Cyril Hédoin challenges a rigid intellectual divide that has long haunted political theory, arguing that the two dominant definitions of liberty are not enemies but necessary partners. While many assume you must choose between freedom from interference and freedom from domination, Hédoin suggests this is a false dichotomy that obscures how we actually build free societies. For the busy listener navigating a world of increasing state power and economic volatility, this distinction is not just academic—it is the key to understanding why some institutions protect us while others quietly enslave us.
The Illusion of Mutual Exclusivity
Hédoin begins by dissecting the work of historian Quentin Skinner, who recently argued that republican liberty—defined as non-domination—requires democratic institutions and stands in opposition to negative liberty. The author acknowledges Skinner's first point: that freedom as independence cannot exist under arbitrary power. However, Hédoin pushes back hard on the second claim that we must choose between these values. He writes, "Strictly speaking, Skinner is of course right that the two conceptions of freedom – as stated above – are mutually exclusive and cannot both be correct. However, this strongly suggests that the difference between (neo-)republicanism and (classical) liberalism lies less in endorsing two mutually exclusive conceptions of freedom than in how they articulate two different values associated with what we call 'freedom.'"
This reframing is crucial. It moves the debate from a war of definitions to a practical question of institutional design. Hédoin points out that both classical liberals and neo-republicans often end up defending the same constitutional structures, such as the separation of powers. He notes, "There is virtually no difference between the views of neo-republicans and classical liberals, at the constitutional level at least." This convergence suggests that the theoretical battle lines drawn by scholars like Skinner may be more about academic turf than real-world governance.
The difference between (neo-)republicanism and (classical) liberalism lies less in endorsing two mutually exclusive conceptions of freedom than in how they articulate two different values associated with what we call "freedom."
Critics might argue that this synthesis glosses over the genuine tension between individual rights and collective self-governance. If the state interferes to prevent domination, it necessarily interferes with negative liberty. Hédoin anticipates this but argues that the conflict is about how to organize social relations, not a fundamental contradiction in values.
Domination Without Interference
The essay's most potent insight lies in its clarification of what domination actually looks like. Drawing on Philip Pettit, Hédoin explains that one can be dominated even if no one is actively interfering with their choices. He quotes Pettit directly: "Such a relationship means, at the limit, that the dominating party can interfere on an arbitrary basis with the choices of the dominated: can interfere, in particular, on the basis of interest on the basis of an interest or an opinion that need not be shared by the person affected."
This distinction is vital for understanding modern power dynamics. A master does not need to beat a slave to dominate them; the mere capacity to do so, without scrutiny or penalty, is enough to constrain the slave's behavior. Hédoin expands this to the political sphere, noting that economic planning often creates this exact dynamic. He argues, "Economic planning requires that some (the minority) make tradeoffs between ends on behalf of the rest (the majority); second, economic planning cannot proceed on the basis of general rules; it necessarily requires significant discretion."
Here, Hédoin brings in a historical nuance often missed in modern debates. He references Friedrich Hayek, a figure usually associated with negative liberty, to show that the fear of arbitrary will is not unique to republicans. Hédoin writes, "Friedrich Hayek, for instance, defines freedom as follows in The Constitution of Liberty: 'the possibility of a person's acting according to his own decisions and plans, in contrast to the position of one who was irrevocably subject to the will of another, who by arbitrary decision would coerce him to act or not to act in specific ways.'" This connection to Hayek, alongside the earlier nod to Isaiah Berlin's 1958 essay "Two Concepts of Liberty," grounds the argument in a deep intellectual tradition that transcends current partisan divides.
The Role of Public Reason
So how do we balance these competing values? Hédoin turns to public reason liberalism as a model for articulation. He suggests that while we start with a presumption of negative freedom, this presumption must be justified publicly. He explains, "The idea of public reason expresses the requirement, in social and political morality, to publicly justify to everyone the principles and institutions that govern their lives – including when and to what extent negative freedom is relevant."
This approach allows for interference that is not arbitrary. If a rule is based on general principles that citizens can accept, it may interfere with an individual's immediate choices without dominating them. Hédoin writes, "Interference without domination is also possible. It occurs when interference is not arbitrary, i.e., not based on one's interests, but based on general rules that constrain the interfering party and that the person interfered with has accepted."
This is a sophisticated move. It acknowledges that a free society requires rules that limit individual action, but insists those rules must be non-arbitrary. The author notes that this requires "adequate political, but also, adequate economic institutions," specifically pointing toward polycentric systems and market economies that allow for exit and self-governance. He writes, "Non-domination requires giving people opportunities to pursue their ends and to exit relationships that put unjustified restrictions on them."
Bottom Line
Cyril Hédoin's strongest contribution is dismantling the idea that we must choose between being left alone and being free from arbitrary power; instead, he shows how a robust free society requires both. The argument's vulnerability lies in its reliance on the assumption that "public reason" can effectively constrain the discretion of those in power, a historical challenge that remains unresolved. Readers should watch for how this framework applies to modern debates on economic regulation, where the line between necessary rules and arbitrary domination is increasingly blurred.