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Yesterday’s war

Doomberg cuts through the noise of geopolitical posturing to ask a question the mainstream narrative has largely ignored: is the West's obsession with the "Russian shadow fleet" actually a strategic masterstroke, or a costly blunder that punishes the global consumer? The piece arrives at a critical juncture where naval drones are striking unarmed tankers and insurance premiums are skyrocketing, challenging the assumption that strangling Russian oil revenue will force a negotiation.

The Escalation of Naval Conflict

The commentary opens by grounding the reader in the recent, violent escalation of maritime warfare. Doomberg notes that after French forces briefly detained the Boracay, a Benin-flagged tanker, the situation shifted from diplomatic friction to kinetic strikes. "Two months later, attacks on the sanctioned fleet escalated dramatically. Several tankers were struck by naval drones, actions for which the Ukrainian Security Service has openly taken responsibility." This shift from boarding to bombing represents a dangerous new phase in the conflict, one that blurs the lines of engagement in neutral waters.

Yesterday’s war

The author highlights the international backlash to these actions, noting that even allies are growing wary. "President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey publicly condemned the assaults as 'unacceptable' and issued a stern warning that they should halt." This reaction underscores a growing fracture in the global consensus; while the West views these ships as legitimate targets, other nations see the attacks on unarmed commercial vessels as reckless and destabilizing. The human cost here is not just in potential casualties, but in the erosion of the rules-based order that keeps global trade flowing.

Stopping these tankers from transporting Russian oil has become an obsession for Western leaders, who believe the associated money brought in is critical to financing Russia’s war effort.

Doomberg argues that this "obsession" is driving policy that may be fundamentally flawed. The logic is simple: cut the money, break the economy, force the negotiation. However, the author suggests this calculus ignores the resilience of the Russian economy and the interconnectedness of global markets. The strategy assumes a level of control over the "shadow fleet"—a term the piece rightly notes has "no legal standing under international law"—that simply does not exist in practice.

The Economic Backfire

The most compelling part of Doomberg's analysis is the data-driven look at the economic consequences. Rather than crippling Russia, the campaign appears to be inflating costs for everyone else. The author points to a stark reality: "The cost of war risk insurance for ships sailing through the Black Sea — a critical trade zone for commodities such as grain and oil — jumped after attacks by Ukrainian special forces on infrastructure including Russia’s Novorossiysk port."

This is where the argument gains significant weight. The financial machinery of global trade is reacting to the violence with a price hike that affects all participants. "War risk insurance prices have risen from about 0.25 to 0.3 per cent of a ship’s value in early November to between 0.5 and 0.75 per cent this week, Marcus Baker, head of marine and cargo for broker Marsh, told the Financial Times, bringing price rises to as much as 250 per cent."

Doomberg uses this data to dismantle the idea that sanctions are a surgical tool. Instead, they are becoming a blunt instrument that raises the price of energy and food for the entire world. The author writes, "As we have long argued, sanctioning strong countries not only doesn’t work but nearly always backfires, and we expect a similar outcome here." This framing is effective because it moves beyond ideology to the hard mechanics of supply and demand.

Critics might argue that the moral imperative to stop funding a war outweighs the economic inconvenience of higher insurance rates. However, Doomberg counters that the economic pain is not isolated; it is a global tax on the very nations trying to isolate Russia. "Additionally, if the campaign continues to escalate, commodity prices will undoubtedly soar across a global economy that simply cannot do without Russia’s vast supply." The piece suggests that in a globalized market, you cannot sanction a major energy exporter without feeling the recoil.

The Strategic Miscalculation

The commentary concludes by questioning the ultimate efficacy of the strategy. If Russia can simply raise prices to offset lost volume, then the sanctions fail to achieve their primary goal. "In such a scenario, Russian oil producers would more than make up any lost volume with higher prices, something they have consistently done since the war broke out." This observation strikes at the heart of the administration's policy: it assumes Russia is vulnerable to volume cuts, when in reality, they may be more vulnerable to price volatility, which they are currently managing well.

The threat of further escalation looms large. "Putin has already threatened to cut off Ukraine from the Black Sea entirely, a move that would only inflame the situation further." Doomberg warns that the current trajectory risks turning the Black Sea into a no-go zone, disrupting not just oil but grain shipments, which would have catastrophic humanitarian implications for food-insecure nations. The author's final question is the most damning: "Just how important are seaborne oil exports to Russia’s economy, anyway? Would stopping these shipments be the hammer blow it is assumed to be?"

As evidenced by the reaction of insurers, the cost of shipping will rise for everyone, not just sanctioned ships—a price that will ultimately be passed on to global consumers.

Bottom Line

Doomberg's strongest asset is its refusal to accept the official narrative that military pressure on the shadow fleet is a clear path to victory; instead, it presents a sobering case that the strategy is inflating global costs while failing to significantly dent Russian revenue. The argument's vulnerability lies in its reliance on economic theory over the political will of the executive branch, which may prioritize symbolic victories over economic efficiency. Readers should watch closely to see if insurance premiums continue to climb, as that will be the true metric of whether this campaign is a strategic success or a self-inflicted wound on the global economy.

Sources

Yesterday’s war

by Doomberg · Doomberg · Read full article

“I am a man of fixed and unbending principles, the first of which is to be flexible at all times.” – Everett Dirksen

In late September, French naval forces boarded and immobilized the Boracay, a Benin-flagged oil tanker sailing off of France’s Atlantic coast. Carrying crude from Russia to India, the Boracay is part of what Western leaders call the “Russian shadow fleet,” a term with no legal standing under international law that refers to sanctioned ships insured by non-Western entities. Russian President Vladimir Putin blasted the move as piracy in neutral waters. After a short news cycle, the ship was released and allowed to continue its course.

Two months later, attacks on the sanctioned fleet escalated dramatically. Several tankers were struck by naval drones, actions for which the Ukrainian Security Service has openly taken responsibility. Another was apparently hit just yesterday. Although no lives were lost, the flagrant attacks against unarmed ships caused outrage in many countries. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey publicly condemned the assaults as “unacceptable” and issued a stern warning that they should halt.

Stopping these tankers from transporting Russian oil has become an obsession for Western leaders, who believe the associated money brought in is critical to financing Russia’s war effort. The thinking goes that if these ships are blocked and that revenue is cut off, Russia’s economy will suffer significant damage and Putin will be forced to the negotiating table in a weakened position. Considering that there are approximately 1,240 ships in the shadow fleet, it seems an unlikely goal to achieve, but the recent bout of attacks is certainly having an impact on global logistics:

“The cost of war risk insurance for ships sailing through the Black Sea — a critical trade zone for commodities such as grain and oil — jumped after attacks by Ukrainian special forces on infrastructure including Russia’s Novorossiysk port.

War risk insurance prices have risen from about 0.25 to 0.3 per cent of a ship’s value in early November to between 0.5 and 0.75 per cent this week, Marcus Baker, head of marine and cargo for broker Marsh, told the Financial Times, bringing price rises to as much as 250 per cent.

A commodities insurance broker at another firm said that prices for their clients had risen more than 200 per cent.”

As we have long argued, sanctioning strong countries not only doesn’t work but nearly always ...