← Back to Library

The week observed: September 26, 2025

This week's briefing from City Observatory cuts through the noise of infrastructure headlines to expose a terrifying reality: a $9 billion bridge project is being strangled not by engineering limits, but by a perfect storm of political hostility and bureaucratic paralysis. Joe Cortright delivers a stark warning that federal funding for the Interstate Bridge Replacement project could vanish entirely by September 2026, leaving two states to choose between absorbing impossible costs or watching a decade of planning collapse. For busy leaders tracking regional economic stability, this is not just a story about a bridge; it is a case study in how policy gridlock can erase billions in public investment.

The Anatomy of a Delay

Cortright frames the crisis as a self-inflicted wound compounded by external pressure. He argues that the project is running two and a half years behind schedule, creating a vulnerability that the current administration is exploiting. "The IBR now seems headed for the perfect political-bureaucratic-financial storm, mirroring the spectacular 2013 failure of its predecessor, the Columbia River Crossing," Cortright writes. This historical parallel is chilling; it suggests that the region is doomed to repeat a costly mistake unless the underlying incentives change.

The week observed: September 26, 2025

The author identifies a specific, lethal combination of factors: federal hesitation, regulatory obstruction, and fiscal reality. He notes that the project's $2.1 billion in federal grants "could evaporate by September 2026 if construction doesn't begin." This deadline is not arbitrary; it is the point of no return where political will fails to match financial commitment. Cortright suggests that the executive branch appears "hostile to big highway projects in blue states and also appears to be deliberately slow-walking needed approvals for the IBR." While the administration may cite bureaucratic necessity, the effect is a targeted delay that threatens the project's viability. Critics might argue that federal oversight is simply ensuring compliance with safety standards, but the timeline suggests a strategic stall rather than a procedural review.

It's reckless to embark on this project before you know whether you're going to get some or any of the billion dollars you're counting on from the federal government.

This quote, attributed to Cortright in a recent interview with The Washington State Standard, captures the core dilemma. He warns that proceeding without guaranteed funding is a gamble with public money. The argument holds weight because it shifts the blame from local planners to the uncertainty of federal policy. The stakes are high: if the funding disappears, Oregon and Washington face an "unpalatable choice: absorb the entire cost themselves or watch another decade-plus bridge effort collapse under its own bureaucratic weight."

The Cost of Bureaucracy

Beyond the political standoff, Cortright highlights a technical dispute that is driving costs into the stratosphere. The Coast Guard is demanding a 178-foot clearance, while the project prefers a 116-foot span. This disagreement is not merely about height; it is about the fundamental design and cost structure of the bridge. "Meanwhile, the Coast Guard continues to demand a costly 178-foot clearance versus IBR's preferred 116-foot span, setting up more delays and another expensive design battle," Cortright explains. This regulatory friction is a classic example of how disjointed agencies can inflate project costs without adding proportional value.

The financial implications are staggering. With costs likely ballooning to $9-10 billion, the project is becoming a fiscal black hole. Cortright points out that the region may soon confront a situation where "federal support in danger of vanishing" forces local governments to pick up the tab. This dynamic creates a perverse incentive: the longer the delays, the higher the cost, and the less likely federal support becomes. The author's framing of this as a "bureaucratic weight" is apt; the system is crushing the project under its own complexity.

Lessons on Efficiency

In a broader look at infrastructure spending, Cortright turns to a Brookings Institution report that offers potential solutions to the problem of exploding costs. He highlights a proposal by Ed Glaeser to lower bus costs, noting that "the average cost of an electric bus in the US is about triple the world wide average; US operators pay $1.1 million, while most overseas operators pay about $350,000." This stark comparison underscores a systemic inefficiency in American procurement that goes beyond just this bridge.

However, Cortright is skeptical of other proposals in the Brookings report, particularly the idea of creating a priority list of major projects exempted from many laws. "David Schleicher suggests creating a priority list of major project that would get exempted from many laws, be guided by appointed experts and granted preferential access to funds (somewhere, Robert Moses is smiling)," he writes. The reference to Robert Moses, the controversial mid-20th-century planner known for his authoritarian approach to infrastructure, serves as a cautionary tale. Cortright argues that while expediting construction is desirable, "the problem of exploding costs has as much to do with bad, bloated projects, and poor incentive structures as it does with sometimes onerous regulations." This is a crucial distinction: efficiency cannot be achieved by bypassing accountability, but by fixing the incentives that lead to bloated projects in the first place.

Bottom Line

Joe Cortright's analysis is a masterclass in connecting bureaucratic delays to real-world financial consequences, making a compelling case that the Interstate Bridge Replacement project is on the brink of failure due to a mix of political hostility and regulatory misalignment. The strongest part of his argument is the clear timeline showing how federal uncertainty is actively dismantling the project's financial foundation. His biggest vulnerability lies in the assumption that local governments can simply absorb the costs if federal aid vanishes, a scenario that may be politically impossible in the current fiscal climate. Readers should watch closely for the September 2026 deadline, as it will likely determine whether this infrastructure project becomes a regional success or another costly ghost of the past.

Sources

The week observed: September 26, 2025

by Joe Cortright · City Observatory · Read full article

.

What City Observatory Did This Week.

Federal funding of the Interstate Bridge Replacement (IBR) Project is in jeopardy, largely due to self-inflicted delays and questionable planning. The IBR now seems headed for the perfect political-bureaucratic-financial storm, mirroring the spectacular 2013 failure of its predecessor, the Columbia River Crossing. Running two and a half years behind schedule, the IBR now faces a lethal combination of Trump Administration hostility, Coast Guard obstruction, and fiscal reality.

The project’s $2.1 billion in federal grants could evaporate by September 2026 if construction doesn’t begin—and the Trump Administration seems hostile to big highway projects in blue states and also appears to be deliberately slow-walking needed approvals for the IBR. Meanwhile, the Coast Guard continues to demand a costly 178-foot clearance versus IBR’s preferred 116-foot span, setting up more delays and another expensive design battle.

With costs likely ballooning to $9-10 billion and federal support in danger of vanishing, Oregon and Washington may soon confront an unpalatable choice: absorb the entire cost themselves or watch another decade-plus bridge effort collapse under its own bureaucratic weight.

Must Read.

Five proposals to make infrastructure spending more efficient. The Brookings Institution has a timely (and also perhaps timeless) post offering several ideas for making infrastructure spending--which is increasing much faster than inflation--more efficient. Some make tons of sense, like Ed Glaeser and his co-author’s ideas for lowering bus costs. The average cost of an electric bus in the US is about triple the world wide average; US operators pay $1.1 million, while most overseas operators pay about $350,000. While cheaper buses would be pretty much an unalloyed good, some of the other ideas are interesting, but debatable, to say the least. David Schleicher suggests creating a priority list of major project that would get exempted from many laws, be guided by appointed experts and granted preferential access to funds (somewhere, Robert Moses is smiling). That may be a recipe for expediting construction but begs the question of whether the project makes sense or is cost effective or “right-sized.” Greater efficiency makes sense, but the problem of exploding costs has as much to do with bad, bloated projects, and poor incentive structures as it does with sometimes onerous regulations.

In the news.

The Washington State Standard quoted City Observatory’s Joe Cortright in its story about delays and rising costs for the Interstate Bridge Replacement Project.

Joe Cortright... said federal funding ...