Eric Blanc delivers a stinging critique of a political moment that many are celebrating as a triumph: the early administration of New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani. While the headlines focus on policy victories like universal childcare and taxes on secondary homes, Blanc argues that the administration's obsession with "delivering" has come at the cost of the very movement that elected them. For a reader tired of top-down politics, this piece offers a necessary correction: policy wins handed down from City Hall are fragile without the mass organizing that turns "gifts" into rights.
The Trap of Delivery
The article opens by acknowledging the tangible successes of the first one hundred days. The administration has expanded universal child care and pushed through a tax on secondary-home "pied-à-terres," a policy area explored in depth in companion analyses of New York's housing market. Blanc notes that the mayor's speech foregrounded his democratic socialist convictions, providing "example after example of how his City Hall has disproved skeptics' claim that 'the Left could debate but could never deliver.'" This is a powerful rhetorical victory, yet Blanc identifies a critical flaw in the strategy. He writes, "These policy wins felt very different from Zohran's victories in the primary and general elections. Those were experienced as our wins... In contrast, the recent policy wins felt like gifts from above."
The distinction is vital. When the administration frames success as a result of executive competence rather than collective struggle, it disempowers the base. Blanc argues that the tightrope act of engaging with the centrist governor has been shrewd, but it has created a dependency on the mayor's personal charisma rather than building independent working-class power. Critics might note that the mayor faces genuine structural constraints and cannot attend every rally without alienating the very officials needed to pass legislation. However, Blanc counters that this hesitancy has become the norm, sending a message that "We've got this" rather than "You need to get involved."
These policy wins felt very different from Zohran's victories in the primary and general elections. Those were experienced as our wins, because they arose not only from Zohran's actions, but also from the actions of a million voters and almost 100,000 volunteers.
The Historical Mirror
To illustrate what is missing, Blanc turns to the historical precedent of "sewer socialism" in early twentieth-century Milwaukee. He highlights how Mayor Mamdani framed his approach by quoting the slogan: "Today we know these leaders as the 'sewer socialists.' But for years, Milwaukeeans knew them simply as leaders who delivered." Blanc accepts the premise that Milwaukee's socialists improved lives but challenges the modern interpretation of their success. He points out that the Milwaukee model was not just about competent governance; it was about building a "moral, physical and intellectual strengthening of the proletariat."
Blanc draws a sharp contrast between the current administration's passive approach and the active mobilization of the past. He cites Victor Berger, a party leader, who demanded a "solemn pledge" from the crowd to help elected officials fulfill their duty. This historical context reveals that the Milwaukee Socialists' power came from a "rank-and-file political machine" that could pressure nonpartisan aldermen. As Blanc paraphrases the historian Todd Fulda, Mayor Hoan took a "populist approach to governing, appealing directly to the citizens of Milwaukee to support his reforms."
The argument here is that without this external pressure, reforms are merely benevolent acts that can be rescinded. Blanc writes, "With every slight advantage now gained in education, social and economic conditions, the worker feels that it is his by right of the strength of the class to which he belongs... This is really the great thing that the election of the Socialists to power in the city and county has done for the workers, or rather that the workers did for themselves." This framing suggests that the current administration's failure to mobilize is not just a tactical error, but a betrayal of the socialist tradition itself.
The Fragility of Charisma
Why does this matter now? Blanc outlines four reasons why a focus on bottom-up organizing is non-negotiable. First, the most ambitious goals, such as building 200,000 affordable housing units, require more power than a mayor can wield alone against "local oligarchs and their political lackeys." Second, popularity is fleeting; without a "widespread intermediary layer of organized working-class leaders," the movement is vulnerable to the first serious crisis. Third, the mayor's tenure is limited, and relying on his "charms and brilliance" is unsustainable. Finally, the model being set for the rest of the country must be about organizing, not just governing.
Blanc notes that while the Mayor's Office to Protect Tenants is doing important work, the scale of Zohran-backed initiatives is "significantly below what is demanded by the moment." He points out that despite active support for congressional candidates, membership in the New York City Democratic Socialists of America has grown to only roughly 14,000 members—a modest number compared to the 100,000 volunteers who backed the mayoral campaign. The core of the argument is that even the best city agencies "won't have much latitude to wage big policy fights or antagonize establishment politicians — for that, you need working-class organizing outside the state."
Unless far more working-class New Yorkers get involved in the fight, it's hard to see how the full agenda can be won.
Bottom Line
Blanc's strongest contribution is reframing policy victories not as endpoints but as opportunities that are currently being squandered by a lack of mass mobilization. The argument's vulnerability lies in the practical difficulty of a mayor simultaneously governing and leading a mass movement, yet the historical evidence from Milwaukee suggests that this dual role is exactly what makes socialist governance durable. Readers should watch to see if the administration's new Office of Mass Engagement can bridge the gap between delivering services and building the power necessary to demand them.
Zohran has articulated this vision; it's now a question of consistently putting it into practice.