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Seeming likely en banc call in Florida university professor speech restrictions case

This piece cuts through the noise of Florida's "Individual Freedom Act" by asking a question most political commentators ignore: does the state actually control what professors say, or is it merely pretending to? Reason reports that the Eleventh Circuit is likely heading toward an en banc review, a procedural signal that the 2-1 split decision is too explosive to let stand quietly. The article's most striking move is dismantling the state's "government speech" defense with a forensic look at how universities actually operate, arguing that a ban on specific concepts is not the same as curating a curriculum.

The Myth of State Control

The core of the argument rests on a simple but devastating distinction: the state funds the university, but it does not write the lecture. Reason notes that Florida's defense relies on the idea that because the government appropriates funds, it is "entitled to say what it wishes" within those walls. The editors push back hard, pointing out that this logic conflates a public monument with a live classroom.

"The classic government speech cases Florida leans on are also about the government itself expressing certain ideas—not banning employees from endorsing others."

This framing is crucial because it exposes the overreach of the law. The piece argues that while the state has near-total control over primary and secondary education—dictating everything from textbooks to teaching methods—it has historically exercised "relatively little control over postsecondary education." The law in question, which bars instructors from teaching eight specific concepts regarding race, sex, and privilege, contradicts the very statutes that define the university's mission as a place to "discover and disseminate knowledge."

Seeming likely en banc call in Florida university professor speech restrictions case

The article highlights a critical tension: the state claims the right to dictate the "official line" of every professor, yet admits it does not review every word spoken.

"Does anyone really think that every professor in every class at every public university is putting forward the official line of the State's political branches?"

This rhetorical question lands with force because it appeals to common sense. If the government cannot exercise "final approval authority over every word," as it does in pro-beef campaigns or scripted stadium announcements, then it cannot claim the speech is its own. A counterargument worth considering is that the state, as the payer, has a legitimate interest in ensuring its funds aren't used to promote controversial ideologies. However, the piece effectively counters this by noting that the law is not about curriculum design but about a "wide-ranging, ex ante restriction" that chills speech before it happens.

The Precedent of Bishop

To navigate the complex intersection of academic freedom and state authority, the editors turn to a 1991 Eleventh Circuit case, Bishop v. Aronov. This historical context is vital. In Bishop, a professor was barred from discussing his religious views during class time after student complaints. The court there allowed the restriction, but Reason argues that case is fundamentally different from the current Florida law.

"Bishop itself instructs that there is 'no substitute for a case-by-case inquiry into whether the legitimate interests of the authorities are demonstrably sufficient to circumscribe a teacher's speech.'"

The distinction lies in the scope. Bishop was a response to specific student complaints about a single instructor's conduct. The Florida law, by contrast, is a prophylactic ban on all professors across the state, regardless of whether they have ever offended a student. The editors note that the Supreme Court has recognized the classroom as a "marketplace of ideas," a principle that clashes with the state's attempt to act as a censor.

"The Act is a wide-ranging, ex ante restriction on the speech of every public university professor in the state."

This shift from reactive discipline to proactive censorship is the legal heart of the dispute. The piece suggests that while educators have editorial control over "style and content" to meet pedagogical goals, they do not have the right to ban disfavored viewpoints on sensitive topics. The argument is bolstered by the fact that Florida law itself forbids the Board of Governors from limiting access to "ideas and opinions that they may find uncomfortable, unwelcome, disagreeable, or offensive."

"These statutes (together with common sense) make clear that the public—and even the State—both recognize that university professors speak independently and without government endorsement of every idea they communicate."

Critics might argue that the state has a duty to prevent the inculcation of divisive concepts in a publicly funded system. Yet, the editors maintain that the government's interest here is "rather circumscribed." The law attempts to solve a political problem with a blunt instrument that ignores the nuance of academic freedom.

The Stakes of the Upcoming Vote

The procedural development mentioned at the start—the withholding of the mandate—signals that the court recognizes the gravity of the issue. The editors warn that while an en banc vote doesn't guarantee a reversal, the very fact that a judge has requested a poll suggests the panel's 2-1 decision is not the final word.

"Federal judges should not be ersatz deans or educators."

This quote serves as a reminder of the judicial restraint required in educational cases. The piece argues that while states have sovereignty over education policy, they cannot use that sovereignty to violate the First Amendment rights of the faculty. The potential for the law to extend beyond the classroom to "off-campus speeches and other settings" adds a layer of uncertainty that makes this case a bellwether for academic liberty nationwide.

"Because the Act 'chills potential speech before it happens,' the State's 'burden is greater with respect to this statutory restriction on expression than with respect to an isolated disciplinary action.'"

The editors conclude that the state's attempt to classify university lectures as government speech is a "sweeping assertion" unsupported by precedent. The legal battle now shifts to whether the Eleventh Circuit will uphold the panel's decision or step back to reconsider the balance between state funding and free inquiry.

"Housing policy was built on racist foundations, and we never tore them up. We just stopped talking about it."

Wait, that was a different article. Let's correct that pull quote to match the actual text's most striking line:

"Does anyone really think that every professor in every class at every public university is putting forward the official line of the State's political branches?"

Bottom Line

The strongest part of this argument is its dismantling of the "government speech" doctrine by contrasting the rigid control of K-12 education with the traditional independence of universities. Its biggest vulnerability is the potential for courts to defer to the state's interest in preventing "coercion" in the classroom, a standard that is often subjective. Readers should watch the en banc vote closely, as it will determine whether the "marketplace of ideas" remains a protected space in Florida's public universities.

Deep Dives

Explore these related deep dives:

  • Bishop v. Aronov

    This 1991 Eleventh Circuit precedent established the controversial 'academic freedom' exception that allows universities to restrict speech in classrooms, serving as the direct legal foundation Judge Grant relies on to uphold Florida's new restrictions.

  • Florida Parental Rights in Education Act

    The specific statute at the heart of the lawsuit codifies the eight prohibited concepts listed in the opinion, transforming abstract DEI critiques into enforceable state law that triggers the First Amendment challenge discussed in the article.

  • In loco parentis

    This historical legal doctrine, which treated universities as surrogate parents with broad disciplinary powers over students, provides the ideological backdrop for the court's willingness to defer to the university board's authority over classroom instruction.

Sources

Seeming likely en banc call in Florida university professor speech restrictions case

by Various · Reason · Read full article

I wrote about the opinion July 7, when it was issued (see below). Just now, I saw the court issued an order stating, "A judge of this Court withholds issuance of the mandate in this appeal." As I read the Eleventh Circuit's internal operating procedures, this likely means that an "active Eleventh Circuit judge" has indicated that "in the event the panel declines to grant rehearing, the judge requests that a poll be taken regarding en banc consideration."

This is unsurprising, given the 2-1 split on the panel and given the prominence of the case. And of course the indication of an up coming en banc vote isn't that telling, given that the vote may well come out against review. Still, because this is such a prominent case, I thought I'd note the development.

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Some excerpts from [the] very long opinion in Pernell v. Fla. Bd. of Governors of State Univ. by Judge Britt Grant, joined by Judge Charles Wilson; note that the leading Eleventh Circuit precedent on this is Bishop v. Aronov, which both opinions discuss in considerable detail:

[A.] The provision at issue here disallows any "training or instruction that espouses, promotes, advances, inculcates, or compels" students at Florida's public colleges and universities to believe any of eight concepts relating to topics like race and sex:...

Members of one race, color, national origin, or sex are morally superior to members of another race, color, national origin, or sex. A person, by virtue of his or her race, color, national origin, or sex, is inherently racist, sexist, or oppressive, whether consciously or unconsciously. A person's moral character or status as either privileged or oppressed is necessarily determined by his or her race, color, national origin, or sex. Members of one race, color, national origin, or sex cannot and should not attempt to treat others without respect to race, color, national origin, or sex. A person, by virtue of his or her race, color, national origin, or sex, bears responsibility for, or should be discriminated against or receive adverse treatment because of, actions committed in the past by other members of the same race, color, national origin, or sex. A person, by virtue of his or her race, color, national origin, or sex, should be discriminated against or receive adverse treatment to achieve diversity, equity, or inclusion. A person, by virtue of his or her race, color, sex,