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Xu jilin on the politics of resentment among China’s youth

Various · Sinification · ·27 min read
Commentary by Hex Index staff

This piece cuts through the noise of "lazy youth" stereotypes to reveal a profound structural crisis: China's youngest generation isn't rejecting work; they are rejecting a broken promise. Sinification presents a chilling diagnosis from scholar Xu Jilin, arguing that the popular "lying flat" movement is not a lifestyle choice but a symptom of blocked social mobility and a deep, accumulating resentment that threatens to destabilize the very system that claims to protect these citizens.

The Generational Rift

The article's most striking insight is its rejection of traditional political labels. Sinification reports that trying to understand the "post-90s" generation through a "left-right" ideological lens is "asking the wrong question." Instead, the piece argues for a generational divide that is far more visceral. The "former wave" (born in the 50s and 60s) grew up believing that individual destiny and the nation's future were inextricably linked. In contrast, the "next wave" faces a paradox: they possess "complete confidence in the nation's future, coupled with utter despair about one's personal fate."

Xu jilin on the politics of resentment among China’s youth

This distinction is crucial because it explains why the state's patriotic narratives fail to resonate with young people. As the editors note, while the older generation sees the state as an extension of the family, the younger generation views the self and the state as "two entirely different 'skins'." This separation creates a psychological void where the "hollow subject" emerges—someone who elevates individual will not out of empowerment, but out of a need to lower expectations and survive.

"Those who claim to have actively embraced lying flat are either privileged 'pseudo-adherents'... or a small minority of genuine philosophical Cynics. Most adherents... are reluctant."

The commentary suggests that this reluctance is the key to understanding the phenomenon. It is not a rebellion of the privileged, but a retreat of the trapped. The piece draws a parallel to Japan's "lower stream society," where young people in the lower reaches of the middle class simply lose hope of upward mobility. This framing effectively shifts the blame from individual laziness to systemic ossification.

The Volatility of Resentment

Where the piece becomes truly urgent is in its application of sociological theory to current events. Xu Jilin invokes German sociologist Max Scheler's concept of ressentiment to describe the emotional undercurrent of this generation. Sinification reports that this is not just dissatisfaction, but a "broad-based, diffuse resentment against fellow youth who have done well and toward all elites."

This is a dangerous cocktail. The article warns that such feelings, when left unaddressed, historically accumulate into a "destructive 'disorganised force' that cannot readily be bargained with." The editors connect this to the concept of "Agricultural Involution," where increased effort yields no advancement, creating a cycle of exhaustion. The piece argues that "lying flat" is a psychological mechanism to cope with a meritocracy where "more work does not result in advancement."

"China's leadership must take this problem extremely seriously: accumulated resentment could develop into a destructive 'great flood' that elites may struggle to control."

Critics might argue that the state has successfully co-opted or suppressed these sentiments through digital censorship and surveillance, rendering the "flood" metaphor alarmist. However, the piece counters that the very nature of this resentment—being diffuse and disorganized—makes it harder to target than a traditional political opposition. The fear is not of a coordinated uprising, but of a spontaneous, chaotic collapse of social cohesion.

"These are grave questions that China must now confront in earnest."

The historical context provided by the publication adds weight to this warning. Just as the "Buddha-like mindset" of the previous decade offered a passive coping mechanism, the current "lying flat" movement signals a deeper fracture. The article notes that the "next wave" grew up in a "depoliticised" era, indifferent to grand narratives, yet deeply aware of the utilitarian philosophy that demands success at the expense of values. This creates a generation that is "red by nature" in their love for the country but "hollow" in their belief in their own future within it.

Bottom Line

The strongest part of this argument is its refusal to pathologize youth behavior, instead treating "lying flat" as a rational response to irrational economic constraints. Its biggest vulnerability lies in the assumption that the current leadership can or will pivot to address these structural grievances without compromising the political status quo. The reader should watch for whether the state's response remains one of suppression or shifts toward the genuine opportunity creation that Xu Jilin implies is the only antidote to this "great flood."

Deep Dives

Explore these related deep dives:

  • Agricultural Involution Amazon · Better World Books by Clifford Geertz

  • Buddha-like mindset

    This Japanese-derived lifestyle trend serves as the cultural precursor to China's 'lying flat' movement, illustrating how East Asian youth are collectively rejecting hyper-competitive meritocracy through passive resistance.

  • Ressentiment

    Xu Jilin explicitly applies Max Scheler's specific sociological theory of repressed envy to explain why China's youth direct their anger not just at the system, but at successful peers, framing their apathy as a dangerous precursor to historical revolution.

  • Agricultural Involution

    While the article uses 'involution' to describe economic stagnation, the original anthropological concept from Clifford Geertz regarding agricultural intensification without development provides the precise technical framework for understanding why increased effort yields diminishing returns in China's modern economy.

Sources

Xu jilin on the politics of resentment among China’s youth

by Various · Sinification · Read full article

Today’s edition opens with an introduction by Timothy Cheek, Professor in the Department of History and the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs at the University of British Columbia. A leading authority on modern Chinese history, his research focuses on the history of the Chinese Communist Party and intellectuals in twentieth-century and contemporary China. He published The Intellectual in Modern Chinese History in 2015 and, more recently, has co-edited The Chinese Communist Party: A Century in Ten Lives (2021). He also runs a collaborative project entitled “Revisiting the Revolution”, translating recent PRC scholarship on China’s modern revolutionary and social history. Many thanks to him for contributing to this newsletter. — James and Thomas

Xu Jilin (b. 1957) is a well-known Shanghai academic and public intellectual who has been widely translated and featured in Sinification. An active public commentator as well as prolific historian of Chinese intellectuals and political culture in the modern period, Xu is identified as a Chinese liberal and proponent of reform within the current Chinese system. His writings before 2015 addressed hot political topics of the day, such as the political role of intellectuals in China (the 2004 debate over ‘public intellectuals’), what China’s role in the world should be (the debate over Tianxia-ism), and humanistic readings of Party ideology. However, like his PRC compatriots, Xu has stepped back from political commentary under the strictures of current Party policy. Instead, he has turned to social commentary with a focus on youth issues and light essays and online lectures plumbing both modern and traditional history for useful lessons—not, as before, for Party leadership but for fellow citizens in general and youth in particular. In this way he continues his commitment as a public intellectual in China’s “New Era.”

In this piece Xu dissects the phenomena of “lying flat” (tangping), “involution” (neijuan), and the troubling attitudes of China’s youthful “post-90s” generation. That attitude, expressed in the low motivation of lying flat and distrust of the meritocracy described as involution—in which more work does not result in advancement—is described by Xu as yuanhen, “resentment” in simple terms, though Xu displays his academic chops by citing German sociologist Max Scheler’s theory of ressentiment. This term, it emerges, is the key point and warning of the essay: such broad-based, diffuse resentment against fellow youth who have done well and toward all elites is a volatile social cocktail that in modern history ...