Jason Slaughter arrives at a conclusion that feels both absurd and inevitable: the most efficient way to see the prehistoric past is to traverse the modern present by rail, yet the very infrastructure meant to enable this journey is actively failing. In a narrative that begins with the awe of titanosaur skeletons, the piece pivots sharply to a damning indictment of European transport policy, arguing that the continent's obsession with cars has strangled the revival of the sleeper train. This is not merely a travelogue; it is a case study in how decades of misallocated capital have turned a dream of seamless cross-border travel into a logistical nightmare.
The Allure of the Iron Road
Slaughter frames the journey as a celebration of two distinct passions, noting that "dinosaurs and trains you couldn't have asked for a better trip." The initial leg of the journey, utilizing the Eurostar from Amsterdam to London, serves as the control group for the argument. He describes the experience as "much more comfortable" than flying, despite the security checks, and highlights the efficiency of the route. The author points out that the Eurostar travels at 300 kilometers per hour, offering a ride that is "perfectly smooth and comfortable at that speed."
This section establishes the baseline for what high-speed rail can achieve when properly funded and integrated. Slaughter's observation that the journey is "faster than flying because of all the extra time that air travel requires" is a crucial data point often ignored in debates about modal shift. He also notes the human element of the experience, mentioning that the train "has commissioned their own beer" which was "actually decent," a small detail that underscores the passenger-centric design of the service. The argument here is that the technology exists and the demand is there; the barrier is purely political will.
"The truth is that European countries have spent significantly more on car infrastructure than they have on rail infrastructure over the past 30 years."
The Brussels Interlude and the Ghost of Infrastructure
Moving to Brussels, Slaughter shifts from the pristine efficiency of the UK-France corridor to the gritty reality of urban planning in Belgium. He notes that while the city has improved, "this painted bicycle gutter is as bad as it was when we lived there." This observation serves as a microcosm for the broader issue: incremental improvements in urban design are being undermined by a legacy of car-centric planning. The author's personal history in the city lends weight to his critique, as he recalls leaving after only two years due to the environment, yet returning to find that the fundamental issues persist.
The visit to the Natural History Museum in Brussels provides a stark contrast between the timeless scale of the exhibits and the fragility of the modern transport network. Slaughter marvels at the "largest dinosaur Hall in the world," yet the very next paragraph introduces the collapse of the planned journey. The museum's exhibits, which span 165 million years of history, stand in ironic opposition to the short-sightedness of current infrastructure policy. He notes that "we live closer in time to T-Rex than T-Rex did to stegosaurus," a fact that highlights the deep time of geology versus the shallow time of political decision-making.
Critics might argue that the author's focus on the failure of a single train service overlooks the broader successes of European rail, but the specific incident serves as a symptom of a systemic disease rather than an isolated anomaly. The cancellation of the sleeper train is not just a travel inconvenience; it is a policy failure.
The Collapse of the Sleeper Dream
The narrative takes a sharp turn when the planned overnight service from Brussels to Berlin is canceled. Slaughter describes the frustration of having "both your transportation and sleeping accommodations canceled at the same time." He contrasts this with the resilience of the German rail system in other contexts, noting that if a train is canceled, Deutsche Bahn allows passengers to "get on any train you want going in that direction." However, this flexibility cannot compensate for the lack of frequency and reliability.
The core of the argument emerges here: the reliability of Deutsche Bahn has "tank[ed] over the past few years reaching an all-time low of 52% for long-distance trains." Slaughter rejects the simplistic narrative of incompetence, instead pointing to a decades-long trend of underinvestment. He cites data showing that between 1995 and 2020, "the length of highways in Europe grew by 60% while the length of Railways grew by um NE - 6.5%." This statistic is the smoking gun of the piece, illustrating a deliberate choice to prioritize roads over rails.
"Germany spent twice as much on road infrastructure as it did on rail while also closing almost 300 [rail lines]."
The author's analysis suggests that the failure of the sleeper train is not an accident but the inevitable result of a policy environment that has starved rail of resources for thirty years. The cancellation of the European Sleeper service, a private company founded in 2021 to meet demand, highlights the fragility of new entrants trying to operate in a broken system. Slaughter's frustration is palpable, yet his conclusion is analytical: the problem is not the operators, but the infrastructure itself.
Bottom Line
Slaughter's piece succeeds by using a personal travel failure to illuminate a massive structural flaw in European policy. The strongest part of the argument is the use of hard data to debunk the idea that rail failures are merely operational; they are the result of a 60% expansion of highways versus a shrinking rail network. The biggest vulnerability is the lack of specific policy solutions beyond general calls for more investment, leaving the reader with the problem but not the blueprint. However, the framing is effective: if we cannot trust the trains to get us to the dinosaurs, we have lost the future before we even arrive.
The truth is that European countries have spent significantly more on car infrastructure than they have on rail infrastructure over the past 30 years.