← Back to Library

"Reply to the reviewers" - tom kaspers

In a field notorious for its endless, often circular debates, Tom Kaspers has submitted a satirical masterpiece that exposes the absurdity of modern academic gatekeeping. Rather than defending a philosophical theory, the author defends the very act of submission itself, arguing that peer review has devolved into a subjective clash of personal intellectual tastes rather than an objective assessment of rigor. This is not a dry methodological critique; it is a biting indictment of a system where a paper's fate hinges on whether a reviewer happens to like the author's "style."

The Illusion of Objectivity

Kaspers opens by dismantling the myth that peer reviewers can separate their personal preferences from their professional judgments. He highlights the frequent, glaring contradictions in referee reports, noting that "wherever one of you told me to go right, the other said, 'Go left!'" This observation strikes a nerve because it is so universally recognized yet rarely addressed so bluntly. The author argues that while scientists can test theories against shared evidence, philosophers often lack this common ground, leaving them to judge truth based on agreement. As Kaspers puts it, "the philosopher, who doesn't have much of a shared body of evidence at all, could only answer the question of the theory's truth by answering the question of whether they happen to agree with it."

"Reply to the reviewers" - tom kaspers

This framing is effective because it reframes the "rejection" not as a failure of quality, but as a failure of compatibility. The author suggests that when reviewers impose their own tastes, they cease to be peers and become mere critics of style. "To judge whether I should trust your testimony on novels or music or pistachio ice cream, I must first establish that our tastes in these areas are aligned," Kaspers writes, drawing a sharp parallel between academic review and personal aesthetic judgment. The implication is clear: the current system rewards conformity to a specific, often unspoken, intellectual fashion rather than genuine coherence.

"Your most noble belief in the pursuit of knowledge and understanding... have plunged the system of peer review in a state of absurdity."

Critics might argue that some degree of subjective taste is inevitable in any field that lacks empirical falsification, and that "taste" is simply a shorthand for deep expertise. However, Kaspers counters that this subjectivity creates a bottleneck where "perfectly coherent theses get rejected" simply because they don't fit the reviewer's horizon. The author's decision to retract the submission while publishing the response is a bold, performative act that underscores the futility of trying to please a system built on conflicting personal sentiments.

The Architecture of Academic Publishing

To illustrate how the field prioritizes trends over substance, Kaspers employs a striking architectural metaphor. He likens a philosophy journal to Architectural Digest, suggesting that if the entire industry is obsessed with "neo-futurist style," publishing a piece on brutalism without addressing the dominant trend is seen as a failure. He notes, "If everyone is building in the neo-futurist style, it makes little sense to publish the designs of some niche architect firm devoted to reviving brutalism." This comparison is particularly apt given the history of brutalism, which, despite its initial rejection by mainstream tastes, eventually became a defining aesthetic of the 20th century, proving that "in vogue" does not always mean "correct" or "valuable."

The author argues that this trend-chasing forces authors into a "highly destructive balancing act," mangling their theories to satisfy contradictory demands. "But why should we mangle our theories for the sake of generality, when we already know which views we want to cater to and which we don't?" Kaspers asks. This is a powerful critique of the "rigor for rigor's sake" mentality that often leads to papers that are technically flawless but intellectually sterile. The system demands that authors "dive as deep and soar as high as you would like" within the bounds of theoretical space, yet simultaneously penalizes them for stepping outside the narrow corridor of current fashion.

"Not all that shall be built will appease your eye, but the philosophical land is expansive and plentiful. My hovel is but a dot on a map."

Kaspers proposes a new set of criteria for acceptance that strips away the personal: clarity, internal coherence, relevance to well-known questions, and productive originality. He argues that reviewers should judge whether a thesis addresses problems the community cares about, rather than whether it aligns with their personal intellectual horizons. "The only tastes that should be relevant are those prevalent in the field of research," he insists. This shift would, in his view, make the process faster and fairer, particularly for scholars from diverse backgrounds who may not have "breathed the same air" as the mainstream elite.

The Path Forward

The ultimate goal of Kaspers' satire is to expose the "crapshoot" nature of current publishing. He warns that when acceptance correlates with a reviewer's personal taste, "those who have unusual tastes will unfairly be disadvantaged." This is a crucial point for the broader academic community, as it highlights how the system inadvertently homogenizes thought. By demanding that authors cater to the "shared tastes of their audience" rather than the individual whims of reviewers, Kaspers envisions a landscape where "getting a paper accepted will remain a mark of academic excellence—probably even more so, since it'll become less of a crapshoot."

While the piece is undeniably a satire, its diagnosis of the problem is painfully accurate. The tension between the need for community standards and the danger of groupthink is real. Kaspers suggests that the solution lies in narrowing the reviewer's task: "You're just trying to improve the paper... But you're doing so by inserting your own intellectual tastes." By refocusing on the field's shared problems rather than individual preferences, the academy might finally stop treating peer review as a popularity contest.

Bottom Line

Tom Kaspers' satirical "Reply" is a devastatingly accurate diagnosis of a broken system, successfully arguing that personal taste has usurped objective rigor in philosophical peer review. While the proposal to rely solely on "field-wide" tastes risks creating new forms of conformity, the piece's greatest strength is its unflinching exposure of the absurdity inherent in demanding authors please two reviewers who fundamentally disagree. The academic world would do well to listen, even if it means admitting that the emperor has no clothes.

Deep Dives

Explore these related deep dives:

  • Peer review

    The entire article is a satirical critique of the peer review process in philosophy, examining its mechanisms, limitations, and how personal intellectual tastes can undermine its objectivity. Understanding the formal history and structure of peer review provides essential context.

  • Brutalist architecture

    The author uses brutalism versus neo-futurism as an extended metaphor for how philosophical journals, like Architectural Digest, favor certain intellectual styles over others. Understanding brutalism's actual history and reception enriches this analogy about academic publishing trends.

Sources

"Reply to the reviewers" - tom kaspers

by Marcus Arvan · · Read full article

Excerpt from “Reply to the Reviewers” (Synthese 2025) by Tom Kaspers:

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-025-05248-4

[This paper is a satire of the response document submitted when a manuscript requires revisions. Instead of actually tackling the reviewers’ comments, the author gets sidetracked into a monologue about the role of peer review in philosophy. He argues that peer reviewers shouldn’t judge a theory on the basis of whether it is true. Unlike the scientist, who may assess a theory’s truth by testing it against a shared body of evidence, the philosopher, who doesn’t have much of a shared body of evidence at all, could only answer the question of the theory’s truth by answering the question of whether they happen to agree with it. And whether they agree with the theory might depend, at least in part, on their personal intellectual tastes. The excerpt is of the last few pages of the article, in which the author criticizes and reconsiders the role of these intellectual tastes in peer review.]

I say we leave our personal tastes out of it, for two reasons. The first requires me to address the elephant in the room: your referee reports, though equally insightful, didn’t exactly align perfectly. This particular elephant finds its way into the halls of philosophy rather often; there is nary a feat more considerable than getting two philosophers to agree with one another. Yet, our elephant did give me a beast of a problem. For wherever one of you told me to go right, the other said, ‘Go left!’

I wouldn’t dare to suggest that we get rid of one of you. There’s a purpose to having two reviewers. For example, there was a rather glaring inconsistency in the third section of my manuscript. One of you failed to notice it—fair enough, so did I—but the other caught it. The second peer reviewer is a safeguard. But this system only works if both can keep their personal tastes out of it.

This brings me to my second reason. You are peer reviewers—and I do consider you to be my peers. Normally, we take each other to be peers—within a given community—by default; if you’re a fellow philosopher, you’re my peer unless you say or do things that disqualify you, e.g., you commit an instance of academic fraud. But where matters of taste are concerned, the mechanisms are entirely different. To judge whether I should trust your ...