← Back to Library

Retreat still leaves tariffs at 90-year highs

Joey Politano delivers a stinging economic autopsy of the recent trade war "retreat," arguing that while the chaos has momentarily paused, the underlying architecture of protectionism remains at levels unseen since the Great Depression. The piece's most arresting claim is that the administration's dramatic 90-day pause was not a policy correction based on new data, but a desperate reaction to the immediate reality that American consumers, not Chinese exporters, were absorbing the full cost of the tariffs.

The Illusion of a Retreat

Politano opens by dismantling the narrative that the executive branch has stepped back from the brink. He notes that while the administration agreed to lower tariffs on most Chinese goods by 115% as part of a 90-day "pause," the effective US tariff rate on China has only dipped 74 percentage points, essentially returning policy to the status quo of early April. This framing is crucial because it forces the reader to confront the baseline: even after this "easing," tariffs remain roughly 8 times higher than before the current administration took office.

"This is the largest easing of trade restrictions since Trump first began his China trade war more than seven years ago, bringing tariffs on the PRC down from 'near-total embargo' levels to merely 'extremely prohibitive' levels."

The author's choice to describe the current state as "extremely prohibitive" rather than "normalized" is a deliberate rhetorical move to prevent readers from feeling false relief. Politano argues that the administration secured no major concessions in return; Chinese tariffs on US exports remain 10% higher than pre-April levels, and the symbolic gestures seen in other deals were absent. The core of the argument here is that the "retreat" was a tactical pause, not a strategic pivot.

Retreat still leaves tariffs at 90-year highs

Critics might argue that any reduction in tariffs is a net positive for inflation, regardless of the long-term strategy. However, Politano counters this by highlighting the volatility: "Millions of businesses and consumers were wrecked because they had to pay a 145% tariff that was subsequently lifted with just as little warning as it was imposed." This volatility itself is a cost, creating a planning environment where "fire, aim, ready" replaces coherent strategy.

"The 'fire, aim, ready' strategy turned already-bad policy into a completely untenable disaster, and the shock-and-awe approach only served to cloak the fact that the administration still lacks coherent trade policy goals."

The Economic Reality Check

The most compelling section of the piece dissects the economic theory that drove the initial escalation. The administration operated on the belief that China's export dependence would force Beijing to lower prices to maintain market access. Politano presents data that completely inverts this logic.

"The evidence has shown the exact opposite—Americans were bearing almost the entire price increases caused by Trump's China tariffs."

Politano details how, when tariffs rose by 74% in April, the pre-tariff cost of Chinese imports fell by a negligible 0.1%. The result? Americans paid nearly double for imports, with key sectors like chemicals and furniture seeing a full 145% price increase. This evidence is devastating to the administration's original rationale. It suggests that the trade war was not a negotiation tactic that worked, but a self-inflicted wound that was only stopped because the supply chain began to snap.

"Without some form of tariff reduction, businesses and consumers would've faced acute shortages in just a couple of months."

The author points out that for nearly $200 billion worth of goods, China represents over 70% of US imports. Items like toys, plastic housewares, and electric heaters would have become practically unobtainable. This humanizes the economic data, moving the discussion from abstract percentage points to the actual availability of goods in American homes.

"Core to the underlying rationale behind the trade war was the theory that China is so export-dependent and currently has such weak consumer demand that they, not Americans, would have to bare most of the costs of US tariffs."

This section effectively uses the administration's own Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent, against the initial strategy. Bessent described current tariffs as a "floor" and the earlier 54% rates as a "ceiling," implying that tariffs can only go up from here. Politano interprets this as an admission that the current levels are already the minimum viable policy for the administration, not the maximum.

"In other words, America continues to face its worst trade shock in a generation, even if Trump's tariff retreat significantly reduces the risk of an imminent self-inflicted recession."

The Path Forward: Soft Decoupling or Chaos?

As the piece moves toward its conclusion, Politano questions the endgame. The 90-day pause appears to be an attempt to negotiate a "soft-decoupling" rather than a hard break, focusing on specific sectors like batteries and microchips. However, the author remains skeptical of the administration's ability to execute a coherent deal.

"It's hard to understand how an even more slapdash version of the same strategy will achieve results this time."

The argument here is that the administration is trying to replicate a "phase one" deal that failed previously, but with even less preparation and more chaos. The shift from "90 deals in 90 days" to regional negotiations suggests a tacit admission that the April 2nd tariff levels were never a rational baseline.

"Any one of Trump's current trade policies—a 30% tariff on China, a 25% tariff on cars, a 10% tariff on the European Union—on their own would have been considered the most brutal trade war in a generation. Instead, Trump has pursued all of them, combined, all at once, and in the most chaotic way possible."

Politano concludes that even if the administration walks back to a simple 10% baseline tariff, the US would still be the only high-income nation with double-digit tariff rates. The "retreat" leaves the country in a unique and dangerous position of isolationism.

"Trump may be easing his trade war, but he is far from ending it."

Bottom Line

Politano's strongest contribution is the forensic breakdown of who actually paid for the tariffs, dismantling the administration's narrative that China bore the cost. The piece's biggest vulnerability is its heavy reliance on the assumption that the administration has no long-term plan beyond chaos, though the data on volatility supports this skepticism. Readers should watch for the next 90 days not for a breakthrough deal, but for the administration's attempt to re-impose tariffs on specific "strategic necessities" while claiming a victory in negotiation.

Sources

Retreat still leaves tariffs at 90-year highs

by Joey Politano · Apricitas Economics · Read full article

Thanks for reading! If you haven’t subscribed, please click the button below:

By subscribing, you’ll join over 65,000 people who read Apricitas weekly!

Last week, Donald Trump made the single-largest walkback of his trade war so far by agreeing to lower the tariffs on most Chinese goods by 115% as part of a 90-day “pause” for negotiations. Accounting for exceptions and sector-specific tariffs, the effective US tariff rate on China has dipped 74 percentage points, essentially bringing US policy back to the status quo of April 5th. Chinese imports now “only” face the 20% China-specific tariffs implemented in February/March, plus the 10% April 2nd tariffs imposed on nearly-all overseas imports, plus the Section 301 China tariffs that have persisted since Trump’s first term, plus sectoral tariffs on all imports of steel/aluminum/car parts/etc. In return, the US got no major concessions from the Chinese—their tariffs on US exports will come down, but remain 10% higher than pre-April, and Xi Jinping didn’t even have to symbolically lower tariffs on beef and ethanol like the UK did.

This is the largest easing of trade restrictions since Trump first began his China trade war more than seven years ago, bringing tariffs on the PRC down from “near-total embargo” levels to merely “extremely prohibitive” levels. Indeed, tariffs are now low enough to allow a significant amount of US-China trade to flow, especially given that companies will certainly take advantage of the pause by stocking up on necessary imports. Still, even after this announcement, Trump has imposed more tariffs on China than during his entire first term, which “only” saw an effective 16 percentage point increase in tariff rates compared to the 28 percentage points added through May.

In total, this still leaves overall US tariff rates roughly 8 times higher than before his Presidency, and relative US protectionism has only declined to “highest since the Great Depression” territory. That’s before accounting for the bevy of sector-specific tariffs slated to come online over the next few months, any possible unpausing of the April 2nd country-level tariffs, and any further re-escalation with China. Indeed, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent described current China tariffs as a “floor” and the 54% tariffs announced through April 2nd as a “ceiling,” implying that tariffs on China can also only go up from here. In other words, America continues to face its worst trade shock in a generation, even if Trump’s tariff retreat ...