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China's "father of robotics"

Jordan Schneider doesn't just trace the history of Chinese robotics; he excavates a forgotten era where 'artificial intelligence' meant steel mills and cold-rolling machines, not chatbots. This piece is a vital corrective to the modern obsession with digital models, revealing how the very concept of AI in China was born from the brutal necessities of industrial survival and the political turbulence of the Cultural Revolution. It forces the listener to reconsider the lineage of today's hardware giants, showing they are the grandchildren of engineers who once had to petition the state just to discuss the word 'intelligence.'

The Hardware Roots of AI

Schneider immediately dismantles the Silicon Valley-centric view of technological evolution. He writes, "To the average person today, 'AI' is synonymous with chatbots — or, at least, tools that exist only in the digital realm. Hardware manifestations, like humanoid robots or intelligent Roombas, are instead considered futuristic." This framing is crucial because it highlights a fundamental disconnect: while the West chased software, China's earliest AI pioneers were literally shoulder-to-shoulder with factory workers. The author argues that the origin story of Chinese AI is not found in the tech hubs of Hangzhou, but in the rusting industrial heartland of the Northeast.

China's "father of robotics"

The narrative centers on Jiang Xinsong, a scientist often called China's "father of robotics." Schneider notes that Jiang's work was "substantively different from deep-learning-driven robotics today," yet he was "thoroughly ahead of his time." This comparison to Qian Xuesen, the father of China's missile program, is particularly striking. Schneider points out that while Qian was deported from the US and built ballistic missiles, Jiang "never left the country until later in life" and did the same with industrial robots. The parallel suggests a deliberate state strategy to build self-reliance in critical technologies, a theme that echoes through the Sino-Soviet split when the USSR withdrew support, forcing China to develop its own automation.

"The Soviet Pravda claims to represent the truth, but in fact a lot of what Pravda publishes isn't true."

This quote from Jiang's early days illustrates the dangerous intellectual climate he navigated. Schneider uses this to show that Jiang was not a blind ideologue but a critical thinker who paid a heavy price for it. The author's choice to highlight Jiang's "Rightist Registration Form" adds a layer of human tragedy often missing from technological histories. It reminds us that the path to China's current industrial dominance was paved with the silenced voices of its own intellectuals.

Dancing in Shackles

The middle section of the piece is perhaps its most haunting, detailing how the Cultural Revolution nearly extinguished China's AI ambitions. Schneider describes how Jiang and his colleagues drafted a petition in 1972 titled On Artificial Intelligence and Robotics, which is arguably China's first policy proposal for the field. Yet, their vision was met with hostility. The author writes, "Radical students and scholars denounced AI and robotics as 'idealist pseudoscience' in magazines." This was not merely academic disagreement; it was a political attack where the concept of machines having "intelligence" was seen as a challenge to human supremacy and a dangerous import from the West.

Schneider includes a chilling excerpt from a 1970s magazine: "If artificial things can create 'intelligence,' then in the future something with 'intelligence' even more advanced than humans is bound to appear... We must take a stand against Deng Xiaoping." This quote reveals the depth of the ideological struggle. The resistance to AI wasn't just about technology; it was about the very definition of humanity and the political order. Schneider's observation that "historical records are otherwise thoroughly sanitized" is a powerful critique of how these struggles are remembered. He suggests that the official narrative of a "patriotic scientist" who was always "buoyant" might be a mask for the devastating reality of a decade lost.

Critics might argue that focusing on the political persecution of one scientist distracts from the broader systemic failures of the era. However, Schneider's focus on Jiang's personal resilience makes the systemic failure more tangible. It is not an abstract policy error but a human cost that delayed China's industrial modernization by years.

"Historical records are otherwise thoroughly sanitized; everywhere he is quoted, Jiang is resilient and grateful, never once resenting the Party, the academic system, or his fanatical accusers."

This line captures the essence of the author's challenge to the reader: to read between the lines of a sanitized history. Schneider implies that the true story lies in what is not said—the private dreams of scientists who were forbidden from traveling, whose papers were presented by others, and whose work was stretched out by a decade of political chaos. The reference to the Shenyang Institute of Automation (SIA) and its role in reviving the Showa Steel Works in Anshan grounds these abstract political struggles in the physical reality of steel and machinery.

From Engineer to Strategist

The narrative shifts with the death of Mao in 1976, marking a turning point where the state finally embraced the very ideas it had once condemned. Schneider describes the 1978-1985 All-China Science and Technology Development Planning Outline as a "landmark document" that made the earliest mentions of intelligent machines in Chinese policy. The author writes, "No longer was AI 'idealist pseudoscience': Beijing was finally endorsing scientists to embrace promising new ideas, unshackled by ideology." This pivot was not just a change in policy but a strategic recognition that the global scientific race required a different approach.

Jiang's first trip abroad in 1979 to the Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence in Tokyo is presented as a pivotal moment. Schneider notes that Jiang was "deeply attuned to the symbiotic relationship between institutional design and scientific innovation." This insight is the core of the author's argument: that China's rise in robotics was not just about technical skill, but about learning how to build the institutions that foster innovation. The author suggests that Jiang's experience in Japan, where robotics research was robustly conducted outside of universities, influenced his later strategic thinking.

"Researching and manufacturing robots is the natural direction of automating equipment manufacturing, and is an important sign of a country's strong and robust industrial development."

This quote from the 1972 petition, finally realized in the late 1970s, underscores the continuity of the vision despite the political interruptions. Schneider's framing of this as a "natural direction" implies that the drive for automation was an inevitable response to the needs of a modernizing economy, regardless of the political weather. The author's choice to highlight the specific date of the 1991 US export controls on autonomous-guided vehicles adds a layer of contemporary relevance, showing how historical patterns of containment and self-reliance continue to shape the present.

Bottom Line

Jordan Schneider's piece is a masterful blend of biography, political history, and technological analysis that reframes the story of Chinese AI as a struggle for industrial sovereignty rather than a digital revolution. Its greatest strength lies in its ability to humanize the abstract concept of AI, grounding it in the lives of engineers who fought against ideological currents to build a machine age. The biggest vulnerability is the reliance on sanitized official records, which forces the reader to infer the true emotional toll of the era, but this very gap invites a deeper engagement with the text. As the world watches the next generation of robots emerge from China, this history serves as a stark reminder that the path to technological dominance is often paved with silence and sacrifice.

Deep Dives

Explore these related deep dives:

  • Qian Xuesen

    The article invokes Qian as a political and scientific parallel to Jiang Xinsong to illustrate how state narratives elevate specific scientists as national fathers of technology while obscuring the complex interplay between their work and political purges.

  • Sino-Soviet split

    This geopolitical rupture explains why Jiang Xinsong's initial plan to study in the Soviet Union was aborted and why China was forced to develop its own autonomous vehicle technology in the 1990s after losing access to both Western and Soviet supply chains.

  • Shenyang Institute of Automation

    Understanding this specific research institute reveals the unique institutional ecosystem where China's first industrial AI was born, distinct from the modern tech giants, and highlights how state-run academies rather than private firms drove early automation.

Sources

China's "father of robotics"

by Jordan Schneider · ChinaTalk · Read full article

ChinaTalk analyst Aqib Zakaria yearns for the mines. He’s on a mission to visit rare earths and other critical minerals mining sites, refineries, and permanent magnet facilities around the world.

If you or anyone you know can help him fulfill this mission, please reach out to aqib@chinatalk.media.

Less than one in a thousand Chinese people owned private cars in the 1990s. But in 1993, a vehicle guided by a computer program landed on the floor of a car plant in Shenyang, capital of Liaoning province. Xianfeng 1 先锋1号 was the first of its kind in China, developed entirely by Chinese researchers.

The car plant had previously relied on American-made autonomous-guided vehicles, but the US tightened export controls in 1991 and cut off sales to China. The plant turned to the Shenyang Institute of Automation (SIA), an institution of China’s national academy, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). It was led by a scientist called Jiang Xinsong 蒋新松.

To the average person today, “AI” is synonymous with chatbots — or, at least, tools that exist only in the digital realm. Hardware manifestations, like humanoid robots or intelligent Roombas, are instead considered futuristic.

But “Chinese AI,” as an idea, did not necessarily begin with DeepSeek or tech companies in Hangzhou. It started on assembly lines in the Northeast, with dreams of intelligent oxygen furnaces for steel production and automated car plants. Some of the earliest champions of artificial intelligence research were not software engineers or information scientists, but those working shoulder-to-shoulder with factory workers.

As Chinese firms like Unitree became forerunners in the race to build autonomous robots, I grew curious about Jiang’s story. State media has dubbed him China’s “father of robotics.” His work — and what he would have conceived of as “artificial intelligence” — is substantively different from deep-learning-driven robotics today. However, the information scientist who petitioned Beijing for what arguably became China’s first industrial policy for AI was thoroughly ahead of his time.

Jiang is increasingly compared to figures like Qian Xuesen 钱学森 in official narratives. Qian, deported from the US under the Red Scare, fathered ballistic missiles and rockets; it is said that Jiang, who never left the country until later in life, did the same with industrial robots. These laudatory stories omit thornier, though more intriguing, parallels. Like Qian, Jiang’s life was one where science and politics were fair-weather friends.

The Road to Shenyang.

Jiang Xinsong ...