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China May produce drones for Russia

This piece cuts through the noise of routine diplomatic statements to reveal a terrifying convergence: China is not just watching the war in Ukraine, it is actively preparing to cross the threshold into lethal aid while simultaneously manipulating global energy markets to influence the outcome of the American election. Joseph Webster argues that the stakes have shifted from passive neutrality to active, calculated interference, where the price of a barrel of oil becomes a weapon in a democracy's ballot box.

The Threshold of Lethal Aid

Webster opens by noting that while Beijing has long skirted the edges of sanctions, a new phase appears to be dawning. He points to recent military maneuvers as the leading indicator of this shift. "Chinese soldiers conducted combined exercises with Belarusian forces on July 6, two days after Minsk joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization," Webster writes. While he admits these drills are not unprecedented, he insists the context makes them "striking." The author suggests that the symbolism of China training with a key Russian ally, immediately after that ally joins a Beijing-led bloc, signals a deepening of the military axis that goes beyond mere posturing.

China May produce drones for Russia

The core of Webster's concern lies in the specific nature of this cooperation. He argues that Beijing is reportedly "ratcheting up this assistance by developing attack drones for Russia, in partnership with Iran." This is a critical distinction. The article posits that China is moving toward "providing lethal assistance, a threshold it previously has not crossed." If true, this represents a fundamental escalation in the conflict, potentially altering the balance of firepower on the ground in Ukraine. Critics might note that verifying the transfer of lethal technology is notoriously difficult, and Beijing could simply be engaging in plausible deniability while selling dual-use components. However, Webster's framing suggests that the distinction between "dual-use" and "lethal" is becoming increasingly thin as the war drags on.

"Beijing appears more and more likely to back the Kremlin's aggression in Ukraine overtly, possibly even by providing lethal assistance, a threshold it previously has not crossed."

The human cost of this potential escalation cannot be overstated. Every drone manufactured in this partnership carries the potential to destroy a home, a hospital, or a school. By analyzing the military ties, Webster forces us to confront the reality that the war's duration and intensity may soon be sustained by a new industrial partnership between Beijing and Moscow.

Energy as a Weapon of Electoral Interference

The commentary then pivots to a more subtle, yet perhaps more dangerous, form of interference: the manipulation of energy markets. Webster draws on reporting from the commodity firm Vortexa to highlight a peculiar trend: China is reportedly stockpiling significant amounts of crude oil. "Beijing seems to be hedging against – or possibly attempting to influence – the outcome of the upcoming US election," he writes. This is a bold claim that reframes a standard economic maneuver as a geopolitical strike.

Webster's logic is that the administration in Washington is calculating its energy policy based on the assumption that China will not disrupt the market. However, if Beijing floods the market with demand to build reserves, it could drive up global prices. "Since rising oil prices raise the probability of a Trump victory in the US election, it's possible that Beijing is putting its thumb on the scale for one candidate," Webster argues. He suggests that authoritarian governments prefer economic levers over disinformation because they are harder to trace and more immediately impactful on the voter's wallet.

This argument rests on the assumption that the Chinese leadership is actively trying to install a specific US president. A counterargument worth considering is that China's stockpiling is purely defensive—a hedge against the volatility of global supply chains or a response to domestic economic needs, rather than a targeted hit on a specific candidate. Yet, Webster's point about the "incentive structure" remains potent: even if the intent is not malicious, the effect is the same. "Economic levers – not disinformation campaigns – are authoritarian governments' preferred method of electoral interference," he asserts. This reframes the election not just as a domestic contest, but as a theater of great power competition where the price of gasoline is a strategic variable.

The Internal Rot of the Kremlin

Finally, Webster turns his gaze inward to the Russian political system, focusing on the deteriorating health of Vladimir Kara-Murza, a prominent dissident. The author describes Kara-Murza's move to a prison hospital as an "ominous development," especially given his history of being poisoned by Kremlin agents. Webster draws a chilling parallel to the death of Alexei Navalny, suggesting that the Russian security services are operating as a "murderous adhocracy."

He argues that the Kremlin's tolerance of these killings creates a dangerous precedent for the Russian elite itself. "If Putin signals that he will meet murder Russian elite political opponents, he will deter many rivals but potentially incentivize others to fight to the death," Webster writes. This is a profound insight into the psychology of authoritarianism: the very tools used to eliminate dissent eventually turn on the dictator. Webster contrasts Putin's path with that of Nursultan Nazarbayev and Boris Yeltsin, who managed to leave power without being liquidated because they avoided the institutionalization of political murder.

"Institutionalizing intra-elite murders makes it more likely that his exit from the stage will be violent."

The tragedy here is twofold. First, the immediate human suffering of Kara-Murza and the countless others silenced by the state. Second, the long-term destabilization of Russia, where the fear of assassination ensures that no political transition can ever be peaceful. Webster's analysis suggests that the current violence is not just a tool of control, but a trap that will eventually consume the regime's own leadership.

Bottom Line

Webster's most compelling contribution is the synthesis of military, economic, and internal political dynamics to show a system in motion toward greater aggression and instability. The strongest part of his argument is the link between China's energy decisions and US electoral volatility, a connection often overlooked in favor of more obvious diplomatic snubs. The biggest vulnerability remains the difficulty of proving intent behind China's stockpiling, though the potential impact is undeniable. Readers should watch the next few months for any spike in global oil prices or confirmation of Chinese drone production lines, as these will be the first concrete signs that the world is entering a new, more volatile phase of this conflict.

Sources

China May produce drones for Russia

by Joseph Webster · China-Russia Report · Read full article

Beijing may soon back Moscow more openly and forcefully. Chinese soldiers conducted combined exercises with Belarusian forces on July 6, two days after Minsk joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. While these exercises are not unprecedented and their implications shouldn’t be overstated, the timing and context are nevertheless striking.

While Beijing has shied from technically violating sanctions, it has nevertheless provided substantial material and informational assistance to Moscow throughout the conflict. Beijing is reportedly ratcheting up this assistance by developing attack drones for Russia, in partnership with Iran. Beijing appears more and more likely to back the Kremlin’s aggression in Ukraine overtly, possibly even by providing lethal assistance, a threshold it previously has not crossed.

Turning to energy markets, Beijing is reportedly stockpiling significant amounts of crude oil, according to Reuters reporting from the Vortexa commodity firm. Beijing seems to be hedging against – or possibly attempting to influence – the outcome of the upcoming US election.

There are more signs that developments in Chinese gasoline and electric vehicles (EV) markets will gradually impact bilateral ties. CNPC released an interesting note on QQ about declining gasoline demand on stronger EV uptake and improving fuel economy across the vehicle fleet.

The interplay between EVs and gasoline demand will increasingly impact Sino-Russian ties. On a personal note, I moved from my hometown (Salisbury, MD) to Houston in early 2018 to work in energy largely because I anticipated that the sector would gradually but increasingly shape bilateral ties between Russia and China, and geopolitics more broadly. Six years later, there is more evidence to support that thesis. In another six years’ time Beijing and Moscow may find it increasingly difficult to manage contradictions between their respective interests in EVs and oil, although incentives for bilateral convergence and alignment will likely continue to persist.  

Finally, there is growing alarm about the health of Vladimir Kara-Murza, the Russian dissident. In an ominous development, Kara-Murza has been moved to a prison hospital while his lawyers say they are being denied access to him. The situation is especially alarming since Kara-Murza was poisoned in 2015 and 2017, almost certainly by agents of the Kremlin. There are also parallels between his confinement in the Russian prison system and the treatment of Alexei Navalny, who was almost certainly murdered while in custody.

It’s possible that Putin has already ordered the execution of Kara-Murza, but the Russian force structures may ...