Michael Huemer delivers a provocative challenge to the foundational assumption that safety requires a state monopoly: he argues that law and order function best when treated like any other consumer good, subject to market competition rather than bureaucratic coercion. This is not merely a theoretical exercise; it is a direct indictment of current institutional failures, suggesting that the very mechanisms we trust for protection are the primary drivers of its scarcity and brutality. For readers tired of hearing that "there is no alternative" to the status quo, Huemer offers a radical reimagining where the incentives of profit align with the safety of the individual.
The Monopoly Trap
Huemer begins by dismantling the idea that police and courts must be public institutions. He proposes replacing the singular, monopolistic force in any city with "multiple, competing protection agencies," much like security firms but empowered to make arrests. The core of his argument rests on the distinction between voluntary exchange and forced provision. As Michael Huemer writes, "Government provision is generally compulsory (you can't choose not to have the product), while market provision is voluntary." He draws a sharp parallel to historical economic failures, noting that "coercive, monopolistic provision of goods is much worse than voluntary, competitive provision," citing the chronic shortages and poor quality seen in communist economies as proof.
The author contends that when providers know they will be paid regardless of performance, the incentive to serve the consumer evaporates. He points out that under the current system, "most crimes go unsolved; indeed, the police don't even try to solve them." This is a stark claim, but Huemer backs it with the logic of monopoly: if you cannot fire your provider, they have no reason not to neglect you. Critics might argue that safety is too fundamental to be left to market whims, yet Huemer counters that the current system already fails the poor most acutely, noting that "poor people are roughly 3.5 times more likely to become crime victims than rich people" even now.
If the government is the only provider of food, we're going to have crappy food, with only a few options, and people will starve because there won't be enough. That is what happened in the communist countries. The same thing that we observe with every other government-provided product is also true of protection and dispute-resolution services.
The Myth of Anarchy as War
Perhaps the most contentious section addresses the fear that private agencies would descend into constant warfare. Huemer dismisses this as "the most ridiculous" objection, arguing that war is simply bad business. He posits that agencies would find it far more profitable to resolve conflicts through third-party arbitration than through violence. This mirrors historical precedents like the Lex mercatoria, where medieval merchants developed a robust system of private dispute resolution across borders without state intervention, proving that order can emerge from competition rather than command.
As Michael Huemer puts it, "Warlike agencies would have to pay their employees much more to make up for the risk," and most workers would simply quit to avoid the danger. He contrasts this with the reality of state behavior, noting that governments are uniquely prone to catastrophic conflict because they can fund destruction without revenue constraints. He highlights the staggering cost of modern warfare: "The U.S.-Iraq war was estimated to have cost in the neighborhood of $2-3 trillion." No private entity, he argues, would sustain such a loss for a venture that only destroys assets.
Incentives and Organized Crime
Huemer tackles the concern that criminals would simply hire their own protection agencies. He argues that economics naturally favors the victim over the aggressor because "most people value keeping their own stuff more than they value getting (otherwise similar) stuff belonging to others." The potential thief values a stolen car at far less than the owner does, making it unprofitable for an agency to defend theft. Furthermore, he suggests that organized crime would wither without state prohibition of vice crimes like drugs, which currently provide criminal syndicates their primary revenue stream.
The author also addresses the fear of extortion, asking why agencies wouldn't just demand money without providing protection. The answer lies in competition: "If an agency started acting like that, no new customers would go to them; new customers would instead go to their competitors." This dynamic is impossible under a state monopoly, where citizens have "no one else to turn to." Huemer suggests that the current perception of government as a necessary protector is actually a result of its ability to act as an extortionist without consequence.
The Voluntary Alternative
Finally, Huemer explores the role of homeowners' associations (HOAs) as a practical model for this system. He argues that HOAs are superior to traditional government because membership is based on an actual contract signed upon buying property, rather than an imputed "social contract." This creates meaningful competition; if you dislike your HOA's rules or services, you can sell and move without the massive cultural and familial disruption required to change national citizenship. He notes that while moving between governments is often prohibited or prohibitively expensive, switching HOAs is a routine market transaction.
Critics might note that relying on private contracts could leave those who cannot afford property with no protection at all, but Huemer counters that market forces usually drive down costs for low-income consumers, creating "affordable versions" of goods just as they do for food or electronics. He concludes that the same logic applying to food applies here: "The same reason why you don't want a government monopoly on food is why you shouldn't want a government monopoly on protection."
If you have a coercive monopoly, you needn't bother with trying to satisfy consumers. If the government starts acting like an extortion agency, people have no one else to turn to, because the government has a monopoly. That might explain the current situation we're in.
Bottom Line
Huemer's most compelling contribution is his reframing of state violence not as a necessary evil, but as the predictable outcome of a business model with zero accountability. While the practical transition from our current system to one of polycentric law remains untested at scale, his diagnosis of why the current monopoly fails—specifically its lack of incentive to solve crimes or protect the vulnerable—is difficult to refute. The argument's greatest vulnerability lies in its assumption that market competition alone can prevent the emergence of new, private monopolies, but it successfully forces a confrontation with the reality that our current "protectors" often act as the very threat they are meant to neutralize.