Zichen Wang delivers a rare, unfiltered window into how Beijing's top strategists are recalibrating their view of Berlin, revealing a consensus that Germany is not merely drifting but actively fracturing under the weight of external shocks and internal decay. While Western media often treats German politics as a stable, if slow-moving, machine, Wang's coverage of the 2025 Year-End Seminar exposes a profound anxiety among Chinese scholars: that the era of predictable German pragmatism is over, replaced by a volatile mix of militarization, right-wing populism, and strategic confusion. This is not just academic gossip; it is a signal that China's most important European partner is becoming a far more dangerous and unpredictable variable in the global order.
The End of the "Stabilizer" Myth
Wang opens by setting the scene at a gathering of nearly 50 experts from China's most elite think tanks, including the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and the Party School. The tone is not one of distant observation but of urgent strategic reassessment. Wang notes that the opening address by Feng Zhongping, Director of the Institute of European Studies, immediately frames the conversation around the destabilizing impact of American policy shifts. "Germany and Europe are making every effort to respond to the 'Trump shock,' and that the value base underpinning the transatlantic relationship is wavering," Wang reports, capturing the central thesis that Berlin's security architecture is crumbling.
The argument here is compelling because it rejects the comforting narrative that Europe will simply pivot closer to China as the US retreats. Instead, Wang highlights a more cynical reality: Europe may double down on Washington to preserve its own identity, even as that relationship becomes transactional. As Feng Zhongping stressed, "Europe and the United States are unlikely to part ways," despite the erosion of shared values. This is a crucial distinction for any observer of global trade; it means Beijing cannot count on a natural drift toward Berlin simply because Washington is becoming unreliable.
Despite challenges, Europe will continue to play a significant role in international affairs, drawing on its achievements in integration, its soft power in global governance, and, when pushed to the brink, its resolve to build hard power.
Wang's reporting on this point is particularly sharp. The scholars are not just watching; they are calculating the moment when Germany's "soft power" transforms into "hard power." This shift has deep historical echoes. Just as the Alternative for Germany (AfD) has grown from a fringe protest movement into a parliamentary powerhouse, the German state is now contemplating a National Security Council and a massive increase in defense spending. The seminar participants see these not as isolated policy tweaks but as symptoms of a system in crisis. The fear is that a Germany forced to militarize rapidly will lose the very rationality that made it a reliable partner for Beijing.
A Society Shrouded in Fear
The most striking section of Wang's piece is the synthesis of Jiang Feng's keynote, which diagnoses a German society paralyzed by three distinct fears: a U.S. pullback, Russian aggression, and Chinese competition. Wang writes, "Jiang Feng, Professor and Chairman of the Council of the Shanghai Academy of Global Government and Area Studies, highlighted based on extensive fieldwork that the German society is shrouded in fear." This is a powerful reframing of the German political landscape, moving beyond economic indicators to the psychological state of the electorate.
Wang effectively connects this psychological state to the rise of the AfD, noting that the party's polling support is "firmly in second place" and threatening to spark a "political earthquake." The analysis suggests that the German political center is not just shrinking; it is being hollowed out by a populist narrative that frames immigration and energy policy as existential threats. Wang paraphrases the consensus that the Merz government's response—tightening immigration and stepping up deportations—is a desperate attempt to blunt the AfD's momentum rather than a coherent strategy.
Critics might argue that Wang's reliance on Chinese academic interpretations risks overestimating the immediacy of a right-wing takeover, as German coalition politics often act as a brake on radicalism. However, the sheer volume of scholars at the seminar warning of a "systemic dysfunction" within the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the fragmentation caused by the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance suggests that the structural weaknesses are real, regardless of the specific electoral outcome.
Berlin's view of China is marked by a tension between "a new round of learning" and a deepening sense of value-based exclusivity.
This quote, attributed to Jiang Feng, encapsulates the core dilemma for Chinese policymakers. Wang explains that the old narrative of "cooperation outweighs competition" is being actively dismantled in Berlin. The German government, led by Friedrich Merz, is adopting a posture of "strategic ambiguity," with the Foreign Ministry taking a tough rhetorical line while the Finance Ministry emphasizes economic ties. Wang notes that this internal contradiction reflects a broader inability to reconcile Germany's economic dependence on China with its security dependence on the U.S. and its ideological alignment with the EU.
The Economic Dilemma: Sovereignty vs. Reality
Moving to the economic session, Wang provides a sobering assessment of Germany's industrial base. The scholars argue that Germany's "prolonged technical recession" has exposed fatal weaknesses in energy costs and digital transformation. Wang writes that while the Merz government has launched a "large, debt-financed investment programme aimed at restarting growth," its impact remains uncertain due to "partisan competition, labour shortages, and lengthy administrative approval processes."
The commentary here is particularly astute regarding the digital divide. Wang points out that while the EU has asserted regulatory leadership with the Artificial Intelligence Act, "in industrial application and innovation investment, Germany and the EU have already fallen well behind China and the United States." This is a humbling admission from a Chinese perspective, acknowledging that regulatory power does not translate to market dominance.
The discussion of the Nexperia case serves as a microcosm of this tension. Wang describes it as illustrating "Europe's dilemma between technological sovereignty, supply-chain security, and dependence on China." The scholars see Germany playing a dual role: both a victim of these tensions and a coordinator trying to manage them. This duality makes Germany a difficult partner; it wants the stability of Chinese supply chains but is increasingly willing to sacrifice them for the sake of political signaling.
The Merz government faces a tough test in strengthening leadership, including domestic political constraints, difficulties in pooling and deploying resources, and the challenge of coordinating closely with France.
Wang's reporting on the Merz government's struggles is unflinching. The phrase "lofty ambitions, disordered implementation, and weak follow-through" captures the sentiment of the seminar participants perfectly. This is not just a critique of one administration; it is an indictment of a political system that seems unable to execute its own strategies. The reference to the need for coordination with France is significant, recalling the historical importance of the Franco-German engine in driving EU policy. If that engine is sputtering, the entire European project faces a crisis of direction.
The Security Pivot and Global South Ambitions
In the final analysis, Wang highlights a dramatic shift in German security policy. The seminar participants note that Germany is pursuing an "unprecedented shift in security policy," including targets to spend 5 per cent of GDP on defense and the deployment of permanent troops in Lithuania. Wang writes that this is driven by "strategic anxiety" in the face of the "America First" policy of the U.S. administration.
This militarization has profound implications for China. Wang notes that "Germany's view of China is becoming increasingly securitised, with a growing consensus that frames China as a systemic rival and systemic challenge." The scholars argue that this framing is not just rhetorical but is reshaping how Berlin engages with the Global South. Zheng Chunrong, a key discussant, urged closer attention to "Germany's efforts to expand its influence in the Global South," suggesting that Berlin is trying to fill the vacuum left by a retreating U.S. and a distracted Russia.
Understanding German foreign policy requires answering three questions: "What is happening in the world? Where is Germany heading? What should China do?"
This triad of questions, posed by Zheng Chunrong, serves as the intellectual anchor for the entire seminar. Wang uses it to frame the conclusion: China cannot simply react to German policy; it must anticipate a Germany that is more militarized, more fragmented, and more ideologically rigid. The scholars argue that China must enter these debates with "greater confidence" and articulate its positions clearly, rather than hoping for a return to the quiet pragmatism of the past.
Bottom Line
Zichen Wang's coverage of the 2025 seminar offers a chillingly clear picture of a Germany that is no longer the stable anchor of Europe but a nation in the throes of a violent political and strategic metamorphosis. The strongest part of this argument is its refusal to sugarcoat the rise of the AfD and the deepening securitization of German foreign policy; the scholars are not predicting a slow decline but a potential political earthquake. However, the analysis's biggest vulnerability lies in its heavy reliance on the assumption that the "Trump shock" is the primary driver of these changes, potentially underestimating the endogenous structural rot within the German economy and political system itself. For the busy strategist, the takeaway is stark: the window for predictable, pragmatic cooperation with Berlin is closing fast, replaced by a landscape where economic interests are increasingly held hostage by security anxieties and populist politics.