This piece cuts through the noise of standard geopolitical analysis by revealing a startling contradiction within Beijing's intellectual elite: they simultaneously condemn the US strike on Iran as 'state terrorism' while admitting a grudging respect for the operational precision that made it possible. What makes this commentary essential reading is not just its synthesis of Chinese expert opinion, but its chilling warning that the administration's use of offshore balancing in the Middle East could be the very template used to contain China in East Asia.
The Paradox of Condemnation and Admiration
The authors present a fascinating dissonance in how Chinese scholars are processing the February 2026 strikes. On one hand, the official narrative and many experts frame the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as a 'grave violation of Iran's sovereignty.' Yet, the commentary reveals that this legal condemnation coexists with a strategic awe. Zheng Yongnian, one of China's most prominent public intellectuals, argues that the attack proves the United States remains 'number one,' a tone the authors describe as verging on admiration. This is a significant shift from the usual narrative of American decline.
The authors note that Niu Tanqin, a widely read opinion leader, is even more candid, admitting he 'cannot but admire' the US operational precision. This duality is the piece's most compelling insight: Beijing's experts are not just dismissing the US as a fading power; they are studying it as a formidable adversary that has successfully executed a high-risk, high-reward strategy. Zheng Yongnian warns that China must not fall into the 'trap of excessive moralisation and self-restraint,' invoking a historical analogy where China invented gunpowder but used it for fireworks while the West made cannons. His blunt formulation—that 'not using it is equivalent to not having it'—suggests a deep anxiety that China's own strategic culture may be holding it back from necessary hard power applications.
Zheng Yongnian warns that China must not fall into the 'trap of excessive moralisation and self-restraint,' invoking a historical analogy where China invented gunpowder but used it for fireworks while the West made cannons.
Critics might argue that this admiration for US military prowess is a rhetorical device to rally domestic support for a stronger Chinese military, rather than a genuine assessment of US capability. However, the authors suggest this is a pragmatic reckoning with a 'Hobbesian fear-based international order' that Zheng Yongnian claims has replaced the rules-based system.
The Offshore Balancing Threat
The commentary pivots sharply from the immediate conflict to a broader strategic warning. Several authors, including Zheng Yongnian and Guo Hai, interpret the US-Iran conflict through the lens of 'offshore balancing,' a strategy where the US empowers regional proxies to maintain dominance without direct ground troop deployment. The text highlights a specific fear: that the Middle East template could be replicated in East Asia, with Japan playing Israel's role and Taiwan and the Philippines serving as other instruments against China.
This connection to the broader geopolitical architecture is where the analysis gains its teeth. The authors point out that the administration's strategy is not isolated; it is part of a consistent effort to reshape regional orders. Zheng Yongnian explicitly outlines the concern that the US might replicate this model in East Asia, turning regional allies into forward-operating bases. This reframes the Iran war not as a regional dispute, but as a rehearsal for a larger confrontation.
The authors also touch on the 2021 comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Iran, noting that Beijing has been Tehran's economic lifeline. Yet, despite this deep entanglement, the consensus among Chinese experts is that the US is unlikely to achieve regime change without ground troops—a 'red line' that the executive branch is unwilling to cross. This skepticism about a ground invasion aligns with the offshore balancing theory, suggesting the US aims to destabilize rather than occupy.
Strategic Conditionality: A Quagmire or a Victory?
Perhaps the most nuanced part of the commentary is its refusal to predict a single outcome. Instead, the authors present a conditional framework where China's strategic gain depends entirely on the war's conclusion. Zheng Ge, a senior academic, frames this with a simple but critical observation: the strategic outcome for China is entirely conditional on how the war ends. If the US succeeds in reshaping the Middle East order, it could reverse China's vision of declining American hegemony. Conversely, if the US gets bogged down in a quagmire, American overextension accelerates the shift in global power.
This conditional view is supported by a split in the expert community. Some, like Zhu Zhaoyi, argue that a US bogged down in the Middle East would relieve pressure on China in the Indo-Pacific. Others, like Qian Yaxu, contend that a successful regime change would free US resources for the Asia-Pacific, increasing containment pressure on China. The authors note that this tension mirrors the unresolved conditionality that Zheng Yongnian identifies as the central question.
Zheng Ge frames the question with a simple but important observation: the strategic outcome for China is entirely conditional on how the war ends.
The commentary also addresses the economic risks, noting that while energy disruption is a concern, China's reserve accumulation provides a buffer. However, Qin Jinghua argues that this is not merely a short-term supply shock but 'a structural challenge that [China's] mid-to-long-term energy security strategy must confront.' This suggests that even if the military outcome is uncertain, the economic fallout is a guaranteed variable that Beijing must manage.
Bottom Line
The strongest element of this commentary is its ability to synthesize a fragmented expert consensus into a coherent warning: the US administration's success in Iran could inadvertently strengthen its global posture, while failure offers China a rare strategic opening. The piece's greatest vulnerability lies in its reliance on the assumption that the US will not commit ground troops, a variable that could shift rapidly if the conflict escalates beyond current expectations. Readers should watch for whether the administration's 'offshore balancing' strategy in the Middle East begins to explicitly inform its posture toward Japan and the Philippines in the coming months.