← Back to Library

The luol deng law

Freddie deBoer identifies a disturbing shift in professional sports culture: the idea that losing is strategically superior to winning unless a team can guarantee a championship. This isn't just a critique of bad management; it's an indictment of a fanbase and an analytics industry that has lost faith in the fundamental joy of competition.

The All-or-Nothing Trap

DeBoer opens by exposing the brazenness of modern "tanking," where teams intentionally lose games to improve their odds in the draft lottery. He notes that while draft position matters in all sports, it is uniquely critical in the National Basketball Association because the league is so star-driven. "Winning a championship is (almost) impossible if you don't have a top-ten player," deBoer writes, explaining why franchises are now openly trying to lose. The evidence is stark: he points to the Utah Jazz benching their best players while winning a game, and the Washington Wizards holding out their entire roster to lose to a terrible Brooklyn Nets team.

The luol deng law

The author argues that this behavior is not an isolated anomaly but part of a broader, toxic trend known as "load management," where healthy stars sit out games to preserve their bodies. This creates a disconnect between the product sold and the product delivered. "You're training those kids to think that the NBA doesn't give a shit about them," deBoer observes, highlighting the long-term risk to the sport's relevance among younger generations. This framing is effective because it moves the conversation from abstract strategy to the tangible experience of the fan who paid over a thousand dollars for a ticket, only to see the stars sit on the bench.

Critics might argue that load management is a necessary business decision to protect multi-million dollar assets and extend careers, but deBoer's point stands: the league has prioritized asset protection over the integrity of the contest.

The Rise of "Sports Nihilism"

The core of deBoer's argument targets the influence of analytics, which has fostered an "all-or-nothing attitude" where being merely good is considered a failure. He illustrates this with the concept of "Quagmires"—players who are good enough to win games but not good enough to win titles, and who therefore consume valuable salary cap space. He cites a Reddit discussion suggesting that drafting a bust like Marcus Fizer might be preferable to drafting a solid player like Paolo Banchero, simply because the latter prevents a team from "bottoming out" for a top pick.

"It's sports nihilism."

DeBoer uses his own history as a Chicago Bulls fan to dismantle this logic. He contrasts the miserable, losing years of the post-Jordan era with the "fun, spunky, winning" team led by Luol Deng, Ben Gordon, and Kirk Hinrich. That Deng-led team made the playoffs three years in a row and provided genuine entertainment, yet modern discourse would label them a failure because they couldn't beat the Miami Heat. "The idea that it would have been better to lose 50+ games again rather than field a competitive NBA team... is anathema to me," he writes. This personal anecdote grounds the abstract analytics debate in emotional reality, making the argument that winning is inherently valuable, regardless of the ultimate prize.

The author's choice to focus on the Deng era is particularly sharp. It highlights how the current "meta" devalues the middle ground of sports success, ignoring the decades of history where fans celebrated a .500 record or a playoff appearance as a triumph. A counterargument worth considering is that the salary cap structure in the NBA makes it nearly impossible to build a contender without a generational talent, forcing teams into these binary choices. However, deBoer suggests this is a structural failure of the league, not a reason to abandon the pursuit of winning.

The Luol Deng Law and Structural Solutions

DeBoer crystallizes his argument into what he calls the "Luol Deng Law": "Winning is better than losing, and having good players is better than having bad players." He acknowledges this sounds obvious, yet he insists it is a contested idea in modern basketball analysis. He extends this to the broader league, noting that the current incentives encourage teams to lose intentionally. He references the historical context of the draft lottery, noting how teams like the Jazz and Wizards are gaming the system to secure a top pick, a practice that has become more aggressive as the stakes have risen.

"You'd rather go 20-62 than 46-36. You'd rather suck shit than be decent."

To fix this, deBoer explores several solutions, including shortening the season to 66 games to increase the value of every contest. He admits this is unlikely due to revenue concerns but suggests that eliminating pick protections or even the draft itself could be viable. He notes that while eliminating the draft might hurt small-market teams like the Utah Jazz or Minnesota Timberwolves, the current system is already broken. "Something has to change," he concludes, urging a cultural shift away from the "championship or bust" mindset.

The author's willingness to entertain radical structural changes, even while acknowledging their political difficulty, strengthens his credibility. He isn't just complaining; he's diagnosing a systemic rot that requires more than just a tweak to the rules. The reference to the 1999 Bulls season, where they won only 13 games, serves as a grim reminder of what happens when a team abandons the pursuit of winning entirely.

Bottom Line

DeBoer's most compelling contribution is reframing the debate from "how do we fix the draft?" to "why do we value winning less than we used to?" His strongest evidence is the emotional resonance of the Deng era, proving that fans derive meaning from competitive, winning teams even without a championship. The argument's vulnerability lies in its assumption that structural changes are the only solution, potentially underestimating the league's ability to adapt its culture without radical rule changes. However, the piece successfully exposes a dangerous trend where the joy of the game is being sacrificed for the cold calculus of probability.

"Winning should always be its own logic, but this 'Paolo Theory' business is an explicit articulation of the opposite perspective."

Readers should watch for how the league responds to the growing backlash against tanking and load management, as the current trajectory threatens to alienate the very fans who keep the sport alive.

Sources

The luol deng law

by Freddie deBoer · · Read full article

The NBA has been dealing with controversy over rampant and shameless tanking lately, and it’s easy to see why. For those who are unaware, teams tank (that is, lose intentionally) because doing so improves their odds in the draft lottery, which determines which players they can select in each year’s amateur draft. Draft position is important in all major professional sports leagues, but it’s uniquely so in the NBA, because there’s only five players on the floor for a give team at any one time and the league is more star-driven than any other sport; it’s widely understood that winning a championship is (almost) impossible if you don’t have a top-ten player, preferably a top-five player. So a lot of teams are openly trying to lose, and they’re doing so more brazenly and earlier and earlier in the season as time goes on. Which, you know, is not a great look.

For example. Recently the Utah Jazz, one of the most fervently tanking teams in the league, played a game against the Orlando Magic. They were winning at the half, then proceeded to bench their three best players in the second half, turning a very winnable game into a loss. To make it even more obvious, the Magic had a three point lead in the last moments of the game, the Jazz had possession and a timeout, and did not use that timeout to set up a potential game-tying three-pointer. That very same day, the Washington Wizards held out every decent player on their roster in order to lose a game against the dreadful Brooklyn Nets, who had lost a game by 50 not that long before. All of this happened before this weekend’s All-Star break, which is traditionally thought of as the halfway point in the season and where the regular season gets serious. It’s bad out there.

Tanking is bad and wrong and wrecks sports and destroys fan trust, and it intersects with another troubling problem for the league, which is “load management,” which means sitting players who are healthy enough to play in order to limit the wear and tear on their bodies. The Los Angeles Lakers certainly aren’t tanking, but that fact would be of little comfort to a family of five that bought tickets well in advance to see them play a recent game against the hometown San Antonio Spurs. Decent seats, parking, food, and ...