G. Elliott Morris dismantles a pervasive political myth with cold, hard data: the idea that war automatically boosts a president's popularity is a comforting fiction that rarely survives contact with reality. While the media narrative suggests a guaranteed "rally around the flag," Morris's analysis of every major conflict since 1941 reveals that genuine, double-digit approval surges are statistical anomalies, not the rule. For a busy reader trying to understand the current geopolitical landscape without the noise of partisan punditry, this piece offers a crucial correction to the conventional wisdom surrounding the administration's recent military strikes in Iran.
The Myth of the Automatic Bounce
Morris begins by challenging the assumption that military action is a political shortcut. He notes that political strategist Karl Rove was likely correct in predicting no surge, but Morris goes further to explain why the pattern is so often misunderstood. "Many in the media refer to the rally effect as a reliable pattern in American politics," he writes, "but when you look closely at the data, genuine rallies are rarer and harder to detect than the conventional wisdom suggests." This distinction is vital; it shifts the conversation from speculation about the current administration's political fortunes to a rigorous examination of historical precedents.
The author's data visualization is particularly striking because it isolates the few moments where a true bounce occurred. Only three conflicts since World War II produced clear, double-digit gains: the Gulf War, World War II, and the Iraq invasion. "The Gulf War represents the largest historical rally effect in our dataset," Morris observes, noting a massive 29-point surge for George H.W. Bush. Yet, even this historic high was temporary, evaporating quickly once economic recession set in. This historical context aligns with the concept of mean reversion in finance, where extreme deviations from the norm inevitably snap back, suggesting that even the most dramatic approval spikes are unsustainable without underlying economic or social stability.
The conventional wisdom is that when presidents go to war, their approval goes up. But the historical record is a lot messier than that.
Critics might argue that the modern media environment, with its 24-hour news cycle, could accelerate or amplify a rally effect in ways historical data doesn't capture. However, Morris's granular look at polling cadence and noise suggests that the fundamental drivers of public opinion remain consistent regardless of the era.
Why the Iran Strikes Failed to Move the Needle
Turning to the immediate situation, Morris applies this historical lens to the administration's February 2026 airstrikes on Iran. The result is a flatline. "There has been functionally no change in the polls in the two weeks after the conflict started," he reports, with approval hovering in the high 30s and disapproval in the high 50s. The lack of movement is not an anomaly; it is the expected outcome given the specific conditions of the conflict.
Morris identifies that the administration's war fails to meet the five conditions political scientists have identified as necessary for a rally. The first condition is a dramatic, sudden shock that unites the nation. While the strikes were significant, the author points out that "Pearl Harbor, 9/11, the seizure of American hostages in Iran in 1979" were the types of events that truly jolted the public consciousness. In contrast, the current conflict lacks that unifying, existential urgency.
The second condition is bipartisan elite consensus. "Rallies persist only as long as opposition elites refrain from criticizing the president," Morris explains, citing Richard Brody's research. In the current polarized climate, this consensus is nonexistent. As soon as partisan criticism becomes prominent in media coverage, the rally fades—or never materializes at all. This dynamic explains why the administration's approval didn't even "twitch" despite the escalation.
Furthermore, the public's view of the war itself is a critical factor. Morris found that only 38% of voters approved of the strikes. "A simple explanation for Trump's non-rally is that his war is unpopular," he concludes. This is a stark departure from the Gulf War or World War II, where the public largely supported the military objectives. The data suggests that without a clear, popular mandate for the use of force, the executive branch cannot leverage military action to shore up political capital.
In an era of deep polarization, the president's approval didn't even twitch.
One might counter that the administration could still benefit from a short-term, unmeasured surge in support among its base, even if the net approval rating remains flat. However, Morris's reliance on aggregated polling averages smooths out such noise, suggesting that any base enthusiasm is being perfectly offset by opposition mobilization, resulting in a net zero effect.
The Fragility of War-Time Popularity
The piece also offers a sobering look at how quickly these rallies can dissolve. Morris highlights the case of the Gulf War, where approval peaked at 79% before crashing to negative territory within a year due to economic downturns. "The Gulf War rally is the best argument that even the biggest bumps don't last," he writes. This serves as a warning for any administration hoping to use foreign policy to solve domestic political problems.
Even in cases where a rally did occur, such as the Korean War or the invasion of Grenada, the gains were often confounded by other factors like economic recovery or pre-existing upward trends. "It's hard to isolate how much of the +9 was Grenada and how much was the economic upturn happening simultaneously," Morris notes. This analytical rigor prevents the reader from falling into the trap of attributing all political success to military action.
The comparison to the Kosovo intervention is particularly instructive. There, the administration saw a decline in approval, which Morris attributes to a combination of post-impeachment normalization and foreign policy fatigue. "The Kosovo shock for Clinton was really a combination of post-impeachment normalization, foreign-policy drag from the air campaign, and broader fatigue," he argues. This suggests that without a clear, unifying narrative, military interventions can actually drag down a president's standing, especially when they are perceived as open-ended or lacking clear objectives.
Bottom Line
G. Elliott Morris delivers a masterclass in data-driven political analysis, effectively debunking the "rally around the flag" myth by showing that it is the exception, not the rule. The strongest part of this argument is its reliance on a comprehensive dataset that spans decades, proving that the current lack of a surge is not a failure of the administration's messaging but a reflection of historical norms. The biggest vulnerability, however, lies in the assumption that public opinion is static; while the data shows no movement so far, the long-term trajectory of the conflict remains the true variable that will determine the administration's political fate. Readers should watch for whether the lack of bipartisan consensus holds as the conflict evolves, as that is the single most likely factor to prevent any future approval gains.