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Weekend update #192: Can Russia counter?

Phillips P. O'Brien cuts through the noise of military speculation to deliver a sobering reality check: the Russian war machine is not adapting; it is frantically reacting while its economic foundation crumbles. While much analysis focuses on the speed of drone warfare, this piece argues that the strategic adaptation cycle for long-range strikes and air defense is dangerously slow, leaving Moscow vulnerable just as Ukraine's offensive capabilities peak. For listeners tracking the geopolitical stakes, the most critical insight here is not about a specific weapon system, but the widening gap between Russia's desperate need to counterattack and its actual ability to do so before financial collapse sets in.

The Asymmetry of Adaptation

O'Brien begins by dismantling the common assumption that Russia will inevitably find a way to neutralize Ukraine's long-range campaign. He observes that while small, short-range drones see rapid tactical shifts, "top line adaptation in both long-range strike and interception has been a much slower process." This distinction is vital because it suggests that the window for strategic damage is wide open right now. The author notes that Ukrainian planning for this specific campaign began years ago, contrasting sharply with Russia's reactive posture.

Weekend update #192: Can Russia counter?

The human cost of this asymmetry is starkly visible in Kyiv. O'Brien details a recent mass attack where "at least 28 ballistic missiles were fired at Kyiv alone—a record number," leaving 30 civilians dead and shattering apartment buildings. He argues that this escalation is not a sign of Russian strength, but of desperation: "The Russians primary option to try and counter the Ukrainian long-range attack on them is to increase civilian strikes." This framing shifts the narrative from a tactical stalemate to a moral and strategic failure by the executive branch in Moscow. By targeting civilians because they cannot stop military logistics, the administration reveals its inability to protect its own economy while inflicting maximum pain on non-combatants.

"Unless partners do step up, there will be more nights like Wednesday night."

Critics might argue that focusing solely on civilian casualties ignores the complex military necessity of targeting infrastructure near population centers. However, O'Brien's point stands: when a belligerent resorts to record-breaking ballistic missile barrages against residential areas because they cannot intercept enemy drones, it signals a breakdown in their defensive strategy rather than a breakthrough.

The Oil Crisis Spiral

The commentary then pivots to the economic front lines, where the impact of Ukrainian strikes is compounding. O'Brien lists a series of devastating hits on Russian refineries, from Slavyansk-na-Kubani to the massive Lukoil complex in Kstovo. He notes that these attacks have forced "Putin to make his first public acknowledgment of a fuel 'deficit.'" The scale of this disruption is hard to overstate; O'Brien writes, "The Ukrainians claim to have shut down more than 42% of Russia's oil output, while other analysts say the figure could be closer to one third."

This section connects directly to broader economic vulnerabilities. Just as the S-400 systems once promised invulnerability but faced adaptation challenges, these energy facilities are proving fragile against sustained drone campaigns. O'Brien emphasizes that "the overall trend is in one direction—more Ukrainian attacks at greater range, more hits on vital facilities, and that begins a compounding spiral of decreases in Russian oil revenue." The argument here is that the war economy is hitting a hard ceiling. With fiscal buffers exhausted, as noted in recent reports from the Kiel Institut, Russia's ability to fund its military is now directly tethered to hydrocarbon sales that are increasingly under fire.

"Do not assume a Russian counter is actually coming unless there is evidence."

This is perhaps the most chilling line in the piece. It challenges the fatalistic view that Russia will inevitably recover. Instead, O'Brien suggests that without concrete proof of new interception systems or increased anti-air production, the assumption of a Russian recovery is merely a "glib assumption" that has shaped public perception for too long.

The Illusion of Sanctions and Global Complicity

The piece takes a sharp turn to examine how global powers are responding to US policy, specifically regarding sanctions. O'Brien uses India as a "bellwether" to test the strength of American leverage. He argues that despite rhetoric about enforcement, major nations have calculated that the current administration will not take legitimate steps against them. The data is damning: Indian purchases of Russian oil reached record highs in June, with the government explicitly stating they will continue buying regardless of US sanctions.

O'Brien writes, "The US is so weak, and other major states are calculating that Trump will never actually do anything to harm Putin, that they are flouting US sanctions now and will do so in the future." This section reframes the geopolitical landscape: rather than a unified front against aggression, there is a "free-for-all situation" where strategic partners of Russia feel emboldened to ignore Western restrictions. The author points out that while the US administration may have generated temporary revenue for Moscow through other conflicts, it has simultaneously destroyed the credibility of its own sanctions regime.

"What Trump giveth in the end will be up to Ukraine to taketh away."

This observation highlights a critical vulnerability in the current global order: if the primary enforcer of sanctions is perceived as unwilling or unable to act, the economic pressure intended to cripple an aggressor evaporates. The burden then falls entirely on kinetic military action—specifically Ukraine's ability to strike oil infrastructure—to achieve what diplomacy and sanctions failed to do.

Bottom Line

Phillips P. O'Brien delivers a compelling case that Russia is trapped in a strategic spiral where its economic lifelines are being severed faster than it can adapt, while its only remaining option is the horrific escalation of attacks on civilians. The strongest part of this argument is the rigorous debunking of the "inevitable Russian counter," backed by specific data on oil facility destruction and interception failures. However, the piece's reliance on the assumption that Western partners will not step up with critical air defense systems remains a significant vulnerability; if those supplies arrive in time, the calculus could shift before Russia faces total economic collapse. The reader should watch closely for any sign of new Russian long-range air defense deployments or a sudden drop in Ukrainian strike effectiveness, as these would be the first true indicators that the adaptation cycle is finally turning.

Deep Dives

Explore these related deep dives:

  • 2022 Kherson counteroffensive

    Understanding the tactical constraints of this specific Ukrainian counteroffensive explains why Russia currently lacks a comparable large-scale ground maneuver to disrupt Ukraine's long-range strike campaign.

  • S-400 missile system

    The article notes Ukraine's dwindling Patriot inventory; knowing the technical limitations and deployment gaps of the Russian S-400 system clarifies why Moscow feels emboldened to launch record numbers of ballistic missiles at Kyiv despite air defense threats.

  • Lukoil

    Since the text highlights a potential financial crisis for Russia due to oil production damage, this article details the specific corporate structure and export vulnerabilities of Russia's largest private oil company that make it a critical target for Ukraine's deep-strike strategy.

Sources

Weekend update #192: Can Russia counter?

by Phillips P. O'Brien · Phillips P. O'Brien · Read full article

Hello All,

Before I get into the update, I have an announcement that the second part of the Substack Live being held with Andriy Zagorodnyuk and Edward Stringer will be held at 17:00 UK time, (19:00 CET and 12:00 EST). We are discussing the creation of the Ukrainian air power strategy that people can see being put into action now.

The first part was held this Thursday (see below) and involved just Edward and me as Andriy was, not surprising considering the Russian mass attack on Kyiv, unable to make it. However assuming tonight is not a repeat of that, Andriy should be there. Here is part 1.

A key part of that strategy is the linked long-range/mid-range Ukrainian strike campaign that is continuing, ominously for Russia, to grow. Some Ukrainian analysis was just released about the damage to Russian oil production for June, which if true, shows that if a Russian counter is not in the works, the Russian war economy will hit a financial crisis sooner rather than later (see more about that in the last segment). People have been stating that at some point Russia will counter, but the question for Putin is pressing: it needs to happen soon. In some ways people have overstressed the speed of the adaptation cycle in this war, and the Ukrainians are hoping this is one.

Two other stories are covered below. India has always been a useful bellwether to understand just how seriously the world took Trump’s sanctions on Russia. We have the answer for June. Finally, there were two reports released recently that I think you should read (and you can download them both for free). Let me take you through them.

Can Russia Counter?.

This week was one of the most extreme comparisons of the long-range war which was discussed in the weekend update two weeks ago. The Russians continued to attack Ukrainian civilian targets, launching a mass attack on Kyiv this week (Wednesday-Thursday night) that heavily damaged a number of apartment buildings and left 30 people dead and many more wounded. At least 28 ballistic missiles were fired at Kyiv alone—a record number.

It confirms that the Russians primary option to try and counter the Ukrainian long-range attack on them is to increase civilian strikes. They are using more and more ballistic missiles on non-strategic targets. The Russians understand that Ukraine has very few Patriot missiles left ...