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Monopoly round-up: Voters just demanded an end to the number go up economy

Matt Stoller delivers a provocative thesis that the recent electoral shift wasn't merely a rejection of a specific leader, but a visceral revolt against an entire economic operating system designed to make stock prices rise at the expense of real human prosperity. He argues that for nearly two decades, American governance has been hijacked by a "number go up" strategy that prioritizes financial engineering over tangible goods, a dynamic now culminating in a massive, government-backed bet on artificial intelligence data centers that voters are beginning to see as a threat rather than a solution.

The Illusion of Change

Stoller's most striking observation is that the political pendulum has swung, but the underlying economic machinery remains untouched. He notes that while voters punished the incumbent party, the structural drivers of their dissatisfaction—monopolization, low labor shares, and Wall Street-led bubbles—persist across party lines. "Among voters who said the economy was their top issue, partisan trust on the economy moved 93 points toward Democrats between 2024 and this year's New Jersey and Virginia elections," Stoller writes, highlighting a massive disconnect between political messaging and economic reality. This data point is crucial because it suggests the anger isn't about culture wars, but about the failure of the economy to deliver.

Monopoly round-up: Voters just demanded an end to the number go up economy

The author draws a sharp parallel between the two major parties, arguing that both have abandoned the working class in favor of financialized growth. He observes that just as the previous administration ignored the real economy to focus on niche identity questions while subsidizing chips and batteries, the current administration has simply swapped the subsidies for tariffs and critical minerals. "Wall Street and big tech did very well, and prices were high," Stoller notes, pointing out that the result was always the same regardless of who held the White House. This framing is effective because it strips away the partisan theater to reveal a consistent policy of enriching capital over labor.

Critics might argue that dismissing the differences in trade policy and industrial strategy between administrations oversimplifies the complex economic landscape, but Stoller's evidence of rising prices and stagnant wages suggests the core complaint is valid regardless of the specific policy tool used.

The AI Data Center Bubble

The piece takes a hard turn into the specific mechanism of the current economic bubble: the construction of AI data centers. Stoller contends that this isn't a market-driven innovation but a form of "American Central Planning" orchestrated by a fusion of big tech and Wall Street. He points to the immediate post-inauguration gathering where the administration announced a $500 billion build-out of data centers by firms like OpenAI and Oracle. "Symbolically, featuring big tech on day one and day two of an administration was an important statement," he writes, suggesting that the government has effectively become a sales arm for Silicon Valley monopolies.

Stoller argues that this strategy is fundamentally flawed because it prioritizes the stock market over actual utility. He cites the logic that if data centers require energy, the U.S. will drill for oil; if they require capital, Wall Street will provide it. "The American stock market, and increasingly the economy, depend on the AI data center buildout," he states, warning that this dependency creates a fragile system where GDP growth is artificially inflated by a single, unprofitable sector. This is a compelling critique of modern industrial policy, which often mistakes asset inflation for economic health.

The truth is that Wall Street and big tech firms are all investing in a known bubble, in the hopes that it will somehow work out, but if it doesn't, well the government will backstop them.

The author further dismantles the narrative that AI will lower costs for consumers. Instead, he argues, the technology is being used to cut jobs and increase returns for shareholders. "If Americans saw clear benefits from AI, like lower prices at the supermarket, they would embrace it. But they aren't," Stoller writes. This observation cuts through the hype, reminding readers that technological advancement does not automatically translate to public welfare. He draws a historical parallel to the dot-com bubble, noting that investments in AI data centers now outpace the telecom boom of the late 1990s, yet the fundamental question of profitability remains unanswered.

The "Number Go Up" Statecraft

At the heart of Stoller's argument is the concept of "Number Go Up" statecraft, a system where the primary goal of government is to ensure the stock market rises, regardless of the societal cost. He traces this ideology back to the 1970s and the theory of a "capital shortage" proposed by William Simon, which justified deregulation and tax cuts to juice returns for investors. "Increasing the capitalization of the stock market at all costs has a number of implications about how our society works," Stoller explains, listing how this mindset pushes aside everything from higher wages to addressing the opioid crisis.

This section is particularly powerful because it contextualizes current events within a decades-long trend of financialization. Stoller argues that this form of statecraft is distinct from standard financial capitalism because it removes risk through government guarantees. "Financial capitalism implies risk. But in our era, the government guarantees financial returns with subsidies, regulations and bailouts," he writes. This distinction is vital for understanding why bubbles keep forming and why they are so hard to pop. The author suggests that the current AI bubble is just the latest iteration of a pattern that includes the savings and loan crisis and the housing bubble.

Critics might note that the "Number Go Up" framework is a broad brush that may ignore legitimate successes in technological innovation, but Stoller's focus on the distribution of those gains rather than the technology itself remains a strong counter-narrative to the prevailing optimism.

The Grassroots Rebellion

Despite the momentum of the data center build-out, Stoller identifies a growing, localized resistance that mirrors the broader voter dissatisfaction. He highlights protests in places like Tucson, Arizona, and the D.C. area, where communities are rejecting the environmental and economic costs of massive server farms. "From arid Tucson, Arizona, to the suburban sprawl of the D.C. area, Americans are protesting, rejecting, restricting, or banning new data center development," he notes. This grassroots pushback is significant because it represents a tangible rejection of the "central planning" Stoller describes.

The author points out that even conservative voices outside the tech bubble are turning against this strategy, citing Craig Fuller, a libertarian logistics founder, who expresses anger at the direction of the economy. "Candidates won office entirely on rejecting data centers," Stoller writes, suggesting that the political future may belong to those who can articulate a vision of economic development that serves families and small businesses rather than monopolies. This is a hopeful note in an otherwise grim analysis, indicating that the "Number Go Up" consensus is finally cracking.

The reason we are engaged in this massive wasteful data center buildout has nothing to do with technology, it's simply that bubble-driven growth run by a few dominant firms and backed by Wall Street is the only form of national development strategy we know how to do.

Bottom Line

Stoller's most potent contribution is his ability to connect the dots between high-level financial policy and the daily frustrations of voters, framing the AI boom not as a technological miracle but as a political choice that prioritizes stock prices over human needs. While his critique of the "Number Go Up" ideology is sharp and historically grounded, the piece leaves the reader wondering how a coherent alternative can be built in a system so deeply entrenched in financialization. The strongest takeaway is that until the government stops acting as a backstop for monopolistic bubbles, the disconnect between the economy and the people will only deepen. Watch for the next wave of local legislation banning data centers, as that may be the first real crack in the facade of this economic strategy.

Deep Dives

Explore these related deep dives:

  • Dot-com bubble

    The article explicitly compares current AI data center investments to the telecom boom of the dot-com era. Understanding the mechanics, psychology, and aftermath of the dot-com bubble provides crucial historical context for evaluating whether AI investment represents a similar speculative excess.

  • Financialization

    The article's central thesis concerns 'financier-friendly statecraft' and the fusion of Wall Street with big tech. Financialization as an economic concept explains how the financial sector grew to dominate the economy and why 'number go up' became the organizing principle of economic policy since the mid-2000s.

  • Robert Lighthizer

    The article mentions Lighthizer as the 'populist trade expert' Trump could have chosen but didn't. Understanding Lighthizer's specific trade philosophy and his role in Trump's first-term tariff policies illuminates the policy shift the article describes between Trump's two terms.

Sources

Monopoly round-up: Voters just demanded an end to the number go up economy

by Matt Stoller · · Read full article

A lot of monopoly-related news, as usual. The Senate agreed to fund the government as long as no one touches health care corruption, the Supreme Court is likely to strip Trump of a key part of his tariff authority, and Disney and Google feud over which monopolist gets to control sports programming. Also, Lina Khan content now goes way more viral than that of Barack Obama.

But this week, the most important story are the results of the elections Tuesday, which I suspect reflect a deep dissatisfaction not just with Trump, but with American economic strategy since the mid-2000s. Here’s pollster G. Elliot Morris describing the key dynamic: “Among voters who said the economy was their top issue, partisan trust on the economy moved 93 points toward Democrats between 2024 and this year’s New Jersey and Virginia elections.” In addition, this week, Trump’s disapproval collapsed, moving from an average of negative 7.5% for most of his first year to negative 13% just this week.

These shifts, while large, make sense, and actually track what happened to Joe Biden. Indeed, Trump’s politics in some ways mirror those of Biden. For instance, during the Biden era, Democrats obsessed over niche identity questions and ignored the real economy, throwing a few crumbs towards an industrial policy, which is to say subsidies for chips, batteries, and solar panels, and a bit of antitrust. Wall Street and big tech did very well, and prices were high. The result was that Republicans over-performed.

This time, it’s Republicans obsessing over niche identity questions and ignoring the real economy, while throwing slightly different crumbs towards an industrial policy, which is to say tariffs plus subsidies for chips and critical minerals. Wall Street and big tech are doing very well, and prices are high. This time, the Democrats over-performed.

Taking a step back, voters have chosen change over incumbents in virtually every election since 2006. And it’s not a coincidence that this ‘throw the bums out’ era was organized around a particularly financier-friendly form of statecraft, one based on the government fostering excessively high returns on capital. The methods were monopolization, a low labor share of income, private equity extraction, and Wall Street-led growth through bubbles in subprime housing or data center build-outs.

Of course, Donald Trump’s economic strategy is not just straight continuity with what came before, so it’s important to look at specifically what he did, and ...