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Why britons really regret brexit

Niall Ferguson arrives not with a standard economic audit, but with a historical autopsy of British political stability. He argues that Brexit did more than damage GDP; it shattered the very mechanism by which Britain has governed itself for two centuries, turning the Conservative Party into a vehicle for its own destruction. What makes this analysis essential right now is its refusal to treat the current chaos as an anomaly, instead framing it as the inevitable collision between a populist backlash and a rigid elite project.

The Cowling Lens on Modern Chaos

Ferguson anchors his entire narrative in the "bracingly baleful influence" of Maurice Cowling, a historian who viewed politics not as ideology, but as the maintenance of power within an elite. Ferguson writes, "Democracy... socialism... and fascism... each of these challenges, Cowling argued... required all the guile of the political elite to withstand." The author uses this framework to suggest that Brexit is simply the latest in a long line of existential threats that British elites failed to contain.

Why britons really regret brexit

This historical lens is effective because it strips away the moralizing often attached to the referendum and focuses on structural failure. Ferguson notes that while Cowling would have enjoyed the "madcap high politics" of the last decade, he would have been saddened by Europe's success in bringing the Conservative Party "to the brink of political oblivion." The argument holds weight when one considers that this is not the first time a single issue has fractured British stability; Ferguson points out that "free trade and Irish home rule had comparable impacts in the 19th century," while "appeasement of Germany and the Suez Crisis" did so in the 20th.

By an irony Cowling would have relished, British party politics has never looked more like Continental European politics than it has since Brexit.

The core of Ferguson's argument is that the two-party system has been irrevocably broken, with Reform UK now polling ahead of both major parties. He suggests this fragmentation mirrors the instability seen in other European nations, a shift that Cowling, who despised liberalism, might have found ironically fitting given his disdain for the "insufferably high-minded liberal elite." However, critics might note that Ferguson's reliance on Cowling's cynical view of politics risks downplaying the genuine cultural and economic grievances of voters who felt abandoned by both parties.

The Broken Promises of Globalization

Ferguson tackles the economic reality head-on, challenging the narrative that Brexit was a necessary correction to globalization. He writes, "The simple answer is that British voters opted to 'Leave'... for many of the same reasons that the U.S. electorate opted to gamble on Donald Trump later that same year." Yet, he immediately pivots to the divergence in outcomes, stating that "Brexit has fallen short of its twin promises to revitalize the British economy and curb immigration—in marked contrast" to American policy shifts.

The author leans heavily on data from his Stanford colleague Nick Bloom to quantify this failure. Ferguson cites a study estimating that "the Brexit process has reduced UK GDP by 6 to 8 percent between 2016 and 2025." He explains that this was driven by uncertainty, noting, "Investment is estimated to have been 12–13 percent lower," while employment and productivity also suffered. This evidence is compelling because it moves beyond political rhetoric to hard metrics of lost potential.

The combination of a federal project and open borders was too much for the Tories.

Ferguson then addresses the immigration paradox, a critical point often missed in broader discussions. He argues that while Leave campaigned on curbing migration, "Brexit caused labor shortages across sectors such as transportation, healthcare, agriculture, and hospitality." In response to these shortages, non-EU immigration surged, leading to what he calls the "Boriswave," where net migration reached unprecedented highs under a Prime Minister who had promised to reduce it. A counterargument worth considering is that Ferguson may underestimate the long-term benefits of shifting from low-wage EU labor to higher-skilled global recruitment, though the immediate economic pain he describes is undeniable.

The Illusion of Sovereignty and the Path Back?

The piece concludes by examining whether Britain can reverse course. Ferguson observes that "a majority of Britons (55 percent) say they would support undoing Brexit altogether," yet he remains skeptical of a full return to the fold. He notes that while the current administration has rejoined science and student exchange initiatives, "key red lines remain: no return to the Single Market, the Customs Union, or free movement of labor."

Ferguson suggests that the benefits of extricating Britain from Brussels are real but limited. He points out that outside the EU's procurement scheme, "the UK could roll out Covid-19 vaccines faster" and is establishing a "more pro-innovation regulatory framework" for AI. However, he warns that these gains do not match the "brave new future promised ten years ago." The author concludes with a grim assessment of Britain's domestic structural issues, arguing that "Britain's economic fate hinges much less on EU membership... than on solving structural issues that are domestic in origin," such as outdated planning laws and a crumbling healthcare system.

More like a battered old moth.

This final metaphor captures the piece's tone: a recognition that the dream of a liberated Britain has faded into a struggle for survival. While Ferguson rightly identifies that domestic policy failures are now the primary drag on growth, he perhaps underestimates the political difficulty of addressing those issues without the leverage or stability that EU membership once provided.

Bottom Line

Ferguson's strongest contribution is reframing Brexit not as a policy error but as an institutional collapse that has permanently altered British governance. The argument's biggest vulnerability lies in its heavy reliance on historical cynicism, which may obscure the genuine agency of voters who sought change regardless of elite preferences. Readers should watch for how the new administration navigates the narrow path between re-engaging with Europe and satisfying a public that feels betrayed by both sides of the debate.

Deep Dives

Explore these related deep dives:

  • The Conservative Party: From Thatcher to Cameron Amazon · Better World Books by Tim Bale

  • Peterhouse, Cambridge

    The article identifies this specific college as the exception to Cowling's disdain for liberal elites, and its Wikipedia entry details how it became a unique incubator for right-wing intellectualism that directly shaped the author's historical perspective.

  • Suez Crisis

    While mentioned briefly as a past disruption, this event serves as the critical historical precedent where an imperial overreach shattered British political stability, offering a direct parallel to the article's argument about Europe fracturing the Conservative Party.

  • Reform UK

    The text positions this party as the modern successor to previous pro-Brexit movements, and its Wikipedia entry explains how it specifically exploits the fragmentation of the traditional two-party system that Cowling's theories predicted would occur.

Sources

Why britons really regret brexit

In my late 20s, as a newcomer to the history faculty at the University of Cambridge, I came under the bracingly baleful influence of that most acerbic of Tory historians, Maurice Cowling. He taught me to understand English history as a succession of challenges to the established religious and social order, which the Conservative Party existed to contend with, and ultimately, to contain.

Democracy, in the form of electoral reform; socialism, in the form of the Labour Party; and fascism, in the form of Hitler—each of these challenges, Cowling argued in three ironic and contrarian books (1867, The Impact of Labour 1920–1924, and The Impact of Hitler), required all the guile of the political elite to withstand. For Cowling, politics was not really about ideologies or personalities, as it might appear to the naive onlooker. It was about the maintenance of power and the allocation of high office within the elite.

As someone whose guiding light was an unholy trinity of “irony, geniality, and malice,” Cowling, who died in 2005, would greatly have enjoyed the madcap high politics of Britain’s past decade, which has now seen an astonishing seven prime ministers depart prematurely from No. 10 Downing Street. But it would have saddened him to reflect that Europe had succeeded where democracy, socialism, and fascism had all failed—by bringing the Conservative Party to the brink of political oblivion. The sole consolation would have been that it has done the very same thing to the Labour Party.

Tuesday marks the 10th anniversary of Brexit, the referendum on British membership of the European Union. It is also the day after the admission by yet another party leader, Keir Starmer, that the game is up, and someone else must ascend what the Victorian Conservative leader Benjamin Disraeli memorably called “the greasy pole” to occupy the post of prime minister.

As Cowling might have said, this is not the first time in British history that the stability of party politics has been disrupted by a big and divisive issue. Not only electoral reform but also free trade and Irish home rule had comparable impacts in the 19th century; appeasement of Germany and the Suez Crisis in the 20th. To Cowling, who despised liberalism and grudgingly respected Marxism, European unification was just the latest disastrous utopian enterprise of the insufferably high-minded liberal elite who ran nearly all the Cambridge colleges (though not his own, reactionary ...