Brad DeLong delivers a stinging indictment of the current geopolitical trajectory, arguing that the administration has managed to engineer a strategic defeat in the Persian Gulf despite possessing overwhelming military superiority. This is not a story of battlefield losses, but of a catastrophic failure of statecraft where the pursuit of maximum pressure has resulted in a reality far worse than the diplomatic status quo the administration sought to destroy. For the busy reader tracking global stability, the urgency here is economic: the closure of the Strait of Hormuz threatens to sever the artery of global energy, and the proposed solutions are merely cosmetic attempts to mask a fundamental loss of leverage.
The Anatomy of a Strategic Defeat
DeLong begins by dismantling the initial assumption that a conflict with Iran would be a straightforward victory for the United States. "Ex ante, I would have said that it would be very difficult for the United States to lose a war with Iran. Yet Trump—somehow—seems to have managed," he writes. This framing is crucial because it shifts the blame from military capability to strategic incompetence. The administration's decision to abandon the nuclear deal and impose a blockade has not crippled the Iranian regime; instead, it has consolidated power within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). As DeLong notes, the IRGC now enjoys "overwhelming strength within the Iranian government for the foreseeable future," having been handed a narrative of resistance that validates their existence and expands their authority.
The human and economic cost of this miscalculation is already mounting. DeLong cites Dan Drezner to illustrate that while Iran may have lost some tactical capabilities, the broader strategic picture is grim. "The costs of the collateral damage of the war to the United States are rising," Drezner observes, noting that Russia and China are stepping in to fill the void left by American isolation. This is a classic case of unintended consequences, where the attempt to isolate an adversary only deepens their alliances with other global powers. Critics might argue that the administration's pressure tactics have degraded Iran's missile program, but DeLong counters that the regime is already "regenerat[ing] its ballistic missile forces program" while cementing a more radical government in Tehran.
The winners are Bibi Netanyahu as an individual and Iran's IRGC as an institution, because their ability to say 'we told you so' gives them overwhelming strength.
The Illusion of Control and the Strait of Hormuz
The piece takes a sharp turn into the specific mechanics of the Strait of Hormuz, a waterway through which one-fifth of the world's oil passes. DeLong contrasts the administration's bluster with the reality of the situation. The administration's threat to reopen the strait by force has met with a chillingly calm response from the IRGC: "We will do worse to you if you don't reopen the Strait of Hormuz!" says Trump. "How could it be worse?" says the IRGC. This exchange highlights the futility of threats that have already been exhausted. The administration has already paid the price of conflict, and now the IRGC is simply collecting the toll.
DeLong scrutinizes a proposal by Niall Ferguson, Richard Haass, and Philip Zelikow that attempts to rebrand this reality. They suggest a "Strait of Hormuz Company (SOHCO)" to manage transit fees, arguing it would be "designed to be done with Iran rather than to it." DeLong sees through this diplomatic veneer, suggesting it is merely a way to "whitewash" the fact that Iran will now collect transit tariffs. "The focus is not on what will the state of things be going forward that will produce a ceasefire in this war?" DeLong asks. "The focus is on: Not on Iran's terms... [Not] turn the seven other states... into its vassals." This reveals a desperate attempt by the foreign policy establishment to save face while accepting a outcome they previously warned against.
The historical parallel to the Siege of Melos is apt here: the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must. But in this instance, the strong (the US) have blundered into a position where they can no longer dictate terms to the weak (Iran), who have leveraged their geographic position to extract concessions. The administration's failure to maintain a broad international coalition, which would have included Arab and Asian partners, has left the US isolated. As DeLong points out, "Saudi willingness to spend the money needed to get Egyptian and Pakistani occupation forces into the theatre... is limited." Without this coalition, the US cannot enforce its will without risking a wider, more devastating conflict.
The Cost of Macho Irrealism
DeLong's most damning critique is directed at the intellectual class that enabled this disaster. He references a past column by Dan Drezner stating that American foreign policy is "being run by the dumbest motherfuckers alive," and applies that label to the current administration's handling of the crisis. The result is a "profound self-inflicted 'strategic defeat of the United States'." The administration's strategy of "macho irrealism," which DeLong traces from the ancient island of Melos to the modern Strait of Hormuz, has delivered catastrophe. This is not just a policy failure; it is a moral one, as the escalation of conflict inevitably leads to civilian suffering and regional instability.
The irony is palpable. The administration sought to demonstrate strength, but in doing so, it has weakened the United States' position globally. "Connecting the dots from the island of Melos to the Strait of Hormuz, foreign-policy macho irrealism usually delivers catastrophe... It is definitely what is happening," DeLong writes. The administration's actions have not only failed to achieve their stated goals but have actively undermined the very security interests they claimed to protect. The proposal for a new international company to manage the strait is a tacit admission that the US can no longer guarantee freedom of navigation on its own terms.
Mind you, that Trump is losing his Pearl-Harbor-in-reverse war with Iran does not mean that Iran is winning its war over Trump: both sides are and can be losers.
Bottom Line
Brad DeLong's analysis is a masterclass in connecting historical precedent to current geopolitical folly, exposing how the administration's aggressive posturing has backfired to create a more dangerous and unstable world. The strongest part of his argument is the unflinching identification of the IRGC and the administration's own political survival as the primary beneficiaries of this conflict, while the global economy pays the price. The biggest vulnerability in the current trajectory is the lack of a credible exit strategy; the proposed diplomatic fixes are merely cover for a strategic retreat. Readers should watch for the next phase of negotiations, where the reality of Iran's new toll-keeping status will likely be formalized, marking a permanent shift in the balance of power in the Persian Gulf.