Noah Smith argues that the Iran War -- despite appearing localized and short-lived -- may actually represent the opening salvos of a global conflagration. Drawing on historical precedent from the late 1930s, where smaller conflicts foreshadowed World War II, Smith makes the case that current tensions across multiple theaters could similarly merge into something far larger. His analysis spans from the U.S.-Israel strikes on Iran to Russia's intelligence-sharing with Tehran, to China's potential designs on Taiwan—mapping how these seemingly separate conflicts might interconnect.
The Foothills of Global Conflict
The pattern is familiar: World War II didn't truly begin when Germany invaded Poland in 1939. By then, conflicts that either foreshadowed or eventually merged with the final conflagration had been brewing for years—in particular, the undeclared war between Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union along the Manchurian border, which began in 1935 and included the four-month Battle of Khalkhin Gol in 1939, where the USSR's superior tank deployments foreshadowed the eventual outcome of World War II itself. The Pacific theater in the late 1930s felt localized—wars and invasions that didn't involve the most capable players—but they destabilized the world and had the potential to merge into a wider global conflict.
Smith writes: it's possible the world will avoid a world war in the first half of the 21st century. But if one does occur, future historians will see it as having had foothills as well.
The Current Conflict: Iran War
In the Syrian Civil War, the U.S. and Russia tested their new hardware against each other—American and Russian troops even clashed once. Russia's invasion of Ukraine was the big shift, inaugurating a new era of great-power territorial conquest, hardening global alliance systems, and pushing Europe to remilitarize.
Now comes the Iran War. The U.S. and Israel started it by attacking Iran and decapitating much of its leadership. The Iranians responded by launching missile and drone attacks across nearly every Arab nation in the Middle East—some threatening to join the war on America's side. In the short term, this conflict seems likely to peter out in days to weeks without decisive results.
Militarily speaking, the U.S. and Israel have generally had their way with Iran—achieving air supremacy, assassinating leadership at will, degrading Iran's missile and drone strike capability. But this seems unlikely to actually bring down the Iranian regime. Protesters are generally not returning to the streets, still cowed after the regime massacred tens of thousands of them in January.
Unlike in Syria, there's no breakaway region or oppressed ethnic majority that can be armed from afar to bring down the regime. As long as Iran's Revolutionary Guard and other security services remain unified and willing to shoot infinite protesters to hang on to power—and there's no ground invasion—it's not clear who could topple the Islamic Republic in the next few weeks.
In the long term, it's a different story: the regime doesn't look strong or stable. But Trump seems unlikely to be in for the long term—he recently called the war "very complete" and his advisers are reportedly urging him to find a way out of the conflict.
One reason is that the Iran War has been fairly unpopular in America from the beginning. About half of registered voters—53%—oppose U.S. military action against Iran, according to a new Quinnipiac Poll. Only 4 in 10 support it, and about 1 in 10 are uncertain. A recent Fox News poll found opinions more evenly divided: half approved, half disapproved.
Wars usually create a "rally round the flag" effect early on, with support only fading later—but this war was unpopular from day one. Most Republicans have conveniently forgotten that Trump ran as the candidate of peace, isolationism, and non-intervention. But Independents—who form the bulk of the American electorate—have no partisan commitments forcing them to forget. They are rightfully wary of yet another American involvement in a Middle Eastern war, especially one America started without being attacked first.
There's an even bigger reason Trump is looking for exits: oil. Oil prices have been jumping wildly up and down as everyone tries to figure out whether Iran will manage to disrupt oil production from the Persian Gulf—possibly by closing the Strait of Hormuz, possibly by destroying Gulf oil infrastructure with drones—but the general trend is upward.
Higher oil prices mean higher gasoline prices, and higher inflation in general—both things that tend to make Americans very mad, and which they are already mad at Trump about. Gas prices are now shooting up.
This war seems highly unlikely to result in Iraq War 2.0—a massive U.S. ground invasion of Iran. Instead, it'll probably end up like a bigger version of the Twelve-Day War last year—Iran's defenses will be laid prostrate before the might of foreign air power, but the regime will survive.
In the long term, things look very bad for the Iranian regime. The economy is dysfunctional and crumbling; high oil prices provide only a temporary palliative. The regime's popular legitimacy is gone after the January massacres. The entire Gulf has now turned against Iran, and Lebanon's government has turned against Hezbollah. With Syria shifting into the Israel/Gulf camp and Hamas basically a spent force, Iran has only one effective proxy left—the Houthis in Yemen. This is not a recipe for long-term success.
But anyway, this is all a bit of a side track from the point of this post, which is about World War 3.
The Western Theater: Coalitions Hardening
The Iran War will probably not be the start of WW3, but it does bring us closer to the brink in several ways. First, in the Western theater—Europe and the Middle East—the coalitional lines are becoming clearer.
When Trump was elected, a lot of people thought America had effectively "switched sides"—that Trump viewed Putin as an ally against global wokeness, and the Europeans and the Ukrainians as betrayers of Western Civilization. There really was—and still is—a lot of this sentiment on the American right, and ending the Transatlantic Alliance was consistent with classic American right-wing isolationism.
But the narrative that "America is a Russian ally now" has been looking a lot shakier in recent months. First, the U.S. toppled a Russian proxy in Venezuela and seized a bunch of Russian "shadow fleet" oil tankers. Elon Musk then shut the Russians off from using Starlink, allowing the Ukrainians to seize the initiative in the war.
Now, the U.S. is trying to topple a key Russian arms supplier—Iran is the source of the Shahed long-range strike drone, which Russia has been using to bombard Ukraine's cities from afar.
Russia didn't leap to Iran's defense. It has its hands full with Ukraine and with planning for a possible wider war against Europe, and the U.S. is too powerful for it to fight. But the Russians did lend a hand, helping Iran to target American forces—providing intelligence about the locations and movements of American troops, ships, and aircraft. Much of the intelligence Russia has shared with Iran has been imagery from Moscow's sophisticated constellation of overhead satellites. This is similar to what the U.S. does for Ukraine.
Russian targeting intelligence may have helped Iran take out some U.S. missile defense radar installations—almost certainly Iran's most significant success of the war.
Meanwhile, Ukraine has leapt to the defense of both America and the Gulf countries being targeted by Iran's fleets of attack drones. Long years of playing defense against Russia's Iranian-provided Shaheds have given Ukraine tons of expertise in shooting this sort of drone out of the sky. Now, the U.S. badly needs that expertise. America had rejected Ukraine's help on anti-drone technology before, but it turns out military necessity usually trumps ideological bias.
As for Europe, they've certainly had a lot of tensions with the Trump administration, but most European countries haven't opposed America's actions in Iran the way they opposed the Iraq War a generation ago. Britain and France made some disapproving noises at first, but eventually acquiesced; only Spain tried to stand up and oppose Trump.
So for now, the coalitions in the Western theater look clearer than they did before—America, Ukraine, Israel, and Europe on one side, Russia and Iran on the other side. Various factions in America and Europe may despise each other, or despise Israel, or despise Ukraine, but at the end of the day, Russia and Iran are the greater enemies.
The Eastern Theater: Uncertain Alliances
In the Eastern theater, things are less certain. India traditionally tries to be friends with America, Russia, Israel, and Iran all at once—it requires it to be effectively neutral when it comes to conflicts like the Ukraine War and the Iran War. China is supposedly on Iran's side, but it has mostly limited itself to criticism of America's actions.
The big question, of course, is whether the Iran War makes a Chinese attack on Taiwan more likely. One school of thought says it's more likely because the war has forced America to consider shifting missile defense systems out of Asia. On the other hand, the almost unbelievable American/Israeli competence in terms of finding and killing Iran's top leaders seems to have given Chinese military analysts pause—although China can outmatch America in terms of defense production, if America could assassinate Xi Jinping and the entire CCP Central Committee in the early days of a war over Taiwan, that could be an effective form of deterrence.
So what we're looking at now feels a little like the situation in 1935 or 1937. The Western theater today is like the Pacific theater then—wars and invasions that feel localized, but which destabilize the world and have the potential to merge into a wider global conflict. Meanwhile, the Eastern theater today is more like the European theater of WWII—it has the most powerful economies and militaries, but the alliances are still uncertain.
If and when China attacks Taiwan, that will probably be similar to Hitler invading Poland—an unambiguous signal that a wider war has begun. It might happen, or it might not.
The Technology Shaping Tomorrow's Wars
The Iran War feels like the lead-up to World War 3 in another way—it's showcasing and developing the technologies that would be central to a wider war.
The Ukraine War has demonstrated that drones—FPV drones at the front, and Shahed-style strike drones behind the lines—are the key weapon of modern warfare. Similarly, America's and Israel's decapitation strikes on Iran have shown the power of AI for modern precision warfare.
From the Wall Street Journal: The U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran have unfolded at unprecedented speed and precision thanks to a cutting-edge weapon never before deployed on this scale: artificial intelligence. AI tools are helping gather intelligence, pick targets, plan bombing missions, and assess battle damage at speeds not previously possible.
The use of AI in the campaign against Iran follows years of work by the Pentagon and lessons learned from other militaries. Ukraine—with U.S. help—increasingly relies on AI in its war against Russia. Israel has tapped AI in conflicts at least since the October 2023 Hamas attacks.
From Rest of World: The U.S. military is using the most advanced AI it has ever used in warfare, with Anthropic's Claude AI reported to be assessing intelligence, identifying targets, and simulating battle scenarios. The biggest role that AI now has in U.S. military operations in Iran, as well as Venezuela, is in decision-support systems, or AI-powered targeting systems.
AI can process reams of surveillance information, satellite imagery, and other intelligence, and provide insights for potential strikes. The AI systems offer speed, scale, and cost-efficiency, and are a game-changer. The use of chatbots such as Claude in decision-support systems is new.
China is prototyping AI capabilities that can pilot unmanned combat vehicles, detect and respond to cyberattacks, and identify and strike targets on land, at sea, and in space.
This is a bit reminiscent of how aerial bombing was used at Guernica in the Spanish Civil War, or how the USSR used tanks to beat the Japanese at Khalkhin Gol. If we ever do see an all-out war between America, China, Russia, Japan, and Europe, AI is going to be incredibly central to performance on the battlefield.
That's why for all the bad blood between the Pentagon and Anthropic, the two organizations have a huge incentive to patch things over and learn to cooperate more closely. Fortunately, Anthropic's CEO, Dario Amodei, is extremely patriotic, which will probably help.
Why Technology Drives War
Unfortunately, new military technologies won't just define the wars of the future—they also help cause them.
Why did the world fight two World Wars in the early 20th century? Ideologies and competing empires certainly played a role, but it's also probably true that the rise of industrial technology disrupted the existing balance of power. Artillery manufacturing, logistics, and railroads made Germany a great power capable of defeating France in the 1870s; that upset the continental balance of power and caused the proliferation of alliances that led to WWI.
In the interwar period, air power made America, Germany, and Japan more powerful, while the rise of tanks empowered Germany and the USSR, all at the expense of Britain and France. The rapid progress of industrial weaponry made it unclear where power really lay in the world, which probably made the great powers of the day more willing to roll the dice and test their strength against each other.
Countries may be more cautious now than they were a century ago. Nuclear weapons still exist, and still provide some deterrent to great-power war—though there are a lot fewer of them now than there used to be, and AI and missile defense make it possible to stop more of them before they hit.
The Western theater today is like the Pacific theater then—wars that feel localized but destabilize the world and have the potential to merge into a wider global conflict. Meanwhile, the Eastern theater today is more like the European theater of WWII—it has the most powerful economies and militaries, but the alliances are still uncertain.
Critics might note that comparing every regional conflict to World War 3 risks inflating minor skirmishes into existential threats—a pattern that could justify endless foreign interventions. The Iran War may simply be a localized conflict with no logical path toward great-power war. Additionally, Smith's reliance on polling data assumes public opinion remains static—war support often shifts dramatically once active combat begins.
Bottom Line
Smith's strongest argument is the historical parallel: just as undeclared wars in the 1930s foreshadowed World War II, current conflicts across multiple theaters could similarly merge into something far larger. His mapping of coalition hardening between America, Ukraine, Israel, and Europe versus Russia and Iran offers a clear picture of how regional tensions might snowball into global ones. The biggest vulnerability is timing—predicting whether China attacks Taiwan, and when, remains entirely speculative, making the entire "foothills" thesis contingent on events that may not happen at all. Watch for China's next move on Taiwan; if that comes, Smith's analysis will have been prescient.