Wang Xiangwei makes a startling claim for a former editor of the South China Morning Post: Hong Kong's biggest strategic error has been its refusal to adopt the very planning mechanism it once feared. By arguing that the region must draft its own Five-Year Plan to survive, Wang transforms a bureaucratic proposal into a vital lifeline for a city caught between geopolitical tides. This is not merely about economic targets; it is a plea for Hong Kong to stop reacting to crises and start engineering its own future.
The Strategic Blind Spot
Wang Xiangwei opens by framing the Chief Executive's recent announcement as a long-overdue correction to a decades-long strategic failure. "After moving back to Hong Kong in November 2022, I have argued on various occasions that Hong Kong should follow the mainland's example and adopt a five-year plan, or even longer-term development strategies," Wang writes. The core of the argument rests on the inadequacy of the current annual Policy Address, which Wang describes as "focusing heavily on short-term targets for the coming year, lacking strategic medium-to-long-term thinking and guidance on lasting challenges such as housing and widening wealth inequality."
This critique lands with force because it exposes a structural weakness in Hong Kong's governance. The annual cycle forces leaders to chase immediate headlines rather than solve deep-rooted issues. Wang suggests that the reluctance to plan was rooted in an ideological "original sin," where the term "Five-Year Plan" was wrongly conflated with the rigid, inefficient command economies of the past. However, the author insists this fear is outdated. "The mainland's five-year plans today bear little resemblance to the rigid planned-economy targets of the past," Wang notes, pointing out that the terminology itself has evolved to "Five-Year Guideline" to reflect a more flexible, market-aware approach.
Critics might note that adopting a mainland-style planning framework could accelerate the erosion of Hong Kong's unique legal and economic autonomy, fueling the very "one country, one system" fears Wang seeks to allay. Yet, Wang counters that without a roadmap, the city is drifting. "In contrast, the Chief Executive's annual Policy Address tends to focus heavily on short-term targets... lacking strategic medium-to-long-term thinking," he argues, implying that the risk of inaction is far greater than the risk of integration.
Mentioning a Five-Year Plan immediately evokes associations with a planned economy. Furthermore, if Hong Kong were to adopt a Five-Year Plan, it would risk being perceived as being incorporated into the mainland's development framework.
Beyond the Annual Cycle
Wang Xiangwei draws a sharp contrast between the static nature of Hong Kong's current policy and the dynamic, evidence-based process used on the mainland. He details how the central government's planning involves a three-year cycle, mobilizing over 60 think tanks and producing hundreds of reports before a single goal is set. This stands in stark opposition to the fragmented nature of Hong Kong's recent efforts. "Regrettably, no timetables or roadmaps were provided for realizing these aspirations and goals," Wang writes regarding the Chief Executive's recent promises to build a gold trading market or a low-altitude economy.
The author's analysis suggests that the lack of a long-term vision is not just an administrative gap but a political vulnerability. He recalls a dismissive comment from a local business tycoon at a symposium: "This is Hong Kong. We don't do Five-Year Plans." Wang uses this anecdote to illustrate the entrenched mindset that prioritizes short-term comfort over long-term survival. The argument is compelling because it reframes the planning process not as an ideological surrender, but as a pragmatic necessity for navigating "intensifying Sino‑US rivalry."
Wang emphasizes that the benefits of such a plan extend beyond economics. "First, it will enable better integration into the overall national development," he writes, noting that without understanding the mainland's strategic direction, Hong Kong cannot effectively position itself. He also highlights the social dimension, arguing that a comprehensive plan is the only way to tackle issues like the housing crisis, which "cannot be resolved without the participation of the whole society."
A New Name for an Old Idea
Perhaps the most pragmatic part of Wang Xiangwei's commentary is his suggestion to sidestep the political toxicity of the name itself. He acknowledges that the term "Five-Year Plan" is a "third rail" that politicians avoid. "Could we rename it a Four-Year Plan or a Six-Year Plan instead?" Wang asks, proposing a semantic shift to bypass ideological baggage while retaining the strategic rigor. This move demonstrates a deep understanding of Hong Kong's political landscape, where perception often dictates policy viability.
The author insists that the Chief Executive must personally lead this effort to ensure it gains traction. "This means the Chief Executive of Hong Kong must personally take charge and lead the entire formulation process," Wang states, calling for the mobilization of government bureaus, universities, and foreign-funded institutions. The inclusion of American and European perspectives is crucial, Wang argues, as it ensures the plan remains globally competitive. "In particular, the views and suggestions of foreign-funded institutions in Hong Kong, especially American-funded ones, should be carefully heeded," he writes, a nod to the region's need to maintain its international financial hub status.
Critics might argue that even a renamed plan cannot fully escape the shadow of Beijing's influence, especially as the 15th Five-Year Guideline approaches. However, Wang's point is that a lack of a plan leaves Hong Kong entirely reactive, vulnerable to external shocks. By taking the initiative, the region can at least shape the narrative of its own integration.
The annual Policy Addresses of Hong Kong's Chief Executive mainly focus on short-term goals to be achieved within the year, lacking medium- and long-term strategic research and guidance for Hong Kong's long-term challenges.
Bottom Line
Wang Xiangwei's strongest argument is that Hong Kong's refusal to plan is a form of strategic suicide in an era of global volatility. His biggest vulnerability lies in the assumption that a planning mechanism can be decoupled from the political reality of increasing mainland integration. The reader should watch to see if the Chief Executive can deliver a plan that is genuinely Hong Kong-centric or if it becomes merely a local echo of Beijing's directives.