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Ukraine builds its own “surovikin line” to stop the russians

While political headlines focus on arbitrary deadlines set in Washington, Good Times Bad Times shifts the lens to the brutal reality on the ground, revealing that the war's tempo is accelerating precisely when diplomatic pressure is supposedly mounting. The author's most striking contribution is not just a map of recent gains, but a forensic breakdown of how chronic Ukrainian personnel shortages are turning logistical hubs into death traps, forcing a desperate retreat to new fortifications that may already be obsolete.

The Illusion of Stability

Good Times Bad Times opens by dismantling the notion that the front is static, noting that despite external noise about timelines, "Russia not only shows no readiness to end it, but is actually intensifying operations on the front as part of the ongoing spring summer offensive." The author meticulously details how Russian forces have exploited gaps in the Ukrainian line, particularly around Pokrovsk, where the situation has deteriorated from a stalemate to a crisis. The coverage is effective because it moves beyond simple territorial maps to explain the mechanics of the breakthrough: small assault groups infiltrating through weak points rather than massive frontal assaults.

"Every trip in and out of this fortress city in Donets oblast is a roll of the dice with death."

This quote, attributed to Francis Farel but highlighted by the author, encapsulates the human cost of the strategic failure. Good Times Bad Times argues that the Russian advance is not merely about capturing ground but about severing the arteries of supply, turning cities into isolated pockets. The author notes that the approach to Rodinsk has cut off a critical supply road, complicating rotations and evacuations. This framing is crucial; it suggests that the loss of Pokrovsk is not a matter of if but how, and that the current Ukrainian defense is already fracturing under the weight of attrition.

Ukraine builds its own “surovikin line” to stop the russians

Critics might note that the focus on Russian momentum sometimes underplays the resilience of Ukrainian counterattacks, such as the partial regain of control in the Yalta area, which the author mentions but treats as a footnote to the broader collapse. However, the sheer volume of evidence regarding the encirclement of Pokrovsk lends significant weight to the author's grim assessment.

The Anatomy of a New Line

As the analysis shifts to Ukraine's response, Good Times Bad Times introduces the concept of the "Ukrainian Surovikin Line," a new defensive belt constructed north of the current fighting. The author explains that these fortifications, stretching roughly 350 kilometers, are designed to replicate the obstacles that stalled Ukrainian forces in 2023, but with adaptations for the modern drone-heavy battlefield. The commentary here is sharp: the author points out that these lines are being built dozens of kilometers behind the front, anticipating a potential fall of the Donbas region.

"The trenches for soldiers themselves have also been prepared based on current battlefield experience. They are adapted to the main threat posed by small FPV drones."

Good Times Bad Times highlights a critical tactical shift: instead of long, continuous trench lines that are easily targeted, the new defenses consist of independent strong points hidden in forest plantings. This detail is vital for understanding the evolution of defensive warfare. The author argues that this design forces the enemy to capture each point individually, slowing the advance. Yet, the author also delivers a sobering caveat: "even the best prepared defensive lines will fail if units intended to defend them are weakened and deprived of full manning."

"Our statistics are negative. We are losing more people than we are gaining. We have too few records."

By quoting Taras Kmut of the Comeback Alive Foundation, the author underscores that the physical fortifications are secondary to the human element. The argument is that without infantry to hold the line, the "dragon's teeth" and anti-tank ditches are merely scenery. This is the piece's most uncomfortable truth: the war is being lost not just to Russian firepower, but to a demographic and logistical exhaustion that no amount of engineering can fully offset.

The Attrition Trap

The final section of the coverage synthesizes the tactical and strategic into a single, inescapable conclusion: the war has become a brutal contest of attrition where Russia is leveraging its numerical superiority to grind down Ukrainian defenses. Good Times Bad Times describes how Russian air superiority, with "100 to 200 glide bombs" dropped daily, combined with thousands of drone operators, creates an environment where Ukrainian positions are constantly under pressure. The author notes that Russian tactics involve accepting high losses to achieve breakthroughs, a strategy that is proving effective against an overextended Ukrainian force.

"The main problem is there are no more people. There are no more resources and the war of attrition continues."

This blunt admission serves as the anchor for the entire commentary. Good Times Bad Times effectively illustrates that while the new fortifications buy time, they do not solve the fundamental equation of the war. The author suggests that the Russian strategy of multidirectional strikes is designed specifically to stretch Ukrainian reserves until they snap, a tactic that is currently succeeding in the Pokrovsk sector. A counterargument worth considering is whether the new defensive lines, if properly manned in the future, could still force a Russian overextension, but the author's evidence of current manpower deficits makes this a difficult case to sustain.

Bottom Line

Good Times Bad Times delivers a sobering, evidence-rich assessment that the Ukrainian defense is reaching a critical breaking point due to a fatal combination of Russian air power and a chronic lack of infantry. The piece's greatest strength is its refusal to sugarcoat the manpower crisis, arguing that no amount of fortification can compensate for the absence of soldiers to man them. Readers should watch closely for the fall of Pokrovsk, as its loss would likely signal the collapse of the current defensive line and force Ukraine to rely entirely on these untested rear fortifications.

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Ukraine builds its own “surovikin line” to stop the russians

by Good Times Bad Times · Good Times Bad Times · Watch video

Trump gave Putin 50 days to end the war. Now he's allegedly shortening that time to just 10. But on the front lines, no change is visible. Russia not only shows no readiness to end it, but is actually intensifying operations on the front as part of the ongoing spring summer offensive, achieving noticeable progress in Donbas.

Pocarovsk is already surrounded on three sides and every expedition to the city is a roll of the dice with death. Weakened Ukraine uncertain of Western aid and above all suffering from chronic personnel problems is forced to prepare for further pressure from the Kremlin's army. For this purpose, the Ukrainian Surovvic line is being created, also known as the new Donbas line. a new line of fortifications north of Dropilia, Katur, and Suvian, which is meant to fulfill one fundamental task.

Stop the advance of the Russians, just as the Ukrainians were stopped by Surovvic line in Zaporia in 2023. What does the situation on the front look like? Will the Donbus line provide Ukraine with stabilization? Let's check on the map.

Let's start with clarifying one thing. We have marked the extent of Russian progress from late May when we last analyzed the front situation with a bright dashed line. This way we can visualize the advances made by the Russian Federation in the last 9 weeks. It is clear that the Russian offensive continues to focus in Donetsk oblast though in recent weeks offensive actions were also observed in other areas.

In the eastern part of the Zaporia oblast the Russians captured the town of Kamyinsk and shortly thereafter began fighting for the neighboring village of Plevi. This enabled them to strike toward Steepn nohirk. The outskirts and buildings of this locality were intensively bombarded, indicating preparations for an attempt to infiltrate Ukrainian positions by assault groups. The potential capture of Steppp noirk would bring the southern districts of Zaperia within range of Russian FPV drones.

Nevertheless, this is not a direction of key importance. Russian actions here are of limited character. The Russians also conducted operations southeast of Julier Pola, capturing the village of Malenfka by July 14th, merely trying to tie down Ukrainian units in this area. The main weight of the Russian offensive, however, rests on Donetsk oblast where the Russians are attacking in several directions.

In the southwest, they have almost completely pushed Ukrainian forces beyond ...