Perun delivers a sobering reality check: the world has quietly slipped into a legal vacuum where the United States and Russia face no caps on their nuclear arsenals for the first time since the 1970s. This isn't just a diplomatic footnote; it is the culmination of a decade-long unraveling of the very guardrails that prevented a Cold War-style arms race from consuming global resources. The piece stands out by treating the collapse of the New START treaty not as a political failure, but as an inevitable economic and strategic reckoning for superpowers that can no longer afford the status quo.
The Economics of Deterrence
Perun anchors the entire analysis in a stark financial reality that often gets lost in geopolitical rhetoric. He argues that nuclear weapons are "singularly effective in the very narrow strategic role they fill, pretty much useless for anything else, all while being, or at least their delivery systems being very, very expensive." This reframing is crucial. It suggests that the drive for arms control was never purely about peace; it was about fiscal sanity. The author notes that between 1945 and 1996, the United States spent over $5 trillion on nuclear programs, a sum that, if avoided, would have left the nation with zero national debt by the mid-90s.
This economic lens explains why the "near insanity of the Cold War arms race" eventually gave way to treaties. Perun writes, "Partly working on the reasoning that being able to glass everything significant from LA to Washington or St. Petersburg to Voody Bosto several times over was an unnecessary state expense." The argument holds up well when viewed through the lens of opportunity cost. However, critics might note that this purely economic view underestimates the psychological and political utility of nuclear superiority, which often drives spending regardless of fiscal prudence.
For states that primarily cast nuclear weapons as a tool of deterrence in their doctrine, you could argue there are a couple of common goals. Don't get nuked accidentally or on purpose while enjoying as good a power balance as possible with whoever you consider your enemies to be while also spending as little as possible.
The Unraveling of the Treaty Ecosystem
The commentary then shifts to the structural collapse of the treaty system, moving beyond the recent expiration of New START to examine the broader ecosystem of agreements. Perun uses the acronym BLOM—Ban, Limit, Usage, Monitoring—to categorize how nations historically managed these weapons. The piece effectively illustrates how the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed in 1987, was a prime example of a "Limit" that successfully wiped out an entire class of weapons until its demise.
The author highlights the specific mechanics of the INF collapse, citing a 2018 statement from the US Director of National Intelligence regarding Russia's 9M729 missile. "Russia initially flight tested the 9M729, a groundbased missile to distances well over 500 km from a fixed launcher. Russia then tested the same missile at ranges well below 500 km from a mobile launcher," Perun quotes, explaining how this loophole allowed Moscow to develop a weapon that violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the treaty. This detail is vital because it shows how technical ambiguities can be exploited to erode trust. The connection to the companion deep dive on the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System is implicit here, as both represent the return of destabilizing, hard-to-track delivery methods that the old treaties were designed to suppress.
The argument gains further depth when addressing the testing restrictions. Perun points out the tension surrounding China's alleged recent testing activities. "I can reveal the US government is aware that China has conducted nuclear explosive tests, including preparing for tests with designed yields in the hundreds of tons," he quotes from a US undersecretary of state. This is a critical pivot point. While simulations have largely replaced live testing for the US and Russia, the author suggests that for a rising power like China, raw data from actual detonations remains a valuable currency.
Between 1945 and 2017, the United States conducted about 1,000 nuclear tests. The USSR and later Russia, more than 700. France north of 200. The People's Republic of China, 45.
This disparity in historical data creates a modern asymmetry. If China is indeed conducting low-yield tests, it signals a desire to validate new designs that supercomputers alone cannot fully model. A counterargument worth considering is that the US and Russia may be underestimating the sophistication of modern simulation capabilities, potentially misreading China's cautious approach as a lack of capability rather than a strategic choice. Yet, Perun's point stands: the return to physical testing is a dangerous signal in a world where the New START treaty's monitoring mechanisms are gone.
The Multi-Polar Precipice
The piece concludes by warning that we are entering a "multi-polar nuclear world" where the old bilateral frameworks are obsolete. The author notes that with the New START treaty expiring without replacement, "for the first time since the early 1970s, there are now no legal constraints on the maximum size of the US and Russian nuclear arsenals." This is the most alarming takeaway. The article suggests that the future will not be a simple return to Cold War bipolarity but a complex web of interactions involving China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea, none of whom were bound by the New START limits.
Perun warns that we may be standing "at the precipice of a new nuclear arms race that some established nuclear powers like Russia might scarcely be able to afford." This highlights the paradox of the situation: the very economic constraints that once drove arms control are now being ignored as strategic competition intensifies. The author's use of the term "strategic deja vu" to describe the current geopolitical climate is apt, but the stakes are higher now that the safety valves have been removed.
And so today I want to talk about the rise and fall of the nuclear treaty system. How one by one those old restrictions began to fall apart and what might come next now that we find ourselves in an increasingly multi-olar nuclear world where warhead counts are once again trending up.
Bottom Line
Perun's strongest contribution is the rigorous dissection of the economic incentives that originally drove arms control, revealing how their erosion has left the world exposed to a new, unregulated race. The piece's vulnerability lies in its relative silence on the specific diplomatic pathways that could re-establish trust in a multi-polar world, focusing more on the inevitability of collapse than the mechanics of repair. Readers should watch closely for any new bilateral or multilateral frameworks emerging from the ashes of New START, as the window for preventing a costly and dangerous escalation is rapidly closing.