Alex O'Connor tackles a paradox that has haunted moral philosophers for decades: how can an action be wrong if the person affected by it is grateful to exist? In "The Biggest Unsolved Problem of Philosophy in 100 Years," O'Connor moves beyond abstract theory to expose a terrifying gap in our ethical logic, using real-world scenarios from IVF clinics to teenage pregnancy ads to prove that our intuition about harm is fundamentally broken.
The Time Dependence Claim
O'Connor begins by dismantling a common fantasy: the idea that we could have lived different lives with different parents or in different eras. He argues that our identity is inextricably linked to the exact moment of our conception. "If you weren't conceived exactly when you actually were, then you simply wouldn't exist," O'Connor writes. This isn't just a biological fact; it is the foundation of the "nonidentity problem," a concept he credits to philosopher Derek Parfit. The author's framing is sharp here, immediately forcing the listener to confront the fragility of their own existence. By establishing that a different conception results in a completely different person, he sets a trap for our moral intuitions.
The Trap of Intuition
To illustrate the problem, O'Connor presents two scenarios. In the first, a pregnant woman intentionally disables her fetus to gain sympathy. The moral verdict is clear: she has harmed her child. But in the second scenario, a woman with a temporary condition chooses to conceive immediately rather than waiting a month, ensuring her child is born disabled. Here, the logic shifts. "If the mother had waited to conceive, it's not that that child would have been born able-bodied. It's just that another different able-bodied child would have been born instead," O'Connor explains. This distinction is the crux of the argument. The first child can claim they were wronged; the second child, if asked, would likely say, "Of course I wouldn't change her decision because if she waited a month to conceive instead, I never would have existed and I'm glad that I'm alive."
The brilliance of O'Connor's coverage lies in how he exposes the contradiction in our reactions. We feel the second mother did something wrong, yet we cannot identify a victim. "It seems natural to say that if something is bad, it has to be bad for someone," he notes, pointing out that the child is actually better off for existing than for never existing. This creates a logical impasse where an action feels immoral, but no one is made worse off. A counterargument worth considering is that this logic could be used to justify neglecting future generations, but O'Connor anticipates this by showing how Parfit himself rejects the idea that these actions are permissible.
Real-World Implications
O'Connor refuses to let the argument remain in the realm of thought experiments. He pivots to in vitro fertilization (IVF), where parents can select embryos based on genetic traits. He cites a study finding that some deaf parents intentionally choose embryos that will be born deaf. "They intentionally chose particular embryos because of the presence of a disease or a disability," O'Connor states, highlighting the disturbing reality that this isn't hypothetical. The author effectively uses this to show that the nonidentity problem is already influencing reproductive choices. If a deaf child is born because of this choice, they cannot claim to be harmed, as a hearing child would have been a different person entirely.
Cases like these are what Derek Parfit described in the 80s. Cases where in order to avoid some negative outcome for a person, a different nonidentical person would have to exist instead.
The commentary then turns to public health campaigns, specifically New York's anti-teen pregnancy ads. O'Connor points out the logical flaw in telling a child, "I'm twice as likely not to graduate high school because you had me as a teen." He argues that while teenage pregnancy has many downsides, the child cannot claim to be worse off than the alternative, which is non-existence. "As long as their life is worth living overall, they can't have been made worse off by something which is responsible for their very existence," he asserts. This is a provocative stance that challenges the very language of public policy.
The Three Claims That Can't Coexist
The author distills the problem into three conflicting beliefs that most people hold simultaneously. First, that something bad must be bad for someone. Second, that something can't be bad for someone without making them worse off. Third, that cases like the intentional disabling of a fetus are bad. "Paret points out basically that these three statements can't all be true at the same time," O'Connor writes. The solution, he suggests, requires abandoning one of these pillars. Many try to abandon the first, becoming utilitarians who argue we must maximize quality of life regardless of who exists. However, O'Connor notes this leads to uncomfortable conclusions, such as implying that a person born into hardship should have never been born at all.
Critics might argue that this utilitarian approach devalues the sanctity of individual life, but O'Connor's point is that our current moral framework is insufficient to handle these choices. He leaves the listener with the realization that we lack a coherent theory to explain why certain reproductive choices feel wrong when no specific individual is harmed.
Bottom Line
O'Connor's greatest strength is his ability to translate a dense philosophical paradox into a series of visceral, relatable dilemmas that expose the cracks in our moral reasoning. His biggest vulnerability is that the solution he outlines—abandoning the idea that harm requires a worse-off victim—feels counterintuitive and potentially dangerous to the average listener. This piece is essential listening for anyone who believes they have a clear definition of "harm."
If some kind of decision is made by a mother, for example, that makes no one involved worse off and actually makes everyone involved better off, how can we say that such a decision is wrong?