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The administration actually started to decouple America from China

Noah Smith cuts through the political noise to deliver a counterintuitive verdict: the administration's aggressive trade policies have actually succeeded in breaking America's manufacturing reliance on China, even if the headlines suggest otherwise. While much of the discourse fixates on the volatility of tariffs or the personalities driving them, Smith offers a data-driven autopsy of supply chains that reveals a structural shift already underway. For busy leaders tracking global risk, this distinction between political theater and economic reality is the critical difference between panic and strategy.

The Mechanics of Separation

Smith begins by dismantling the nostalgic view of the pre-2016 trade relationship, where the U.S. handled design and China handled assembly. He notes that both nations grew dissatisfied with this dynamic: Americans lost factory jobs while Chinese leaders resented being stuck in the "low-value-added middle of the production chain." The resulting policy divergence was inevitable. Smith writes, "China used industrial policy to onshore high-value component manufacturing and create its own 'national champion' brands, while U.S. Presidents Trump and Biden strove to reduce U.S. trade dependence on China."

The administration actually started to decouple America from China

This framing is crucial because it removes the idea that decoupling is a sudden, erratic reaction to a single election cycle. Instead, it presents the shift as a long-term structural correction. The evidence Smith marshals is compelling: import shares from China have plummeted, with production shifting to Mexico and Southeast Asia. He points out that while some businesses have moved production to the U.S., the flow is modest, but the broader trend is undeniable. "It's clear that tariffs have had an effect on the shifting of U.S. imports away from China," Smith observes, noting that even the weaker tariffs of the first term forced a reallocation of trade partners.

Critics might argue that this shift is merely cosmetic, a game of "whac-a-mole" where goods are just rerouted rather than re-engineered. Smith anticipates this by acknowledging that while the U.S. has reduced direct imports, the global trade deficit with China remains stubborn. However, he effectively counters the "macro camp"—economists who claim the decoupling is an illusion because trade imbalances persist. Smith argues, "You can't just look at macro imbalances... and conclude that Chinese goods must be making their way into America. It just doesn't follow."

"China could be finding alternative markets for its exports, while America found alternative sources for its imports, and these could roughly be the same countries. The macro imbalances would persist, but China and America would have decoupled."

This distinction is the article's intellectual anchor. It forces the reader to look beyond headline trade deficits and examine the actual flow of goods. Smith's analysis suggests that the "messy divorce" is real, even if the financial ledgers haven't fully balanced yet.

The Hidden Loopholes and the Real Story

The commentary then dives into the skeptics' strongest arguments: transshipment and measurement errors. Smith systematically dismantles the idea that Chinese goods are simply being relabeled in Vietnam. Citing Gerard DiPippo, he notes that transshipment accounts for at most 18% of lost exports, likely far less. The data simply doesn't align; the products China sends to Vietnam don't match what Vietnam sends to the U.S. "Transshipment can't be the big story here," Smith concludes.

However, the analysis takes a more nuanced turn when discussing the "de minimis" loophole, which allowed small packages to enter the U.S. tariff-free. Smith highlights that the administration closed this loophole in 2025, yet the decline in Chinese exports continued. This suggests the trend is driven by deeper forces than regulatory arbitrage. The most significant factor, he argues, is the rise of intermediate goods. While final assembly has moved to Vietnam or Mexico, those factories still rely heavily on Chinese components. "Just as a 'Made in China' iPhone was mostly made out of Japanese and Korean and Taiwanese parts back in 2011, a 'Made in Vietnam' iPhone today will contain a lot of Chinese parts," Smith explains.

This is where the concept of the "Smiling Curve" becomes relevant. Historically, the highest value in manufacturing sits at the design and branding ends, while assembly is the low-value middle. China spent decades climbing this curve. Now, as Smith notes, "Chinese companies have moved up the value chain, becoming direct competitors to multinationals." The decoupling isn't a total severance; it's a reconfiguration where the U.S. buys fewer finished Chinese goods but still relies on Chinese inputs. This is a subtle but vital distinction for supply chain managers.

Smith also touches on the investment side, attributing the collapse of foreign direct investment in China to the "China Cycle"—the painful realization by multinationals that their technology is often appropriated by local competitors. "Multinationals have learned the painful lesson that when they put their factories in China, their technology will be appropriated by Chinese indigenous companies," he writes. This, combined with geopolitical risks regarding Taiwan, has created a powerful incentive for companies to leave, regardless of tariffs.

The Verdict on Policy

The piece concludes with a sharp, almost surprising endorsement of the policy's efficacy, despite the administration's chaotic reputation. Smith admits that much of the protectionist agenda has been "haphazard, misdirected, stupid, and downright corrupt," yet he insists that the specific focus on decoupling has worked. "But this one — which was continued by Biden and the Democrats — was actually starting to yield some results," he asserts.

This is a bold claim in a polarized environment. It suggests that institutional momentum can outlast political volatility. Smith warns that the administration risks squandering this progress on the current trade trip, potentially trading hard-won supply chain shifts for short-term political wins like "a few soybean purchases." The underlying message is that the structural changes in the global economy are now self-reinforcing; other nations like Vietnam are learning to industrialize just as China did, creating a viable alternative to Chinese manufacturing.

"A non-Chinese supply chain won't be built quickly or easily, and it hasn't been happening as fast as the headline numbers suggest. But we've made a promising start, and the tariffs on China were part of that."

Bottom Line

Noah Smith's analysis is a masterclass in separating political rhetoric from economic reality, proving that the administration's trade war has achieved a tangible, structural decoupling despite the noise. The argument's greatest strength is its refusal to accept the "macro camp's" dismissal of the trend, instead using granular data to show how supply chains are genuinely rewiring. However, the piece's biggest vulnerability lies in its optimism about the speed of this transition; while the direction is clear, the reliance on intermediate goods means total independence remains a distant goal, and the geopolitical risks of a fragmented global economy are only just beginning to be felt.

Deep Dives

Explore these related deep dives:

  • The China Price: The True Cost of Chinese Competitive Advantage Amazon · Better World Books by Alexandra Harney

  • Smiling curve

    This economic model explains the specific value-chain dynamic where the U.S. captured design profits while China was relegated to low-margin assembly, setting the stage for the 'decoupling' described.

  • Made in China 2025

    This specific industrial policy initiative details the exact state-led strategy China used to climb the value chain and create the 'national champion' brands like BYD and Huawei mentioned in the text.

  • Transshipment

    This trade practice explains the mechanism by which Chinese goods are routed through countries like Vietnam and Mexico to evade U.S. tariffs, clarifying why import statistics might show a drop in direct Chinese trade without a true reduction in dependence.

Sources

The administration actually started to decouple America from China

by Noah Smith · Noahpinion · Read full article

Donald Trump is headed to China with a whole bunch of top U.S. CEOs in tow to talk about trade. There is probably a post to be written here about how Trump is creating a new kind of “America, Inc.” centered around his own person, using a combination of tariffs, export controls, federal government equity stakes, and personal bullying. But this is not that post. Instead, this is a post about decoupling. Trump was elected in 2016, and again in 2024, on promises to reduce American economic dependence on China. How well has he succeeded?

First, some background. In the mid-2010s, when Trump came to power, the U.S. and China had a pretty well-understood economic relationship. America did R&D and designed products, then shipped the designs to China where they were manufactured — often using components from Japan/Korea/Taiwan, but sometimes using Chinese components. China would then ship the products back to America, where they were marketed and sold and serviced by the American companies.

Both countries chafed at this arrangement. Americans complained that the relocation of labor-intensive assembly to China put American factory workers out of a job (which was true) and worried that outsourcing assembly would eventually lead to the outsourcing of more valuable activities (which was probably true), while Chinese leaders were annoyed at being stuck in the low-value-added middle of the production chain. So both countries implemented policies to break up this arrangement and create a new trading system.

China used industrial policy to onshore high-value component manufacturing and create its own “national champion” brands, while U.S. Presidents Trump and Biden strove to reduce U.S. trade dependence on China.1 I wrote about this breakup in 2022:

Everyone agrees that China has succeeded in its half of the decoupling — far more Chinese-made goods are now made with Chinese components. The country has climbed up the value chain, and developed top brands like BYD, Huawei, Xiaomi, DJI, CATL, and so on.

Whether the U.S. has succeeded in reducing its dependence on Chinese manufacturing, however, has been a subject of hot debate. On one hand, the percentage of America’s imports that it gets from China has plummeted:

That’s from a WSJ story in February of this year, entitled “The American and Chinese Economies Are Hurtling Toward a Messy Divorce”. A few more details:

Some businesses have moved production from China to the U.S. to avoid tariffs, but the flow ...