Perun cuts through the fog of conventional military analysis to reveal a startling truth: NATO's traditional playbook for learning from foreign wars is broken, and the alliance is scrambling to build a new one before it's too late. By embedding with senior officers at a recent innovation event in Istanbul, the author exposes a critical gap between NATO's theoretical readiness and the brutal, Darwinian reality of the Ukrainian front. This is not just a report on drones; it is a forensic look at how a 30-nation alliance attempts to reverse-engineer survival from a war it is watching but not fighting.
The Failure of Traditional Observation
The core of Perun's argument rests on the collapse of historical precedents. For decades, nations learned from conflicts they didn't fight by sending observers or volunteers. Perun notes that "historically, one way to learn from a war that you're not fighting in, is to go fight in it, at least a little bit, sort of." He points to the German Condor Legion in the Spanish Civil War or North Korean troops in Russia as examples of this high-risk, high-reward strategy. However, he argues that in the modern context of nuclear escalation and political risk, "NATO doesn't have a large-scale observer mission in Ukraine."
This absence creates a dangerous blind spot. Perun explains that sending observers forward enough to see real combat would risk casualties and diplomatic fallout, leading decision-makers to conclude that "the juice ain't worth the squeeze." The result is a reliance on second-hand data rather than lived experience. Critics might note that this assessment underestimates the value of high-quality intelligence analysis and remote sensing, which can provide vast amounts of data without risking personnel. Yet, Perun's point stands: data is not the same as the visceral, tactical intuition gained only in the mud.
"If NATO can't go to Ukraine, then maybe Ukraine and its lessons can come to NATO."
The JKE Solution: Bringing the War to the Alliance
To solve this, Perun highlights the creation of the Joint Analysis Training and Education Center (JKE) in Poland, a unique entity that employs a permanent Ukrainian contingent. The logic is straightforward: "if NATO can't go to Ukraine, then maybe Ukraine and its lessons can come to NATO." This shift represents a fundamental change in how the alliance approaches doctrine. Instead of guessing how Russia fights, NATO is now inviting the people who are currently fighting Russia to teach them.
Perun describes how this is already happening in naval exercises, where Ukrainians serve as the "red team" to simulate Russian tactics more accurately. "The Ukrainians stepped in to play the red team, essentially trying to take on the role of the totally not Russians," he writes, ensuring that NATO trains against the enemy as it exists in 2025, not the version found in pre-war manuals. This is a potent argument for dynamic adaptation. The effectiveness of this approach lies in its ability to shatter assumptions. By letting Ukrainians adjudicate war games, NATO forces are forced to confront the reality of their own vulnerabilities rather than the comfort of their existing doctrines.
The Need for Head-to-Head Testing
The most provocative part of Perun's coverage is his call for direct, unscripted combat simulations. He argues that NATO needs to move beyond role-playing and allow Ukrainian units to bring their actual technology—drones, battle management systems, and communications—to test against NATO formations. "Let a Ukrainian infantry company with all those drones go up against a NATO company without them and just see what happens," he suggests. The goal is not competition but raw, unfiltered learning.
Perun warns against the bureaucratic constraints that often stifle such learning, such as airspace restrictions or safety protocols that prevent realistic testing. "The goal here wouldn't be competition. It would be learning and observing," he emphasizes. This is a crucial distinction. The military industrial complex often prioritizes the smooth operation of exercises over the messy, uncomfortable discovery of failure. By advocating for "company on company exercises" without "training restrictions," Perun is calling for a level of honesty in military preparation that is rare in peacetime.
Critics might argue that integrating active combat units into NATO exercises poses significant security risks and could blur the lines of engagement. However, Perun's framing suggests that the risk of being unprepared for a future conflict far outweighs the logistical and political challenges of these simulations.
"The scenario for that war game might have looked a bit different if there had been greater Ukrainian involvement in designing and umpiring it."
Bottom Line
Perun's strongest contribution is his identification of the JKE as a structural pivot point, moving NATO from passive observation to active integration of Ukrainian combat experience. The argument's greatest vulnerability lies in the political feasibility of running truly unrestricted, head-to-head simulations between Ukrainian and NATO forces, which may remain more of an ideal than a reality. Readers should watch closely to see if NATO can overcome its institutional inertia to let these lessons reshape its doctrine before the next conflict begins.