This conversation cuts through the hype of quantum supremacy to reveal a far more urgent reality: the race isn't about who cracks the code first, but who controls the physical supply chains that will power the next century of computing. Jordan Schneider, hosting a deep dive with CNAS researcher Constanza Vidal Bustamante, exposes a critical vulnerability in the American industrial base that most policymakers have missed until now.
The Illusion of a Single Race
Schneider frames the discussion around Vidal Bustamante's landmark report, "Quantum's Industrial Moment," arguing that the current geopolitical narrative is dangerously oversimplified. The core of the argument is that there is no single "quantum supply chain" to secure. Instead, as Vidal Bustamante explains, "there isn't just one kind of quantum computer... Each has a different bill of materials, pulling from various layers of the quantum supply chain in different ways." This heterogeneity means that a blanket policy approach will fail; the United States must secure distinct, overlapping networks for superconducting, atomic, and photonic modalities.
Schneider draws a compelling parallel to the semiconductor wars of the late 2010s, noting that the depth of detail in this report mirrors the early intelligence work that eventually birthed the CHIPS Act. However, the stakes are arguably higher because the technology is still in its infancy. As Zachary Yerushalmi, another guest on the panel, observes, "Quantum is at a super early stage as a technology package. We are pre-transistor." This uncertainty creates a paradox: governments must invest heavily in supply chains for machines that may not exist in their current form for decades, all while competitors are racing to lock in the standards of tomorrow.
If we think carefully, we're not entirely without an idea of what it will look like... It's just a matter of breaking the chicken-and-egg cycle of waiting for enough market demand before making major investments in the supply chain.
The argument here is that the United States still has a window to dominate, but only if it treats the supply chain as a national security priority before the market forces the issue. Critics might note that this approach risks massive government overreach, pouring capital into speculative technologies that could be rendered obsolete by a different architectural breakthrough. Yet, the panelists suggest that the cost of inaction—being locked out of the foundational layer of future computing—is far greater.
The Cryogenic Bottleneck
The discussion shifts to the most tangible choke point in the current landscape: the cryogenic supply chain. To operate superconducting quantum computers, chips must be cooled to temperatures colder than outer space. This requires dilution refrigerators, massive, chandelier-like machines that rely on a specific isotope: helium-3. Vidal Bustamante highlights the fragility of this resource, noting that "helium-3 is an extremely rare and highly regulated isotope that you can't simply build or supply on demand." It is a byproduct of nuclear decay, creating a supply constraint that is difficult to solve with traditional manufacturing.
The geopolitical implications are stark. Schneider points out that while the US and its allies have historically dominated this space, export controls have had a perverse effect. By restricting the sale of dilution refrigerators to China, the administration inadvertently spurred Beijing to accelerate its own domestic production. As Vidal Bustamante warns, "restrictions on dilution refrigerators helped spur China to go from zero to more cryogenic suppliers than the rest of the world combined in just two years." This is a classic case of unintended consequences, where protectionist measures accelerated the very dependency they sought to prevent.
The speed of iteration in this field is the true metric of power. Yerushalmi illustrates this with a chilling example: "If China invents an ability to take that from 40 hours to 12 hours [to cool a system], you go from one test a week to one test a day." In a field where scientific progress is measured in iteration cycles, a threefold increase in speed is not just an advantage; it is a decisive lead. The panel suggests that the country which masters the physics of cooling and the logistics of helium-3 will effectively hold the keys to the quantum future.
The country that does that has a total lock on the ability to scale whole approaches in quantum computing.
While the conversation briefly touches on the futuristic possibility of mining helium-3 on the moon, the panelists remain grounded in the immediate reality. As Vidal Bustamante puts it, "I don't think it's questionable that there is helium-3 on the moon. The question is whether it's ever going to be feasible to extract it." For now, the battle is being fought on Earth, in the factories and supply lines that produce the rare materials needed to reach millikelvin temperatures.
The Public-Private Fault Line
The final layer of the argument addresses the tension between state intervention and market forces. The panelists agree that the private sector cannot solve the "chicken-and-egg" problem of quantum supply chains alone. Without guaranteed demand, companies will not invest in the massive infrastructure required to scale production. However, the path forward requires a delicate balancing act. As Schneider notes, the challenge lies in "the high-stakes balancing act between the government stepping in to accelerate innovation and letting the market work on its own."
This is where the comparison to the semiconductor era becomes most relevant. Just as the government helped create the market for chips in the 2020s, it may need to do the same for quantum. But the window is narrowing. The report suggests that the next decade will determine whether the US can lock in a supply chain advantage or if it will find itself dependent on foreign sources for the components that power its most advanced computers. The argument is clear: being first to the algorithm is less important than being first to the factory floor.
Bottom Line
Schneider and Vidal Bustamante make a compelling case that the quantum race is fundamentally an industrial one, not just a scientific one. The strongest part of their argument is the identification of specific, non-obvious choke points like helium-3 and dilution refrigerators, which have been overlooked in favor of abstract discussions about qubit counts. The biggest vulnerability remains the speed of execution; as the panel notes, China's rapid response to export controls suggests that the window for US dominance is closing faster than anticipated. The next move for Washington must be to shift from banning components to building the domestic capacity to replace them.
If we think carefully, we're not entirely without an idea of what it will look like. It's just a matter of breaking the chicken-and-egg cycle of waiting for enough market demand before making major investments in the supply chain.