Mick Ryan delivers a rare, clear-eyed assessment that cuts through the noise of daily headlines to reveal a stark strategic reality: the war in Ukraine is not stalling, but shifting into a brutal war of attrition where Ukraine is successfully imposing operational dilemmas on Russia, even as the United States faces a potentially catastrophic decision to commit ground troops in Iran. While much of the commentary focuses on the personalities in Washington or Moscow, Ryan zeroes in on the hard mechanics of force, logistics, and the terrifying asymmetry of modern drone warfare. This piece is essential for the busy strategist because it moves beyond the "who said what" to answer the far more difficult question of "what actually works" when the will of two nations remains fundamentally unreconciled.
The Southern Disruption and the Cost of Momentum
Ryan's most compelling argument centers on the misconception that Russia is on the verge of a decisive spring offensive. He flips the script, arguing that the most significant development is what Ukraine has prevented from happening. "The most consequential military development of the past few weeks is not what Russia has done. It is what Ukraine has prevented Russia from doing," Ryan writes. This framing is crucial because it shifts the metric of success from territorial gain to the disruption of enemy timelines. The author details how Ukrainian counterattacks in the south have liberated over 400 square kilometers, forcing Moscow to burn through operational reserves intended for a major push.
The analysis draws a sharp parallel to the grueling defense of Moshchun, where the sheer will of defenders delayed Russian plans for months, noting that "they achieved the most important thing – they gave our children the chance to live in a free Ukraine." Ryan suggests that the current southern operations are achieving a similar strategic delay, but at a steep price. He notes the inherent tension in this strategy: "you cannot be strong everywhere." As Ukrainian units redeploy to the south, the northern outskirts of Pokrovsk have weakened, allowing Russian forces to launch new pushes. This trade-off is the central dilemma of the conflict.
The price of this Ukrainian operational success, however, is being paid elsewhere. Ukraine's ground force resources are not infinite.
Critics might argue that focusing on the disruption of a Russian offensive understates the reality of Russian territorial gains in the east. However, Ryan's data on Russian casualties—claiming 4,840 losses over a three-day period—supports the view that Moscow's margin for error is narrowing significantly. The author points out that Russian mechanized assaults are increasingly becoming "reconnaissance-in-force missions" rather than breakthrough attempts, a sign of a military struggling to find a path forward.
The Drone Revolution and the Asymmetry of Cost
Perhaps the most startling revelation in Ryan's coverage is the shift in the aerial domain. For the first time, Ukraine is matching, and on some nights exceeding, the volume of long-range drone strikes launched by Russia. "Ukrainian forces have been systematically hunting Russian air defence systems, particularly Pantsir, at a pace that Russia's military-industrial complex cannot match," Ryan observes. This is not just a tactical victory; it is a strategic erosion of Russia's ability to protect its own soil and supply lines.
The author highlights the economic logic behind this shift, noting that Ukraine is intercepting expensive Russian munitions with cheaper systems. "President Zelensky noted on March 16 that Ukraine is now intercepting Russian drones worth tens of thousands of dollars with systems costing thousands of dollars," Ryan writes. This cost asymmetry is a developing strategic advantage that threatens to exhaust Russia's industrial capacity faster than its manpower reserves. The author cites the destruction of nearly 40 percent of Russia's oil refining capacity at its peak as evidence of the campaign's success.
However, the picture is not entirely one-sided. Ryan acknowledges that Russian pressure remains relentless, with nightly strikes involving hundreds of drones and missiles. The recent attack on Kyiv, which saw the interception of a Zircon hypersonic cruise missile, demonstrates that while Ukraine is gaining ground in the air, the threat to civilian infrastructure remains existential. The author's assessment that "the Russian spring-summer offensive has been disrupted but hardly stopped" serves as a necessary reality check against over-optimism.
The Middle East Gamble: Ground Troops and Strategic Limits
The commentary takes a sharp turn to the Middle East, where the question of American intervention looms large. Ryan warns against the illusion that air power alone can secure political outcomes. "Our operations in Iran are again teaching that war involves more than fighting," he writes, quoting retired Lieutenant General James Dubik. The author draws a sobering historical lesson from Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, noting that the U.S. military won every tactical engagement in those conflicts yet failed to achieve strategic victory.
The piece questions whether committing ground troops to Iran would ensure a decisive outcome or merely open a new, unwinnable front. "Wars must be fought and waged," Ryan emphasizes, distinguishing between the act of fighting and the broader campaign of waging war. This distinction is vital for understanding the limits of military force in achieving political goals. The author suggests that the administration is grappling with a choice between declaring victory and withdrawing, or escalating into a quagmire with uncertain results.
Our military won every tactical engagement in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. American citizens have every reason to ask, therefore, if we fight so successfully, why did we lose in Vietnam and Afghanistan and why was success in Iraq so limited?
A counterargument worth considering is that the situation in Iran may differ fundamentally from those previous conflicts due to the specific nature of the regime and the potential for rapid regime collapse under sustained pressure. Yet, Ryan's cautionary tone suggests that the structural difficulties of occupation and nation-building remain constant regardless of the theater. The author's analysis implies that without a clear political endgame, military success in the air and at sea will not translate into the desired stability.
Bottom Line
Mick Ryan's analysis is a masterclass in separating tactical noise from strategic signal, correctly identifying that Ukraine's ability to disrupt Russian plans is a more significant metric than simple territorial maps. The piece's greatest strength lies in its unflinching examination of the limits of force, both in the drone-heavy skies of Ukraine and the potential ground war in Iran. The biggest vulnerability, however, is the assumption that Russia's operational dilemmas will inevitably lead to a collapse in will, a leap that history suggests is far from guaranteed. Readers should watch closely to see if the cost of attrition finally forces a shift in Moscow's negotiating position or if the war simply drags on into a deeper, more destructive winter.