Joe Cortright exposes a brutal truth that urban planners often try to soften: massive infrastructure projects are frequently doomed not by bad luck, but by deliberate deception. In this week's analysis, he argues that the chronic failure of Portland's bridge projects stems from a political strategy of "low-balling" initial costs to secure approval, only to face catastrophic overruns once construction begins. This is not just a story about Portland; it is a case study in how the executive branch's shifting funding priorities and the inherent flaws of mega-project planning are wasting billions of taxpayer dollars on infrastructure that may never be built.
The Anatomy of a Zombie Project
Cortright begins by dissecting the Burnside Bridge, a project intended to be a simple, seismic upgrade of a century-old structure. Unlike other regional megaprojects, it promised no capacity expansion, yet it has still spiraled out of control. "The project, which was supposed to have cost about $965 million has now doubled in price to as much as $1.8 billion," Cortright writes, noting that this has pushed the initiative into "indefinite postponement (zombie-status)." This framing is crucial; it suggests that the project is dead in all but name, lingering in bureaucratic limbo while consuming resources.
The author is particularly sharp when he dismisses the common scapegoat for these failures: federal uncertainty. While local officials blame the administration for funding volatility, Cortright argues that "the huge cost overrun is hardly the fed's fault." Instead, he points to a systemic issue where initial estimates are manipulated to get projects approved. "Our best estimate is that on a price and quantity adjusted basis, the proposed Burnside Bridge is now three to six times more expensive than two recently constructed Willamette River bridges in Portland," he notes. This evidence is damning because it isolates the cost explosion from external political noise, placing the blame squarely on the project's design and estimation phase.
Critics might argue that federal funding instability is a legitimate risk factor that cannot be entirely ignored, especially given recent shifts in national policy. However, Cortright's data suggests that even without federal interference, the project's internal economics were flawed from the start.
Our best estimate is that on a price and quantity adjusted basis, the proposed Burnside Bridge is now three to six times more expensive than two recently constructed Willamette River bridges in Portland.
The Interstate Bridge and the Cost of Delays
The analysis then shifts to the Interstate Bridge Replacement (IBR) project, where the stakes are even higher. Cortright highlights an interview with conservative talk-show host Lars Larson, who questions if the project is "already dead." The signs of failure are mounting: the project is years behind schedule, struggling with Coast Guard approvals for a low fixed span, and facing a potential price tag of $9 to $10 billion. Cortright observes that "it is likely to grow in cost to the $9-10 billion range" while simultaneously losing federal support due to delays and hostility from the executive branch.
The human and institutional cost of this failure is becoming visible. The project's director, a veteran of the effort for five years, has announced his resignation. Cortright interprets this departure as a symptom of a deeper rot. "Johnson's departure signals that it's kind of unsettled, unsettled time right now," he says, adding that "the blame really lies squarely on the people who have designed a project that lacks financing and may not even be approvable by the Coast Guard." This is a powerful indictment of the planning process itself, suggesting that the project was designed to be unbuildable.
The situation is further complicated by the political climate. As Cortright notes, blue cities like Chicago and New York have seen significant funding cuts, clouding the outlook for the light rail component of the IBR. This creates a paradox where a project designed to reduce carbon emissions may be killed by the very policies it was meant to support. A counterargument worth considering is that the Coast Guard's requirements for river navigation are non-negotiable safety standards, not bureaucratic hurdles. Yet, Cortright's point remains valid: if a project cannot meet these standards without becoming financially ruinous, it should not be pursued.
The Contradiction of Multi-Modal Planning
In a broader look at national trends, Cortright points to Los Angeles as a cautionary tale of conflicting priorities. While the city spends billions to create car-free connections to the airport, it simultaneously widens access roads into an expressway. "After all that talk about car-free connections for the transit-first games, LAX is dropping 5.8 lane miles of roadways in one of the most congested areas of LA," Cortright writes, highlighting the absurdity of spending $1.5 billion on a freeway expansion. He calls this "a classic example of the muddled priorities and mixed messaging sent by 'multi-modal' planning."
The science behind this is clear, yet often ignored by policymakers. Cortright reminds us that "the science of induced travel means that building more roadway capacity will increase traffic and pollution, and not incidentally undercut the viability of the public investment in mass transit." This is a fundamental truth that the article brings to the forefront: you cannot build your way out of congestion, and trying to do so while claiming to support sustainability is a contradiction that will eventually collapse under its own weight.
The Oregon Transportation Commission's recent vote to advance the IBR project despite these red flags underscores the difficulty of stopping a momentum-driven machine. Commissioner Jeff Baker's dissent is particularly telling. He argued that relying on benefit-cost ratios without accurate cost estimates is impossible. "All of these [benefits] are formulated with cost, . . . and we don't know what the cost is," Baker stated, adding that he "can't support the request based on wrong information." Cortright uses this to illustrate the absurdity of approving billions in funding for a project whose final price tag is a complete mystery.
I can't support the request based on wrong information.
Bottom Line
Joe Cortright's strongest argument is his unflinching exposure of the "low-balling" strategy that plagues urban infrastructure, revealing how political pressure to "get 'er done" overrides fiscal reality. The piece's greatest vulnerability is its heavy reliance on the assumption that federal hostility is the primary external threat, potentially underestimating the role of local state-level mismanagement. Readers should watch for the next cost estimate for the Interstate Bridge, as it will likely confirm whether this project is a necessary investment or a financial black hole.
The blame really lies squarely on the people who have designed a project that lacks financing and may not even be approvable by the Coast Guard.