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Why is South Korean fertility so low?

"Works in Progress delivers a chilling diagnosis of South Korea's demographic collapse, arguing that the crisis is not a failure of pro-natalist policy, but rather the catastrophic success of a society that has optimized itself against raising children. While Western observers often dismiss the situation as a cultural inevitability, the piece makes the startling claim that the government's past anti-birth campaigns were so effective they created a path dependency that current subsidies cannot easily undo. This is a story about how extreme work culture, an educational arms race, and a gender war have converged to make parenthood a financial and social suicide mission."

The Career-Motherhood Trap

The article immediately dismantles the myth that South Korea simply lacks money for families. Instead, it points to a structural hostility toward working mothers that dwarfs even the most difficult Western environments. Works in Progress reports, "In South Korea, mothers' employment falls by 49 percent relative to fathers, over ten years – 62 percent initially, then rising as their child ages." This statistic is staggering when compared to the United States, where the drop is a quarter, or Sweden, where it is a mere 9 percent. The piece argues that this isn't just about long hours, but about an active coercion within the workplace. It notes that "27 percent of female office workers report being coerced into signing illegal contracts promising to resign if they fall pregnant or marry."

Why is South Korean fertility so low?

The commentary here is vital because it shifts the blame from individual choices to systemic design. The article illustrates this with a harrowing anecdote about a young woman chided by her boss for being uncomfortable with colleagues hiring a sex worker for a karaoke outing, told, "You shouldn't be surprised by this, at your age." This cultural backdrop explains why "over 62 percent of women quit their jobs around the birth of their first child." The financial penalty is severe; by the time a child turns ten, a mother's earnings have fallen by an average of 66 percent, a figure that makes the decision to have children a rational economic calculation for many women. Critics might argue that cultural change takes generations and that policy cannot instantly rewrite deep-seated workplace norms, but the piece suggests that without addressing the "motherhood penalty," cash handouts are merely a drop in the bucket.

Having children is extremely expensive for South Korean women in terms of their careers and earnings.

The Educational Arms Race

The analysis then pivots to the cost of raising a child, revealing a system where the pressure to succeed begins before a child can walk. The piece highlights the Doljanchi, a first-birthday ceremony that has evolved from a home gathering into a lavish hotel event, noting that "a typical Korean family can expect to spend a month's wages on the Doljanchi." But the true driver of cost is the shadow education system, or hagwon. Works in Progress reports that "Almost 80 percent of children attend a hagwon, a type of private cram school operating in the evenings and on weekends," with families pouring $19 billion into the system in 2023 alone.

The article paints a grim picture of this "arms race," where parents feel they cannot trust the public system. It describes students in high school hagwons running from 7 am to 2 am, and even mentions "screaming pods for frustrated teenagers to let off some steam" in the Daechi district. The piece argues that this creates a zero-sum game: "High performance in the university entrance exam is an arms race: if everyone becomes better at the exam, nobody is better off." This dynamic is exacerbated by the extreme scarcity of top-tier university spots, with the acceptance rate for the "SKY colleges" being just one percent. The historical context here is crucial; the piece notes that the government has long viewed this shadow education as a "social evil," yet bans have only driven the market underground, with tutors "simply switching off the lights and continuing with lessons in the dark." The result is a society where "Korean parents with more children usually spend less per child on education," creating a powerful disincentive for second or third children.

The Gender War and Political Polarization

Perhaps the most explosive section of the piece is its examination of the gender divide, which the authors argue has reached a level of polarization unseen in other developed nations. The text traces this back to the MeToo movement, which initially had broad support but eventually triggered a backlash. Works in Progress notes that "In 2021, only 29 percent of young men said they still supported MeToo," leading to a political realignment where young men view themselves as victims of "female supremacy." This sentiment was capitalized on by the current administration, which "embraced the gender war narrative, attributing South Korea's ultra-low fertility to feminism."

The piece argues that this political strategy has deepened the rift, with conservative candidates winning the support of 74 percent of men in their twenties in the June 2025 election, compared to only 36 percent of women. The demographic reality compounds this: due to past sex-selective abortions, "there are 115 men for every 100 women" among today's 30-year-olds. This skewed ratio, combined with a competitive labor market, has created a "punishing dating market" where men blame women for their lack of success. The article observes that "majorities of young men view themselves as victims of female supremacy and of sex-based discrimination," a sentiment that fuels a culture where "men and women live bifurcated lives." While the piece acknowledges that gender polarization is a global trend, it emphasizes that in South Korea, it has happened "so quickly and because gender issues have become so central to the country's politics." This rapid fracture suggests that the decline in marriage is not just a delay in timing, but a fundamental rejection of the institution by a generation that no longer trusts the opposite sex.

A chasm between young South Korean men and women has been opening up for years.

Bottom Line

Works in Progress offers a sobering verdict: South Korea's demographic collapse is the result of a perfect storm where extreme work culture, an educational arms race, and a toxic gender war have made parenthood irrational for a vast swath of the population. The argument's greatest strength is its refusal to blame a lack of government spending, instead highlighting how deeply entrenched structural incentives actively punish family formation. The biggest vulnerability lies in the speed of the gender polarization; while the piece correctly identifies the political weaponization of these tensions, it remains to be seen if any policy can repair a social contract that has been so thoroughly fractured by the very institutions meant to hold society together.

Deep Dives

Explore these related deep dives:

  • Hagwon

    The article extensively discusses hagwons as central to South Korea's education arms race and their role in the fertility crisis. A deep dive into this institution's history, structure, and societal impact would give readers crucial context for understanding the parenting pressures described.

  • Demographics of South Korea

    Provides historical context for the antinatalist campaigns mentioned in the article, plus demographic data on marriage rates, birth rates over time, and population projections that frame the current crisis.

  • Motherhood penalty

    The article discusses the severe earnings penalty for Korean mothers (66%) compared to other countries. This Wikipedia article explains the broader phenomenon, research behind it, and cross-country comparisons that contextualize why Korea's penalty is so extreme.

Sources

Why is South Korean fertility so low?

This article originally appeared in the first print issue of Works in Progress. Subscribe to get six full-color editions sent bimonthly, plus invitations to our subscriber-only events.

South Korea has the lowest fertility rate in the world. Its population is (optimistically) projected to shrink by over two thirds over the next 100 years. If current fertility rates persist, every hundred South Koreans today will have only six great-grandchildren between them.

This disaster has sources that will sound eerily familiar to Western readers, including harsh tradeoffs between careers and motherhood, an arms race of intensive parenting, a breakdown in the relations between men and women, and falling marriage rates. In all these cases, what distinguishes South Korea is that these factors occur in a particularly extreme form. The only factor that has little parallel in Western societies is the legacy of highly successful antinatalist campaigns by the South Korean government in previous decades.

South Korea is often held up as an example of the failure of public policy to reverse high fertility rates. This is seriously misleading. Contrary to popular myth, South Korean pro-parent subsidies have not been very large, and relative to their modest size, they have been fairly successful.

The story of South Korean fertility rates is thus doubly significant. On the one hand, it illustrates just how potent anti-parenting factors can become, creating a profoundly hostile environment in which to raise children and discouraging a whole society from doing so. On the other, it may offer a scintilla of hope that focused and generous policy can address these problems, shaping a way back from the brink of catastrophe.

Career-motherhood conflict.

In every developed country, women struggle to reconcile their careers with a satisfying family life and their preferred number of children. This tradeoff is exceptionally severe in South Korea.

Despite its very high level of female education, South Korea has the largest gender employment gap in the OECD. There is almost no employment gap between men (73.3 percent) and unmarried women without children (72.8 percent). The gap is driven by the fact that large numbers of women stop working when they have kids: only 56.2 percent of mothers work, the fourth lowest in the OECD.

In South Korea, mothers’ employment falls by 49 percent relative to fathers, over ten years – 62 percent init­ially, then rising as their child ages. In the US it falls by a quarter ...