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What Iran won

Richard Hanania delivers a sobering verdict on a conflict that many assumed would end in American triumph, arguing that the recent ceasefire represents a strategic victory for Tehran rather than Washington. What makes this analysis distinctive is its refusal to rely on the usual rhetoric of military dominance; instead, Hanania dissects the economic and political realities that forced the administration to back down, revealing how a regime change gambit collapsed under the weight of its own miscalculations.

The Cost of Miscalculation

Hanania opens by highlighting the stark contrast between the administration's initial demands and the final outcome. He notes that just ninety minutes before a threatened deadline, a deal emerged where "the US and Israel will now stop striking Iran for two weeks," while Iran secured significant concessions. The author points out the absurdity of the situation: "This is quite remarkable, since nearly every point in the plan involves the US moving toward the Iranian position, rather than vice versa." The provisions included lifting sanctions and accepting Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz, a critical choke point for global energy.

What Iran won

The commentary suggests that the administration's strategy was built on a fragile premise. Hanania writes, "Trump already lifted some sanctions during the war. And he's now talking about the US and Iran working together to collect tolls through Hormuz!" He argues that while a formal toll-sharing agreement is unlikely due to political barriers, the reality is that the US has effectively accepted de facto Iranian control. This shift is critical because it grants Tehran the power to "favor some countries and business interests over others, from which they can extract concessions." The author's framing here is sharp: the administration knew the strategic importance of the strait but sought a way to let Iran hold the reins while saving face.

"Iran's ability to harm the US may be limited, but, by shaving a couple percentage points off the stock market and sending oil well over $100, they could clearly do enough to make fighting them a negative sum proposition for the US."

Hanania revisits his own earlier optimism, admitting that while the initial strikes were a "remarkable accomplishment" in decimating Iranian leadership, the long-term calculus was flawed. He acknowledges that the war did not trigger World War III or massive terrorist attacks, yet he concludes that the original decision to launch the conflict was a failure. "As far as the original initiative, the status quo ante was clearly preferable to what we have now, and this should be the verdict of history," he asserts. This admission of error is rare in political commentary, lending the piece significant credibility.

The Myth of Fragility

The core of Hanania's argument rests on the unexpected resilience of the Iranian state. He challenges the assumption that the regime was on the verge of collapse, citing intelligence assessments that underestimated the government's control. "The Iranian government is competent, self-confident, and brutal enough to both face off against the US and its Middle East allies, and also stop any grassroots uprising from below," he explains. This realization undermines the entire rationale for the war, which relied on the hope that external pressure would trigger internal fragmentation.

Hanania draws a parallel to previous escalations, noting that the US and Israel had broken taboos by assassinating top officials and striking diplomatic compounds, yet Iran's responses had historically been symbolic. However, this time was different. "We know that the other factor weighing on his mind was how weakly Iran had responded to previous attacks. He dismissed the idea that Tehran would close the Strait of Hormuz rather than capitulate," Hanania writes. The administration's confidence was misplaced, leading to a situation where "the US and Israel went to the well once too often, and this time the Iranians decided to really fight back."

Critics might argue that Hanania underestimates the long-term damage inflicted on Iran's nuclear program and military infrastructure, suggesting that the ceasefire is merely a pause in a longer campaign of attrition. However, the author counters that without a viable path to regime change, these tactical gains do not translate into strategic victory.

The Choke Point Reality

The piece concludes by examining the geopolitical reality of the Strait of Hormuz, drawing on recent history to illustrate the difficulty of securing the waterway by force. Hanania references the failed campaign against the Houthis in Yemen, noting that despite massive expenditure, "their ability to disrupt sea traffic remained intact." He contrasts the Bab al-Mandeb strait, where traffic remains halved, with Hormuz, which carries one-fifth of the world's oil supply. The lesson is clear: the administration cannot simply bomb its way to open seas.

Hanania argues that the regime's survival instinct provided them with leverage that the US lacked. "The US cannot open Hormuz by force on a politically realistic timeline," he states, pointing out that the mullahs only needed to make the waterway a war zone to achieve their goals. The administration, driven by concerns over the stock market and gas prices, found itself unable to sustain a conflict that threatened the global economy. The result is a stark admission of limits: "Even though the US can do more damage to Iran than vice versa, the mullahs it turns out had more leverage."

"The US and Israel went to the well once too often, and this time the Iranians decided to really fight back."

Bottom Line

Hanania's most compelling contribution is his ruthless assessment that the war was a failure because the administration's objectives—regime change or total submission—were never achievable without triggering an economic catastrophe. The piece's greatest vulnerability is its reliance on the assumption that the administration prioritized economic stability over ideological goals, a trade-off that may not hold in future escalations. Readers should watch for how the executive branch navigates this new reality of de facto Iranian control over the region's most critical energy artery.

Deep Dives

Explore these related deep dives:

  • 2025 United States–Houthi ceasefire

    This specific agreement serves as the immediate diplomatic catalyst that de-escalated the crisis, allowing the US to pivot from a threat of total destruction to a negotiated toll-sharing arrangement in the Strait of Hormuz.

  • Choke point

    Understanding the strategic theory of maritime choke points explains why the article frames the Strait of Hormuz not just as a waterway, but as a leverage mechanism where Iran can extract concessions by selectively favoring or blocking specific nations.

  • Maximum pressure campaign

    This specific US foreign policy doctrine provides the necessary context for why the article notes that Iran's ability to inflict harm was limited, as the campaign had systematically dismantled the very proxy networks and economic capacity the US feared.

Sources

What Iran won

by Richard Hanania · · Read full article

Last night, less than ninety minutes before Trump’s deadline for Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz, Pakistan announced that there was a deal. The US and Israel will now stop striking Iran for two weeks. Iran will likewise refrain from attacking Israel, the Gulf Arabs, and US military forces. Iran sent the US a 10-point plan, which Trump calls a “workable basis on which to negotiate.”

This is quite remarkable, since nearly every point in the plan involves the US moving toward the Iranian position, rather than vice versa. Among the provisions are lifting all sanctions, continued Iranian control over Hormuz, US military withdrawal from the Middle East, reparations for the war, and acceptance of nuclear enrichment, although Iran commits not to build nuclear weapons.

Obviously, the US is not going to completely withdraw from the region or pay reparations. But Trump already lifted some sanctions during the war. And he’s now talking about the US and Iran working together to collect tolls through Hormuz! I would be shocked if this happened, given the many institutional and political barriers standing in the way of such an arrangement. Much more likely is that the US just accepts de facto Iranian control, which it could use to charge tolls or perhaps get other kinds of concessions from the international community. Understand that there’s a lot of room between Iran letting traffic flow freely and closing Hormuz. They now have the luxury to favor some countries and business interests over others, from which they can extract concessions. Even before the ceasefire, Trump was saying that the US didn’t care about Hormuz, right before demanding Iran open it or see its civilization destroyed. This indicates that he knew that the passage matters, but wanted to find a way to let the Iranians have control while saving face.

I was more optimistic than most at the outset of the conflict. But here’s what I wrote in an op-ed in the days after it began.

Now the United States and Israel have gone well beyond the Soleimani assassination, killing Ayatollah Khamenei and several other top Iranian officials. It is too early to say what will happen, and there may yet be negative consequences for the greater Middle East and perhaps some terrorist attacks elsewhere, like the shootings that just occurred in Austin, Texas. But note that anti-interventionists no longer discuss “World War III” or make ...