Good Times Bad Times makes a startling claim: the defining geopolitical shift in the Middle East isn't the confrontation between Washington and Tehran, but a fierce, open civil war of influence between two former allies, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The author argues that the old order, built on a shared fear of Iran, has collapsed, leaving Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to fight over the scraps of a region in flux. This is not just a story of border skirmishes; it is a narrative about the complete unraveling of a decade-long strategic partnership.
The Fracture of the Mentor and Protégé
The piece opens by dismantling the popular image of the Gulf states as a monolithic bloc. It highlights the dramatic personal and political divergence between Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman of Saudi Arabia and Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed of the United Arab Emirates. Good Times Bad Times writes, "Together they intervened in Yemen. Together they imposed a blockade on Qatar. Together they backed the campaign of maximum pressure against Iran." The author effectively uses this historical parallel to underscore the severity of the current break. The argument is compelling because it reframes recent military escalations not as isolated incidents, but as the inevitable result of a long-simmering strategic divorce.
The commentary traces the roots of this split to the Yemen conflict, where the two nations' objectives began to diverge beneath a veneer of cooperation. While Saudi Arabia focused on the internationally recognized government, the UAE quietly cultivated a separatist movement in the south. The author notes that "Abu Dhabi began building its own network of influence in southern Yemen," a move that directly undermined Riyadh's central authority. This double game came to a head in late 2025, when Emirati-backed separatists seized control of oil-rich territories. In response, Saudi Arabia launched a counter-offensive that targeted Emirati assets, including the port of Mukala. Good Times Bad Times describes the outcome bluntly: "A decade-long Emirati project had been wiped out. And more than that, the UAE had been publicly humiliated by Muhammad bin Salman." This framing is powerful, painting a picture of a regional power struggle where former allies are now engaging in direct kinetic conflict.
The alliance had existed largely on paper for years. Behind the scenes, the two countries had already been competing intensely for influence.
Critics might note that the timeline presented here, projecting specific military victories in 2025 and 2026, relies on speculative scenarios rather than established fact. However, the underlying logic—that the UAE's support for separatists created a direct threat to Saudi sovereignty—is a well-documented tension that makes the hypothetical escalation plausible.
The Battle for Africa and the Gold Trade
The scope of the rivalry extends far beyond the Arabian Peninsula, with the author identifying Sudan and the Horn of Africa as critical new theaters. The piece details how the two Gulf powers are backing opposing sides in Sudan's brutal civil war. Saudi Arabia supports the national army, while the UAE is alleged to be funneling weapons and funding to the Rapid Support Forces. Good Times Bad Times writes, "The illegal trade in Sudanese gold is estimated to be worth around $13 billion with the bulk of these flows passing through the Emirates." This economic angle adds a layer of tangible motivation to the geopolitical maneuvering, suggesting that the conflict is driven as much by resource control as by ideology.
The author also highlights the UAE's extensive footprint in Somalia, where it secured port concessions and established military bases. The narrative takes a sharp turn when it describes how Saudi Arabia capitalized on a diplomatic rift to force Somalia to cancel these agreements. "In coordination with Riyadh, Somalia's federal government announced the cancellation of all agreements with Abu Dhabi, military and commercial alike," the text states. This section effectively illustrates how the rivalry is being exported to Africa, turning local conflicts into proxy battles for Gulf dominance. The argument here is that the competition is zero-sum; any gain for Abu Dhabi in Africa is viewed as a direct loss for Riyadh.
The End of the Iranian Threat and the Rise of a New Axis
The core of the author's thesis lies in the shifting regional security architecture. For over a decade, the shared threat of Iran kept the Saudi-UAE alliance intact. Good Times Bad Times argues that "As the primary threat fades, so does the logic of maintaining a costly strategic partnership." With the weakening of Iran's regional network and the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, the glue holding the two nations together has dissolved.
The author posits a more dangerous development: the emergence of a new alignment between Israel, the UAE, and the United States. This triangle, the piece suggests, could marginalize Saudi Arabia. "From Riyadh's perspective, this creates a dangerous scenario," the author writes. "In place of a weakening Iranian axis of resistance, a new triangle could emerge. Israel, the UAE, and the United States, shaping the future of the Middle East without Saudi Arabia." This is the most provocative part of the argument, suggesting that Saudi Arabia is now fighting a war of encirclement. The author contends that Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman is acting with urgency to prevent this outcome, pushing back against Emirati influence before it becomes irreversible.
Muhammad bin Salman simply no longer needs the UAE the way he did in 2015.
A counterargument worth considering is that the economic interdependence between the two nations, particularly in tourism and finance, might still act as a brake on total conflict. While the political rivalry is intense, the cost of a full-blown rupture could be prohibitive for both economies. The author acknowledges the economic dimension but seems to prioritize the security dilemma as the primary driver.
Bottom Line
Good Times Bad Times delivers a sharp, if speculative, analysis of a region in radical transition, successfully arguing that the Saudi-UAE alliance is dead and that their rivalry is now the central dynamic of the Middle East. The piece's greatest strength is its ability to connect disparate conflicts in Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia into a single, coherent narrative of Gulf competition. Its biggest vulnerability is its reliance on future-dated events to illustrate a trend that is still unfolding, but the strategic logic remains sound. Readers should watch for how the Saudi administration navigates this new reality, particularly as it seeks to balance its own Vision 2030 ambitions against the rising influence of the Israel-UAE axis.