attribute about 17% of the fertility decline to Rede Globo's reach alone.
But culture can shift the other direction. In late 2007, Georgia's Patriarch Ilia II promised to personally baptize any baby born into families with two or more children. Richard Hanania notes that "the causal mechanism is so simple and straightforward" — fertility boosted literally nine months after the announcement. Over 16 years, the Patriarch baptized over 48,000 godchildren, roughly eight per day.
Critics might note that Georgia's population was under four million — a scale that makes personal promises feasible. The Pope cannot offer the same to 1.3 billion Catholics without losing the intimacy that made Georgia work.
Policy's Limited Reach
Richard Hanania writes, "China and South Korea today are trying to encourage more births, and have had limited if any success." Brazil never engaged in family planning policies — it even banned contraception advertising until 1979 and criminalizes most abortion today. Fertility fell anyway, driven by technology and culture despite government conservatism.
On subsidies, Richard Hanania offers a provocative view: "At the point government is spending a lot of money on increasing births, it will indicate that the battle has largely been won." In democracies, states fund what citizens value. If society spent on babies near what it spends on Social Security, consensus on children's importance would already exist.
Bottom Line
Richard Hanania's argument cuts deeper than standard economic explanations for fertility decline. The data shows something more troubling: time itself is the headwind, with technology and culture pulling each generation further from replacement rates regardless of income. The Georgia example proves cultural interventions can work, but scaling them remains the unsolved challenge. Whether subsidies win or lose, Richard Hanania concludes that "partaking in this movement can increase the salience of the fertility issue and provide opportunities to convince people that creating new life is a good thing." The verdict: pessimism on policy, but not on persuasion.