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Progressive Democrats pledge a reordering of corporate America if they win Congress

Matt Stoller delivers a startling diagnosis of the American political moment: the real battle isn't between parties, but between a populist surge demanding economic discipline and a corporate establishment that has captured both. While conventional wisdom obsesses over polling numbers and election mechanics, Stoller argues that the underlying crisis is one of monopoly power so entrenched that it has rendered the traditional economy unrecognizable to the average worker. This piece matters because it shifts the lens from who wins the next vote to what happens to the rules of commerce if the balance of power actually tips.

The Illusion of Political Choice

Stoller begins by dismantling the comforting narrative that a simple party switch will fix the economy. He notes that despite the administration's low approval ratings and the opposition's likely electoral gains, "the Democrats themselves are absolutely hated, with just 28% of voters approving of the Democratic Party." The author suggests this disdain isn't accidental but structural, rooted in a decades-long trend where "the main dynamic in American society is... the power of the stock market to block any political action to raise wages, help consumers, or empower the American family." This framing is crucial because it explains why voters feel alienated regardless of which flag they wave; the system itself feels rigged against them.

Progressive Democrats pledge a reordering of corporate America if they win Congress

The evidence Stoller marshals is stark. He points to recent GDP data showing that growth is driven by "ephemeral things like intellectual property and software, that don't require workers," while the "actual real economy outside of financialized sectors looks to be in a recession." This disconnect between stock market performance and the lived reality of the workforce is the engine of current political anger. Critics might argue that focusing solely on corporate concentration ignores other drivers of inflation, such as global supply chain shocks or fiscal policy, but Stoller's data on wage stagnation suggests that market power is a primary, not peripheral, culprit.

A Legislative Counter-Offensive

Where many analysts see paralysis, Stoller identifies a surprising, if tentative, legislative rebellion within the Senate. He highlights a new bill introduced by Senators Cory Booker, Elizabeth Warren, and others called the "CLEAN Mergers Act," which would "automatically undo every corporate combination above $10 billion occurring during the Trump administration." This is a radical departure from the standard antitrust playbook, which relies on slow, court-heavy investigations that often fail. Stoller writes, "Reversing the massive number of acquisitions happening illegally under the Trump administration can't happen through the antitrust regime, so it's good that there are laws now in the hopper to make it happen across the economy."

The urgency of this approach is illustrated by the brazen behavior of corporate leaders who now operate with impunity. Stoller cites billionaire Brad Jacobs, who, after acquiring billions in building supply companies, publicly bragged on a podcast about his new dominance: "We will get, because we deserve, a better price from the manufacturers... Bigger customers get bigger discounts, bigger rebates than the smaller ones." Stoller uses this quote to underscore a terrifying reality: CEOs are no longer hiding their anti-competitive intent. The proposed legislation attempts to draw a hard line, warning Wall Street that "anything they do merger-wise in the Trump era could be undone."

The process took more than a decade to break up a single factory acquisition; reversing the massive number of acquisitions happening illegally under the Trump administration can't happen through the antitrust regime.

This legislative strategy aligns with historical precedents like the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, which was designed to stop monopolies before they solidified, rather than punishing them after the fact. However, the political reality is messy. Stoller acknowledges that the Democratic party is fractured, with leadership figures like Hakeem Jeffries and fundraising chief Suzan DelBene often aligned with the very tech and finance sectors these bills target. The author notes that "there are some fundamental disagreements within the Democratic apparatus about what is wrong with the American order," creating a bitter intra-party fight that could last until 2028.

The Affordability Agenda

Beyond breaking up mergers, the progressive faction is tackling the mechanics of pricing itself. Stoller details a plan led by Congressman Greg Casar that includes a ban on "surveillance pricing," where algorithms set prices based on individual data. The proposal, the "Stop AI Price Gouging and Wage Fixing Act," seeks to prohibit personalized price setting, a practice that has become increasingly pervasive. Furthermore, the plan advocates for the federal government to manufacture generic medications like insulin, a move Stoller notes has already succeeded in California, producing insulin for $11 per pen.

The ideological underpinning here is a direct challenge to the financialization of the economy. Stoller draws a parallel to the New Deal era, quoting Franklin Delano Roosevelt: "A small group had concentrated into their own hands an almost complete control over other people's property, other people's money, other people's labor—other people's lives." The author argues that just as the Great Depression forced a reckoning with "money barons," today's economic fragility is forcing a similar confrontation. However, the path forward is uncertain. Stoller warns that "if there's a narrow majority, then the House leadership will be able to impose a lot more control," potentially stifling the more radical elements of the agenda.

The historical context provided is sobering. Stoller reminds readers that the 1930 election saw voters return a Republican majority despite the worsening depression, simply because they didn't trust the Democrats. It took a special election in 1931 and a dramatic shift in the 1932 convention for the party to embrace a populist, anti-monopoly platform. "That's how it worked, the people versus organized money," Stoller concludes, suggesting that history does not guarantee a progressive victory, but it does show that such a shift is possible when the system collapses.

Bottom Line

Stoller's most compelling argument is that the era of trusting courts to fix monopoly power is over; only direct legislative action can reverse the tide of consolidation. The piece's greatest vulnerability lies in its optimism about the political will required to pass such sweeping reforms within a deeply divided party. Readers should watch closely to see if the "CLEAN Mergers Act" and the affordability agenda can survive the friction between populist lawmakers and corporate-aligned party leadership. The stakes are not just about election results, but about whether the American economy can be re-ordered to serve the many rather than the few.

Deep Dives

Explore these related deep dives:

  • Herfindahl–Hirschman index

    The CLEAN Mergers Act proposes a structural shift in antitrust enforcement that moves beyond the current reliance on this specific mathematical formula, which the article implies has failed to prevent the concentration of corporate power.

  • Financialization

    This economic concept explains the article's central argument that the stock market's dominance has decoupled corporate behavior from the real economy, creating the stagnation in wages and consumer welfare that progressives aim to reverse.

  • Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914

    Understanding this foundational law is essential to grasp how the proposed legislation seeks to resurrect and expand dormant enforcement mechanisms that have been eroded by decades of judicial interpretation favoring mergers.

Sources

Progressive Democrats pledge a reordering of corporate America if they win Congress

We’re about six months away from the midterm election, when voters get to make their voice heard on whether they approve of the current administration agenda. And so far, it doesn’t look good for Donald Trump and the GOP. On Wednesday, Trump hit his second term low in the polling averages, with 39% of Americans approving of his job and 57.7% disapproving, which is, as Nate Silver noted, “right around where his net approval was at the end of his first term, in the aftermath of January 6th.”

There’s more. Since the middle of 2025, Democrats have over-performed in virtually every special election. And there are likely more severe shocks coming from the Iran war, even as consumers give the economy some of the lowest marks on record. Given these trends, the conventional wisdom is that Democrats are almost certain to win back the House, and perhaps the Senate.

What are they likely to do with their newfound power?

Well, it’s tough to know. A change in party control of Congress is actually consistent with recent political trends. It happened in 2006, 2008, 2010, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2022, and 2024. And despite their likelihood of winning power, the Democrats themselves are absolutely hated, with just 28% of voters approving of the Democratic Party and 56% disapproving. That’s actually worse than it was in November of 2024, meaning the Democrats have lost popularity in the second Trump era. Still, much of the disdain comes from people who hate the Republicans as well, the so-called “double haters.” And that group is leaning to the Democrats in the midterms.

The reason for the hatred of our political establishment is simple. The main dynamic in American society is, as I have noted many times, the power of the stock market to block any political action to raise wages, help consumers, or empower the American family. Americans have noticed this trend, and since the Bush/Obama bailouts, have increasingly soured on political elites. Just today, GDP growth numbers came out, showing that most of the increase in economic activity in the first quarter is coming from ephemeral things like intellectual property and software, that don’t require workers. The actual real economy outside of financialized sectors looks to be in a recession.

So what will an opposition party do about this state of affairs? On Sunday, I described a little noticed set of actions by the ...