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China’s AI optimism isn’t what it seems

Jordan Schneider dismantles the comforting American assumption that China's embrace of artificial intelligence stems from technological utopianism, arguing instead that it is a trauma response forged in the fires of the 1990s economic collapse. While Washington frets over AI-induced joblessness, Schneider reveals a society that has already lived through a far more brutal industrial reckoning, teaching its citizens to view disruption not as a crisis to be halted, but as an inevitable force to be survived. This is not a story about a rival superpower's optimism; it is a mirror reflecting the painful cost of the very market forces the West now seeks to regulate.

The Myth of Enthusiasm

Schneider begins by dismantling the polling data that suggests Chinese citizens are simply more open to automation. He notes that while over 85% of Chinese respondents view AI as beneficial compared to less than 45% in the United States, this "optimism" is a misreading of a deeper societal conditioning. The core of his argument is that this acceptance is not born of faith in the technology, but of a historical memory where resisting change was never an option. As Schneider writes, "The answer is not a narrative about AI, but about an earlier transformation also perceived as inevitable." This reframing is crucial because it shifts the analytical lens from cultural preference to structural necessity.

China’s AI optimism isn’t what it seems

He draws a sharp distinction between the American desire to pause or regulate AI and the Chinese historical reality where slowing development was never a viable policy choice. The administration's historical narrative, rooted in the fear of falling behind, dictates that progress must be pursued regardless of the human toll. Schneider captures this mindset perfectly: "For China's policymakers, slowing development was never an option." This historical imperative explains why the public tolerates the churn of automation; the alternative, in their collective memory, is stagnation and national vulnerability. Critics might argue that this view underestimates the genuine excitement for tech in China's booming coastal cities, but Schneider's point is that even that excitement is underpinned by a fear of being left behind.

"Accurately interpreting that response — which is often misleadingly called 'enthusiasm' — is essential to understanding that worried Americans watching China's AI frenzy might not be looking at a rival but into a mirror."

The Ghosts of Shenyang

To understand the Chinese psyche, Schneider takes the reader to the rust belt of the northeast, specifically the city of Shenyang, once known as the "Eastern Ruhr." He details the catastrophic collapse of the state sector in the late 1990s, a period known as xiagang, or "stepping down from the post." This was not a gentle transition; it was a systemic dismantling where over 24 million workers lost their jobs, and entire cities like Shenyang saw half their industrial workforce laid off in a few years. Schneider notes that in Liaoning province, the state was laying off nearly 1,700 workers every single day.

The human cost was absolute because the danwei, or work unit, was not just an employer but a total social world providing housing, healthcare, and identity. When the factories closed, the social fabric unraveled. Schneider recounts the harrowing fieldwork of economist Wu Xiaobo in Shenyang, who documented families folding poison into dumplings and workers lying on railway tracks. "For many workers in the northeast, employment was everything," Schneider observes. The loss of a job was a loss of dignity, community, and the very definition of being a "master of the nation." This historical trauma explains why the current generation does not panic at the prospect of AI replacing jobs; they have already survived the moment when the state told them they were surplus.

The Social Darwinist Turn

The article's most chilling insight is how this economic shockwave reshaped the moral compass of the nation. As the northeast collapsed while the coastal Pearl River Delta flourished, a brutal social Darwinism took root. Those who succeeded in the new economy viewed the failures of their neighbors not as victims of structural forces, but as individuals who lacked the grit to adapt. Schneider writes, "The paradox of the era was that as much of China's population was losing jobs, an emerging group of poor people... was growing rich overnight."

This created a culture where the burden of failure was internalized. In rural Liaoning, villagers looked down on neighbors who could not find work overseas, asking, "why have others gone overseas successfully but you can't?" This mindset, Schneider argues, is now the default response to AI: if the technology takes your job, it is your fault for not being skilled enough to pivot. The state attempted to cushion the blow with re-employment centers and microloans, but as Schneider points out, "the scale of the problem overwhelmed the response." Funds were embezzled, and the mismatch between old industrial skills and new market demands left millions behind. The lesson learned by the survivors was that the system is relentless, and the only permissible response is to adapt or perish.

"In a society that for decades had told them workers were the masters of the nation, the sudden sense that they were surplus, inefficient, and unwanted imposed a burden that no severance payment could address."

Bottom Line

Schneider's most powerful contribution is exposing the "optimism" around Chinese AI not as a cultural trait, but as a scar tissue formed by the xiagang era. The argument is strongest in its historical grounding, using the specific tragedy of Shenyang to explain a national attitude that baffles Western observers. However, the piece risks overgeneralizing a complex, diverse population into a single monolith of trauma, potentially overlooking the genuine, unburdened excitement of China's digital-native generation. The takeaway for the busy observer is clear: when the West debates pausing AI, it is debating a luxury that a society which has already endured the collapse of its entire economic foundation simply cannot afford. The real story isn't about the technology; it's about the price of survival.

Deep Dives

Explore these related deep dives:

  • Xiagang

    This term describes the specific mechanism of 'laying off' state-owned enterprise workers without formally terminating their employment, which directly explains the historical trauma of mass unemployment that the article argues shapes China's current acceptance of AI-driven job displacement.

  • Shenyang

    As the epicenter of China's rust belt collapse in Shenyang, this specific location embodies the 'great mansion collapsed' imagery in the article's lyrics, providing the concrete geographic and emotional context for the generational memory of industrial upheaval.

Sources

China’s AI optimism isn’t what it seems

by Jordan Schneider · ChinaTalk · Read full article

This article was originally published in Asterisk Magazine.

Americans — left, right, and everywhere in between — seem to be afraid of AI. They fear data centers speeding up climate change, disinformation and deepfakes, AI companionship, and, above all, job loss from automation. Meanwhile, the Chinese public seems to be perfectly fine with the technology, or even “optimistic” about it.

The polling data is striking: Stanford University’s 2026 AI Index Report shows that more than 85% of Chinese respondents see AI as more beneficial than harmful, compared to less than 45% of respondents in the United States. A 2025 report published by the University of Queensland and KPMG Australia revealed that 73% of Chinese respondents are willing to trust AI system outputs and share relevant information with AI at work, and 88% intentionally use the technology, compared to 52% and 48% of Americans, respectively.

Why does Chinese society, which suffers from acute job loss and a youth unemployment rate close to 17%, embrace a technology it knows is likely to take away more jobs?

The question was answered three decades ago. The answer is not a narrative about AI, but about an earlier transformation also perceived as inevitable. It is a story about how Chinese society has learned, through repeated upheaval, what it believes to be the only permissible response to disruption. Accurately interpreting that response — which is often misleadingly called “enthusiasm” — is essential to understanding that worried Americans watching China’s AI frenzy might not be looking at a rival but into a mirror.

The millennium that broke two ways.

Lived this way for thirty yearsUntil the great mansion collapsedThe deep, dark cloudsAre drowning the view in my heart.

如此生活三十年 ruci shenghuo sanshi nian直到大厦崩塌 zhidao dasha bengta云层深处的黑暗啊 yunceng shenchu de hei’an a淹没心底的景观 yanmo xindi de jingguan– “Killing the One from Shijiazhuang,” Omnipotent Youth Society, 2010

In December 1978, reeling from the economic wreckage of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, China’s Communist Party formally shifted its central task from class struggle to economic construction, launching Deng Xiaoping’s “Reform and Opening Up” and beginning a gradual dismantling of three decades of central planning. In 1992, the country formally declared a turn toward a socialist market economy — an acknowledgment that market forces, not central planners, would now drive growth.

The country’s enterprises, built for a planned economy, were suddenly exposed to market competition — and consequently began ...