In an era where smartphones function less as tools and more as surveillance endpoints, The Hated One offers a rare, evidence-based framework for reclaiming digital autonomy. Rather than relying on marketing slogans about "privacy," the piece applies a rigorous threat model to rank devices, revealing a stark hierarchy where mainstream options fail and only radical customization succeeds.
The Benchmark of Betrayal
The Hated One begins by dismantling the comforting illusion that tech giants have reformed. "Smartphones have been designed to be the ultimate spying devices," they assert, citing how Apple collects usage data even when users opt out and Google tracks location despite settings being disabled. This framing is crucial because it shifts the burden of proof from the consumer to the manufacturer. The author argues that current privacy claims are merely "marketing" rather than evidence-based reality, a perspective that resonates deeply given the frequency of data breaches and the predatory nature of the advertising industry.
To move beyond opinion, the piece introduces the "Lynen" privacy threat model, a seven-category benchmark designed to score devices based on vulnerability. The logic is simple but devastating: the more points a phone scores, the worse it is for privacy. "We will take these seven threat categories and measure how much each phone is exposing our data to each threat," The Hated One explains. This methodological approach transforms a subjective debate into a reproducible audit, allowing readers to verify the claims themselves.
"All of this is really just marketing. Is there a method that's based on evidence that can tell us which options are actually private?"
The Linkability Trap
The analysis quickly exposes the fundamental flaw in mainstream ecosystems: linkability. The Hated One points out that using an iPhone requires an Apple account, which "immediately broadcasts all unique identifiers from your phone to Apple." This creates a permanent profile of the user's activity across services. While the author acknowledges that Apple processes more data on-device, they note that the initial linkability score remains high due to the necessity of the account.
Google Pixel phones fare similarly, with the author noting that "by default Google does share more data with third parties than Apple," earning them additional points on the vulnerability scale. The situation deteriorates further for other Android vendors, who often ship phones with "unnecessary pre-installed apps with privileged permissions that... cannot be deleted." The author's critique here is sharp: these vendors collect more than necessary, retain it longer, and sell it without restraint.
Critics might argue that the average user prioritizes convenience over perfect anonymity, making the high linkability of mainstream phones a tolerable trade-off. However, The Hated One counters this by highlighting how easily travel patterns and purchasing habits can be linked to a specific identity, turning convenience into a permanent digital footprint.
The Case for Radical Isolation
The piece's most distinctive argument centers on Android forks, specifically GrapheneOS. The Hated One singles out this operating system because it "significantly enhances the application sandbox to the point no app on your phone has any privileged access whatsoever." This technical distinction allows for fully isolated user profiles, effectively compartmentalizing privacy-invasive apps from personal data.
In the category of identifiability, where users are exposed through email, phone numbers, or behavioral patterns, the iPhone and Pixel score poorly because they require identifiable information to function. "To use the iPhone you have to create an Apple account... this immediately gives Apple your email address, phone number, payment method, IP address and all hardware identifiers," the author writes. In contrast, GrapheneOS requires no identifiable information and employs full MAC address randomization.
The analysis of non-repudiation—the ability to deny using a service—is equally damning for mainstream options. The author notes that Apple and Google log interactions, making it "lucrative to go to these companies and request that data" for government prosecution. Only GrapheneOS achieves a zero score in this category because "not even Google nor anyone else... have access to any hardware identifiers."
"The very same applies to other Android phones and AOSP forks if you use them with Google services. The only phone that has full plausible deniability is GrapheneOS."
Detectability and Data Disclosure
The commentary concludes by addressing detectability and data disclosure. While encryption protects data content, it does not hide the fact that data exists. The Hated One argues that "almost all cases detectability threats will come from external sources," noting that only GrapheneOS can be used as a Wi-Fi-only device with a trusted VPN to completely anonymize traffic.
Regarding data disclosure, the author acknowledges that Apple and Google have improved by minimizing collection and using federated machine learning. However, they maintain that "they still do a lot of unnecessary data collection and analysis." The iPhone receives a slightly better score than Pixel due to optional end-to-end encryption, but both lag behind GrapheneOS, which treats all apps as third-party threats and restricts them accordingly.
Bottom Line
The Hated One's strongest contribution is the application of a rigorous, reproducible threat model that strips away corporate marketing to reveal the architectural realities of smartphone privacy. The piece's greatest vulnerability lies in its assumption that users are willing to sacrifice the seamless integration of mainstream ecosystems for the technical complexity of GrapheneOS. For those prioritizing true anonymity, however, the verdict is clear: the only path to privacy is a complete departure from the standard smartphone experience.
"The only phone that has full plausible deniability is GrapheneOS."
Bottom Line
The Hated One successfully reframes smartphone privacy from a feature list to a threat landscape, proving that mainstream devices are inherently compromised by design. While the solution requires significant technical effort, the argument that true privacy is impossible within the current walled gardens is compelling and difficult to refute. Readers should watch for how the industry responds to this growing demand for open-source, sandboxed alternatives.